Memorandum Opinion by Justice LETICIA HINOJOSA.
Appellant Jairus Pegues, a pro se litigant, appeals from a judgment granting appellee Adecco USA, Inc. declaratory and permanent injunctive relief. Pegues' brief purports to raise twenty-one issues, of which only two are cognizable. As best we can tell, Pegues complains that (1) the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in Adecco's favor on the ground that its suit was barred by the statute of limitations and (2) the summary judgment rule is unconstitutional. We affirm.
Adecco, a temporary staffing company, employed Pegues. In August 2005, Adecco placed Pegues with Pittsburgh Glass Works (PWG). At some point, PWG requested that Pegues be removed from the temporary assignment. In January 2009, Adecco terminated Pegues. Thereafter, Pegues instituted a lawsuit in state court,
After being terminated, Pegues sued, among others, the Texas Workforce Commission, PGW, and Adecco in state district court (the first lawsuit). Adecco answered Pegues' suit. According to Adecco, the trial court severed Pegues' judicial review of the Texas Workforce Commission's decision on unemployment compensation benefits from the claims Pegues asserted against Adecco
In March 2011, the trial court signed a default judgment that provided in part:
There is no indication that any of the parties received notice of the hearing that resulted in the first default judgment. Two days later, the trial court signed an order setting aside and vacating the first default judgment. Eight days after the vacatur, the trial court signed a second default judgment that is identical to the first default judgment. Again, there is no indication that any of the parties received notice of the hearing that resulted in the second default judgment. According to the clerk's file stamp, the second default judgment was signed at 9:22 a.m. At 3:05 p.m. on the same day, the trial court signed an order setting aside and vacating the second default judgment.
In April 2011, the trial court dismissed, with prejudice, Pegues' claims against, among others, Adecco and assessed attorneys' fees against Pegues in the event he appealed. Pegues attempted to appeal from the dismissal order, but the Third Court of Appeals dismissed his appeal. See Pegues v. Tex. Workforce Comm'n, No. 03-11-00299-CV, 2012 WL 1959325, at *2 (Tex. App.-Austin May 25, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.).
On Friday, October 21, 2011, while the appeal from the dismissal order was pending, Pegues filed a judgment lien in a Travis County justice court in the amount of $5,639,180.80 against Adecco based on the first vacated default judgment. Adecco instituted a new legal proceeding with the filing of a "Motion for Judicial Review of Documentation Purporting to Create a Judgment Lien and Motion to Vacate and Set Aside Same" (the second lawsuit). In February 2012, the trial court held:
On Friday, March 9, 2012, Pegues filed a second judgment lien in a Travis County justice court. The second judgment lien was premised on the second vacated default judgment and was also in the amount of $5,639,180.80.
In addition to filing judgment liens, Pegues tried to collect on the two vacated default judgments directly and through what appears to be a collection agency.
In October 2014, the comment section of a fax coversheet Pegues sent to a representative of Adecco stated, "liens have been active for two years and have accrued considerable interest. Also notice the court dismissed Adecco USA INC case to get lien removed (see notice of court setting)." Adecco's counsel responded to Pegues:
Pegues replied:
In November 2014, the same Adecco representative received correspondence from Jillian Martin with Silverstone, Taylor & Klein
In May 2015, Pegues sent a second fax coversheet to an Adecco representative with the comment section stating, "The lien has not been satisfied and is currently at $9,051,957.07."
In October 2015, Adecco filed the underlying lawsuit seeking declaratory relief regarding the two judgment liens and injunctive relief to restrict Pegues from filing further judgment liens premised on the two vacated default judgments (the third lawsuit). Pegues answered and filed a "countersuit," asserting:
Adecco moved for traditional summary judgment on its request for relief and a no-evidence summary judgment on Pegues' "countersuit." On May 3, 2016, the trial court set Adecco's summary-judgment motions for hearing on May 25, 2016. On May 13, 2016, Pegues responded to Adecco's motion for traditional summary judgment. Attached to Pegues' response is an affidavit wherein he states, "I attest and affirm that the statements of fact and the evidence attached to it are true and correct." Also attached to Pegues' response are letters from Adecco's counsel, postal tracking receipts, a receipt from the district clerk's office, and various filings. On May 23, 2016, Pegues filed his own motion for summary judgment.
On May 25, 2016, the trial court heard Adecco's motions for summary judgment and signed a "Final Judgment and Permanent Injunction," which provides in relevant part:
The trial court also ordered Pegues to pay Adecco $8,700 for attorneys' fees that it had incurred at the trial-court level and attorneys' fees at the appellate level. Pegues filed a "Motion to Vacate Final Judgment and Permanent Injunction and for Re-Trial." No ruling was obtained on Pegues' filing. This appeal followed.
