Filed: Nov. 16, 2005
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: Opinions of the United 2005 Decisions States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 11-16-2005 Arroyo v. Comm Social Security Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential Docket No. 04-4739 Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2005 Recommended Citation "Arroyo v. Comm Social Security" (2005). 2005 Decisions. Paper 223. http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2005/223 This decision is brought to you for free and open access b
Summary: Opinions of the United 2005 Decisions States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 11-16-2005 Arroyo v. Comm Social Security Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential Docket No. 04-4739 Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2005 Recommended Citation "Arroyo v. Comm Social Security" (2005). 2005 Decisions. Paper 223. http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2005/223 This decision is brought to you for free and open access by..
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Opinions of the United
2005 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
11-16-2005
Arroyo v. Comm Social Security
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 04-4739
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2005
Recommended Citation
"Arroyo v. Comm Social Security" (2005). 2005 Decisions. Paper 223.
http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2005/223
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova
University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2005 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 04-4739
____________
EDWIN ARROYO,
Appellant
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. No. 01-cv-05717)
District Judge: Honorable William J. Martini
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 23, 2005
Before: ROTH, McKEE and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
(Filed November 16, 2005)
____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
FISHER, Circuit Judge.
Edwin Arroyo appeals from the District Court’s order affirming the Commissioner
of Social Security’s denial of his application for disability insurance benefits (DIB) and
supplemental security income (SSI). Arroyo challenges the determination of the
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) at step three of the five-step evaluation process
promulgated by the Social Security Administration to determine whether an individual is
disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. At step three, the ALJ concluded that
Arroyo’s impairments did not meet or equal the criteria for a listed impairment. For the
reasons stated below, we will affirm the order of the District Court.
I.
We apply the same standard of review as the District Court, and review the ALJ’s
decision to determine whether it is based on substantial evidence. Burnett v.
Commissioner, 220 F.3d 112, 118 (3d Cir. 2000). “Substantial evidence” has been
defined as “more than a mere scintilla,” and as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate” to support a conclusion.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
The Social Security Administration has promulgated a five-step evaluation process
to determine whether an individual is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. In
step one, the Commissioner decides whether the claimant is currently engaging in
substantial gainful activity. If so, the claimant is not eligible for DIB or SSI. Id.
§§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). In step two, the Commissioner determines whether the
claimant is suffering from a severe impairment. If the impairment is not severe, the
claimant is not eligible for benefits.
Id. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). In step three, the
Commissioner evaluates whether the evidence establishes that the claimant suffers from a
listed impairment. If so, the claimant is automatically eligible for benefits; if not, the
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Commissioner proceeds to the next step. Id. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). In step four,
the Commissioner reviews whether the claimant retains the “residual functional capacity”
to perform his or her past relevant work. If so, the claimant is not eligible for DIB or SSI.
Id. §§ 404.1520(e), (f), 416.920(e), (f). Finally, in step five, the Commissioner
determines whether the claimant can make a transition to other work. In making this
determination, the Commissioner considers the claimant’s age, education, work
experience, and residual functional capacity.
Id. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g).
The ALJ, following the five-step sequential analysis discussed above, made the
following findings: (1) Arroyo has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the
alleged onset of disability; (2) he has bilateral pes planus deformity with foot and ankle
pain, a combination of impairments considered severe under applicable regulations;
(3) his medically determinable impairments do not meet or medically equal one of the
listed impairments; (4) he is unable to perform any of his past relevant work; and
(5) based on Arroyo’s exertional capacity for sedentary work, and his age, education, and
work experience, a finding of “not disabled” is directed by Medical Vocational Rule
201.28.
II.
Arroyo challenges the ALJ’s step-three conclusion, alleging that the ALJ failed to
compare the combination of his severe impairments to any of the listed impairments.
Arroyo’s argument is based on the fact that the ALJ did not specifically mention any of
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the listed impairments. Arroyo also points to an apparently conclusory statement on page
seven of the ALJ’s decision.1
We agree with the District Court that only two listed impairments were potentially
relevant to Arroyo, and that the ALJ properly compared Arroyo’s combined impairments
with those two listings. Listing 1.03, titled “[a]rthritis of a major weight-bearing joint
(due to any cause),” requires “marked limitation of motion or abnormal motion of the
affected joint.” Viewed as a whole, the ALJ’s decision clearly indicates that he
considered the factors relevant to this listing. The ALJ cited medical reports that
indicated that Arroyo had “no significant evidence of osteoarthritis” and a “mildly limited
range of motion in each ankle.”
