JAMES P. DONOHUE, Chief Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff Natalie Brown appeals the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("Commissioner") that denied her application for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-33, after a hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ"). For the reasons set forth below, the Court recommends that the Commissioner's decision be REVERSED and REMANDED for further administrative proceedings.
Plaintiff is a 39-year-old woman with an associate's degree and additional college coursework. Administrative Record ("AR") at 51, 162. Her past work experience includes employment as a estimator, drafter, manufacturing designer, sales representative, office coordinator, and assistant manager of a video rental store. AR at 169. Plaintiff was last gainfully employed in May 2011. Id.
On November 7, 2012, she filed an application for DIB, alleging an onset date of May 8, 2011.
The Commissioner denied Plaintiff's claim initially and on reconsideration. AR at 95-97, 108-09. Plaintiff requested a hearing, which took place on February 13, 2014. AR at 30-69. On March 11, 2014, the ALJ issued a decision finding Plaintiff not disabled and denied benefits based on her finding that Plaintiff could perform a specific job existing in significant numbers in the national economy. AR at 10-24. Plaintiff's administrative appeal of the ALJ's decision was denied by the Appeals Council, AR at 1-5, making the ALJ's ruling the "final decision" of the Commissioner as that term is defined by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). On July 30, 2015, Plaintiff timely filed the present action challenging the Commissioner's decision. Dkt. 1, 3.
Jurisdiction to review the Commissioner's decision exists pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3).
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court may set aside the Commissioner's denial of social security benefits when the ALJ's findings are based on legal error or not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1214 (9th Cir. 2005). "Substantial evidence" is more than a scintilla, less than a preponderance, and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989). The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and resolving any other ambiguities that might exist. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). While the Court is required to examine the record as a whole, it may neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). When the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, it is the Commissioner's conclusion that must be upheld. Id.
As the claimant, Ms. Brown bears the burden of proving that she is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act (the "Act"). Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1113 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal citations omitted). The Act defines disability as the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity" due to a physical or mental impairment which has lasted, or is expected to last, for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). A claimant is disabled under the Act only if her impairments are of such severity that she is unable to do her previous work, and cannot, considering her age, education, and work experience, engage in any other substantial gainful activity existing in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A); see also Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 1999).
The Commissioner has established a five step sequential evaluation process for determining whether a claimant is disabled within the meaning of the Act. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. The claimant bears the burden of proof during steps one through four. At step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner. Id. If a claimant is found to be disabled at any step in the sequence, the inquiry ends without the need to consider subsequent steps. Step one asks whether the claimant is presently engaged in "substantial gainful activity." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b).
When the claimant's impairment neither meets nor equals one of the impairments listed in the regulations, the Commissioner must proceed to step four and evaluate the claimant's residual functional capacity ("RFC"). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). Here, the Commissioner evaluates the physical and mental demands of the claimant's past relevant work to determine whether she can still perform that work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f). If the claimant is able to perform her past relevant work, she is not disabled; if the opposite is true, then the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five to show that the claimant can perform other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy, taking into consideration the claimant's RFC, age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g); Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1099, 1100. If the Commissioner finds the claimant is unable to perform other work, then the claimant is found disabled and benefits may be awarded.
On March 11, 2014, the ALJ issued a decision finding the following:
AR at 12-23.
The principal issues on appeal are:
1. Whether the ALJ erred in assessing medical opinion evidence; and
2. Whether the ALJ erred in discounting lay witness statements. Dkt. 11 at 1.
Plaintiff challenges the ALJ's assessment of opinions rendered by consulting psychologist John T. Lloyd, Ph.D., and treating psychologist Anne Leefeldt Kanters, Ph.D. Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ erred in assessing the opinions of State agency reviewing consultants. The Court will address each disputed opinion in turn.
As a matter of law, more weight is given to a treating physician's opinion than to that of a non-treating physician because a treating physician "is employed to cure and has a greater opportunity to know and observe the patient as an individual." Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751; see also Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 631 (9th Cir. 2007). A treating physician's opinion, however, is not necessarily conclusive as to either a physical condition or the ultimate issue of disability, and can be rejected, whether or not that opinion is contradicted. Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751. If an ALJ rejects the opinion of a treating or examining physician, the ALJ must give clear and convincing reasons for doing so if the opinion is not contradicted by other evidence, and specific and legitimate reasons if it is. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1988). "This can be done by setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings." Id. (citing Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751). The ALJ must do more than merely state his/her conclusions. "He must set forth his own interpretations and explain why they, rather than the doctors', are correct." Id. (citing Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 421-22 (9th Cir. 1988)). Such conclusions must at all times be supported by substantial evidence. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 725.
The opinions of examining physicians are to be given more weight than non-examining physicians. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). Like treating physicians, the uncontradicted opinions of examining physicians may not be rejected without clear and convincing evidence. Id. An ALJ may reject the controverted opinions of an examining physician only by providing specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by the record. Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1216.
Opinions from non-examining medical sources are to be given less weight than treating or examining doctors. Lester, 81 F.3d at 831. However, an ALJ must always evaluate the opinions from such sources and may not simply ignore them. In other words, an ALJ must evaluate the opinion of a non-examining source and explain the weight given to it. Social Security Ruling 96-6p, 1996 WL 374180, at *2 (Jul. 2, 1996). Although an ALJ generally gives more weight to an examining doctor's opinion than to a non-examining doctor's opinion, a non-examining doctor's opinion may nonetheless constitute substantial evidence if it is consistent with other independent evidence in the record. Thomas, 278 F.3d at 957; Orn, 495 F.3d at 632-33.