Initially, we note that pro se litigants must comply with the same procedural rules followed by represented parties, and we cannot hold pro se litigants to a different standard than applied to represented parties. Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184-85 (Tex. 1978). In Pegues' brief, he purports to raise twenty-one issues but fails to reference a single appellate court opinion. Pegues' brief is, without question, multifarious. An issue is multifarious when it generally attacks the trial court's order with numerous arguments. See Hollifield v. Hollifield, 925 S.W.2d 153, 155 (Tex. App.-Austin 1996, no writ); Clancy, 705 S.W.2d at 823. We may disregard any assignment of error that is multifarious. See Hollifield, 925 S.W.2d at 155; Clancy, 705 S.W.2d at 824. Alternatively, we may consider a multifarious issue if we can determine, with reasonable certainty, the error about which complaint is made. See Green v. Kaposta, 152 S.W.3d 839, 842 n. 2 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.).
We have reviewed Pegues' brief, and conclude with reasonable certainty that it presents only two cognizable issues: (1) the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in Adecco's favor because its suit was barred by the statute of limitations; and (2) the summary judgment rule is unconstitutional.
We review a trial court's granting of a traditional motion for summary judgment under a de novo standard of review. Creditwatch, Inc. v. Jackson, 157 S.W.3d 814, 816 n.7 (Tex. 2005). To obtain relief via a traditional motion for summary judgment, the movant must establish that no material fact issue exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); see Garza v. Exel Logistics, Inc., 161 S.W.3d 473, 475 n.10 (Tex. 2005); Mowbray v. Avery, 76 S.W.3d 663, 690 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002, pet. denied). After the movant produces evidence sufficient to show it is entitled to summary judgment, the non-movant must then present evidence raising a fact issue. See Walker v. Harris, 924 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Tex. 1996).
To defeat summary judgment by raising an affirmative defense, such as limitations, see TEX. R. CIV. P. 94, the non-movant, Pegues in this case, must do more than just plead the affirmative defense.
As best we can tell, Pegues believes that the four-year residual statute of limitations, see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.051 (West, Westlaw through 2017 R.S.), controls Adecco's request for declaratory and injunctive relief. He argues that Adecco's lawsuit is barred by limitations because it was filed on October 23, 2015, and the first lien, premised on the first vacated default judgment, was filed in the Travis County justice court on Friday, October 21, 2011. Assuming, without deciding, that the four-year residual statute of limitation applies, we are not convinced that Adecco's claim in the instant case accrued on Friday, October 21, 2011. Cf. Diversicare Gen. Partner, Inc. v. Rubio, 185 S.W.3d 842, 846 (Tex. 2005) (holding that a defendant moving for summary judgment on the affirmative defense of limitations has the burden to conclusively establish that defense, including the accrual date of the cause of action).
When a cause of action accrues is question of law, not fact. Holy Cross Church of God in Christ v. Wolf, 44 S.W.3d 562, 567 (Tex. 2001). On this record, it is clear that Pegues obtained two default judgments against Adecco, a party who had answered, without notifying Adecco of the hearings that resulted in the default judgments. The default judgments were vacated and set aside. A reasonable and prudent person would not expect the filing of judgment liens premised on vacated default judgments. We conclude that, under the facts of this case, Adecco's claim as to each judgment lien accrued when it received actual notice of the judgment lien in question.
Pegues failed to present sufficient evidence to raise the affirmative defense of limitations. See Brownlee, 665 S.W.2d at 112. The first event in the record that evidences Adecco's actual knowledge of the first judgment lien occurred on December 2, 2011, when it instituted a proceeding in state district court to vacate and set aside the lien. Accordingly, Adecco's lawsuit was timely filed.
Pegues' first issue is overruled.
In what we consider to be Pegues' second issue, he contends that the rendition of relief in a summary judgment is unconstitutional "pursuant to the Seventh Amendment" because it denies him his "Constitutional Right to a Jury Trial." But, when a party cannot show a material fact issue, there is nothing to submit to a jury, and the granting of summary judgment to the opposing party does not violate the constitutional right to a jury trial. Fertic v. Spencer, 247 S.W.3d 242, 251 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2007, no pet.) (citing Martin v. Commercial Metals Co., 138 S.W.3d 619, 627 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, no pet.); Lattrell v. Chrysler Corp., 79 S.W.3d 141, 150 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, no pet.)).
Pegues' second issue is overruled.
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