The other relevant listing, Listing 1.09, is titled “[a]mputation or anatomical
deformity of … [b]oth hands or [b]oth feet; or [o]ne hand and one foot.” The listing
provides examples of equivalents such as “loss of major function due to degenerative
changes associated with vascular or neurological deficits, traumatic loss of muscle mass
or tendons and X-ray evidence of bony ankylosis at an unfavorable angle, joint
subluxation or instability.” The ALJ cited medical reports that found that Arroyo had “no
significant evidence of … degenerative change,” that his “hands were within normal
1
After a significant discussion of Arroyo’s claim, the ALJ made several findings.
At step-three, the ALJ found that, “[t]hese medically determinable impairments do not
meet or medically equal one of the listed impairments in Appendix 1, Subpart P,
Regulation No. 4.”
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limits,” that his “left ankle was within normal limits,” that he “showed no … muscle
weakness,” that there was “no orthopedic abnormality except for somewhat limited range
of motion in the left ankle,” and that his right ankle had normal range of motion. In
addition, the ALJ noted that X-rays of both the feet and ankles showed that the right ankle
was “a normal ankle joint with a calcaneal spur” and the left ankle was subject to “mild
osteoarthritis of the tibiotalar joint.” Thus, analysis of the entire decision shows that the
ALJ did in fact consider Listings 1.03 and 1.09.
Arroyo, however, claims that the ALJ violated our directive in Burnett by failing to
adequately explain his reasoning at step three of the Commissioner’s five-step analysis.
“To be sure, in Burnett we required ‘the ALJ to set forth the reasons for his decision,’ and
held that the ALJ’s bare conclusory statement that an impairment did not match, or is not
equivalent to, a listed impairment [is] insufficient.” Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 504
(3d Cir. 2004) (quoting
Burnett, 220 F.3d at 119-20). However, the ALJ’s step three
analysis in this case satisfies Burnett. As we stated in Jones, “Burnett does not require
the ALJ to use particular language or adhere to a particular format in conducting his
analysis. Rather, the function of Burnett is to ensure that there is sufficient development
of the record and explanation of findings to permit meaningful review.”
Id. at 505.
We agree with the District Court that the ALJ sufficiently explained his reasoning
so as not to run afoul of this Court’s requirement that an ALJ’s decision be explained in a
manner sufficient to ensure “meaningful judicial review.” Burnett, 220 F.3d at 119. In
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Burnett, the ALJ had set forth only a conclusion. Here, we have more than that. The ALJ
specifically discussed the considerations relevant to two specific listings. Although we
would encourage ALJs to specifically identify the listed impairments under consideration,
we are able to discern the particular listed impairments considered in this cased based on
the ALJ’s discussion of the relevant evidence and his related conclusion that Arroyo’s
combined impairments were not severe enough to “meet or medically equal one of the
listed impairments.” The ALJ’s step three analysis satisfies the requirements of Burnett.
Arroyo also argues that the ALJ did not seriously consider his subjective
complaints of pain. The ALJ may consider a claimant’s subjective complaints of pain at
step three of the sequential analysis. However, “[a]n individual’s statement as to pain or
other symptoms shall not alone be conclusive evidence of disability.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 423(d)(5)(A). Rather, the pain reported by the claimant “must be associated with
relevant abnormal signs or laboratory findings” that are supported by medical records. 20
C.F.R. § 404, subpt. P, app. 1.
It is true that pain “might suggest a greater severity of impairment than can be
shown by objective medical evidence alone.” A claimant may therefore submit other
evidence for consideration, such as his daily activities; the duration, frequency, and
intensity of the pain; the types of medication taken for the pain; and any other measures
taken to alleviate pain. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3)(i-vii), 416.929(c)(3)(i-vii).
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After carefully considering all the evidence before him, including evidence of the
nature discussed above, the ALJ concluded that the claimant’s credibility concerning
allegations of pain and limited concentration was low. Substantial evidence supports the
ALJ’s conclusion. Arroyo’s testimony regarding his daily activities belies his claims of
severe pain. Moreover, Arroyo testified that he took only an occasional over-the-counter
painkiller for his pain, and never discussed his pain with his doctor. As substantial
evidence supports the ALJ’s credibility determination, we find no error in it.
III.
In addition to reviewing Arroyo’s specific arguments, we have reviewed the
administrative record in its entirety and conclude that the ALJ’s decision to deny benefits
is based on substantial evidence.
Accordingly, we will affirm the order of the District Court.
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