Dr. Kanters treated Plaintiff "off and on" between November 2004 and April 2013, and wrote a narrative report in February 2014 summarizing the treatment history, and concluding that she "obviously cannot work." AR at 381-84. The ALJ gave "minimal to no weight" to Dr. Kanters' opinion, for the following reasons:
AR at 22. Plaintiff argues
The Court agrees with Plaintiff. Dr. Kanters did opine that Plaintiff's symptoms worsened over the last year of their treatment relationship, and Dr. Kanters attributed the worsening symptoms to an exacerbation of an underlying bipolar disorder, triggered by the use of a non-prescribed medication. AR at 22, 383-84. Even if, as suggested by Dr. Kanters, a manic episode was triggered by Plaintiff's use of a non-prescribed medication, the episode persisted long after she had taken the medication and resulted in serious functional limitations, including a suicide attempt. The Commissioner's brief even acknowledges that Plaintiff's symptoms did worsen to at least some degree during that period, contrary to the ALJ's findings. Dkt. 12 at 7-8 (referencing Plaintiff's suicide attempts and threats to Dr. Kanters).
Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ's interpretation of the evidence related to her artwork is unreasonable, because her behavior at art shows indicates that she was not as successful as the ALJ found her to be. See AR at 22; Dkt. 13 at 4-5. The main source of information regarding Plaintiff's behavior at art shows is her mother's testimony, which the ALJ improperly discounted (as discussed infra). Accordingly, because the ALJ must reconsider Plaintiff's mother's statements on remand, the ALJ shall also reconsider on remand whether Plaintiff's behavior at art shows, as described therein, are consistent with Dr. Kanters' opinion.
Dr. Lloyd examined Plaintiff in February 2013 and wrote a narrative report summarizing Plaintiff's symptoms and his own conclusions. AR at 334-38. Dr. Lloyd's medical source statement reads in its entirety:
AR at 338. The ALJ gave some weight to the portion of Dr. Lloyd's opinion wherein he indicated that Plaintiff could complete simple and complex tasks, but rejected his opinion regarding social limitations, finding that Plaintiff could tolerate "a variety of social settings." AR at 19-20. The ALJ's RFC assessment specifically limited Plaintiff to working in the same room (but not in coordination) with up to five co-workers, but that she can have only superficial contact with co-workers or the general public. AR at 15. The ALJ also found Plaintiff capable of occasional interaction with supervisors. Id.
The Court finds the ALJ's discussion of Dr. Lloyd's opinion to be inadequate. The ALJ failed to discuss Dr. Lloyd's Global Assessment of Functioning score, and also failed to discuss Dr. Lloyd's opinion regarding Plaintiff's prognosis. On remand, the ALJ shall discuss all of Dr. Lloyd's opinions, including these portions.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in relying on State agency opinions because they were rendered before Dr. Kanters' February 2014 opinion was written. Dkt. 11 at 14. Plaintiff does not explain why the timing of the State agency opinions divests the opinions of any probative value. While it may be true that the State agency opinions predate Dr. Kanters' opinion, the ALJ reviewed all of the evidence in the record at the time of her decision and Plaintiff has not identified any particular error in the ALJ's assessment of the State agency opinions. The ALJ may reconsider these opinions as necessary on remand.
Plaintiff's mother, Katherine Brown, wrote multiple statements describing Plaintiff's symptoms and limitations. AR at 181-88, 242-48, 347-51. The ALJ summarized Ms. Brown's statements and gave them minimal weight, because Plaintiff's work history and Ms. Brown's statements themselves indicated that Plaintiff's symptoms were present even when she was employed, and the records do not "indicate a drastic worsening of these impairments, despite the claimant's lack of prescribed psychiatric medication." AR at 20.
In order to determine whether a claimant is disabled, an ALJ may consider lay-witness sources, such as testimony from "non-medical" sources, such as spouses, parents, siblings, and friends. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(d). Such testimony regarding a claimant's symptoms or how an impairment affects his/her ability to work is competent evidence, and cannot be disregarded without comment. Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 918-19 (9th Cir. 1993). If an ALJ chooses to discount testimony of a lay witness, he must provide "reasons that are germane to each witness," and may not simply categorically discredit the testimony. Dodrill, 12 F.3d at 919.
In this case, the ALJ failed to provide a germane reason to discount Ms. Brown's statements. Ms. Brown repeatedly suggested that Plaintiff's symptoms had been longstanding in duration, in existence during the period when she was working full-time. See, e.g., AR at 181, 188, 242, 347-49. In the absence of evidence that a condition has worsened, a claimant's ability to work with a longstanding condition undermines an allegation of disability. See Drouin v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1255, 1258 (9th Cir. 1992); Gregory v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 664, 666-67 (9th Cir. 1988). As explained in the previous section, evidence shows that Plaintiff's symptoms did worsen after her alleged onset date, contrary to the ALJ's findings. Accordingly, Plaintiff's ability to work when less symptomatic does not undermine the veracity of Plaintiff's mother's statements. On remand, the ALJ shall reconsider Plaintiff's mother's statements.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court recommends that this case be REVERSED and REMANDED for further administrative proceedings. A proposed order accompanies this Report and Recommendation.
Objections to this Report and Recommendation, if any, should be filed with the Clerk and served upon all parties to this suit by no later than
This Report and Recommendation is not an appealable order. Thus, a notice of appeal seeking review in the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit should not be filed until the assigned District Judge acts on this Report and Recommendation.
The Court does, however, find that reassigning this case to a different ALJ on remand is appropriate, to ensure a full and fair hearing for Plaintiff.
