JOHN A. GIBNEY, Jr., District Judge.
James E. Curtis, a Virginia prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Curtis challenges his convictions for multiple sexual crimes against his underage step-daughter in the Circuit Court for the County of Spotsylvania. Respondent has moved to dismiss on the ground that Curtis's claims lack merit. Curtis has responded. The matter is ripe for disposition.
Curtis contends that he did not receive the effective assistance of counsel because:
Claim 1(a) Counsel "failed to explain and breakdown to the Petitioner, that based on his defense (black mailed, etc.), the Commonwealth could merely arguably prove the statutory charges dealing with the fact that the victim was under age." (§ 2254 Pet. 15.)
Claim 1(b)(i) Counsel failed to interview: (1) Glona Jackson, "victim's special-ed teacher;" (id. at 16); (2)"Kaylan Brown & Carilan Brown (sisters) friends of the victim, whom [sic] know the . . . full name of `Faith' the victim's best friend. . . (Faith) knows of the victim['s] sexual relations with her boyfriend (`D.J.') . . . ." (Id.)
Claim 2(b)(ii) Counsel failed to obtain: (1) the victim's phone records; and (2) "all relevant documents which will support that the victim told several lies and that she at one time blamed a (tampon) for taking her virginity." (Id.)
On November 21, 2008, three days before his scheduled jury trial, Curtis pled guilty to one count of indecent liberties, two counts of rape,
During his plea proceedings, Curtis asked the Court to accept the following stipulation of facts with respect to his offenses:
Commonwealth v. Curtis, No. CR08001071; CR08001099-CR08001104, R. at 31-32 (Va. Cir. Ct. filed Nov. 21, 2008). Both K.Y.'s diary entry and Curtis's letter substantially corroborated the above account of Curtis's guilt.
By pleading guilty, Curtis avoided at least one mandatory term of life imprisonment. Prior to the incidents involving K.Y., Curtis had been convicted of rape. The Commonwealth initially charged Curtis with two counts of rape-second offense, which requires a mandatory term of life imprisonment under section 18.2-67.5:3 of the Virginia Code.
On February 6, 2009, Curtis moved to withdraw his guilty pleas. Curtis asserted that counsel had "intimidated" him into pleading guilty. (Feb. 6, 2009 Tr. 12.) During the course of the hearing on the motion to withdraw, however, Curtis could not articulate any coherent, plausible basis for withdrawing his pleas. Specifically, after hearing Curtis's testimony the Circuit Court stated, "I've not heard anything that would indicate a foundation for allowing you to withdraw your guilty pleas, no misunderstanding or misapprehension of the facts that were asserted against you, no fraud upon you, no undue influence upon you." (Id. at 42.) The Circuit Court further stated, "I've heard no statement of any defense that would warrant the withdrawal of your guilty plea." (Id.) The Circuit Court denied Curtis's Motion to Withdraw his guilty plea.
On February 9, 2009, Curtis appeared for sentencing. At sentencing, Curtis testified that K.Y. had instigated all of the sexual contact. Curtis testified that he only continued to engage in sex with K.Y. after the first act, because K.Y. threatened to go to the authorities. The Circuit Court sentenced Curtis to a total active term of imprisonment of sixty years.
Curtis pursued an unsuccessful direct appeal and a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the state courts. Because the details of those proceedings do not impact the Court's analysis of Curtis's current claims for relief, the Court declines to recite the details of those proceedings here.
To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show first, that counsel's representation was deficient and second, that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To satisfy the deficient performance prong of Strickland, the defendant must overcome the `"strong presumption' that counsel's strategy and tactics fall `within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.'" Burch v. Corcoran, 273 F.3d 577, 588 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). In analyzing ineffective assistance of counsel claims, it is not necessary to determine whether counsel performed deficiently if the claim is readily dismissed for lack of prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.
The second component of Strickland, the prejudice component, requires a defendant to "show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. In the context of a guilty plea, the Supreme Court modified the second prong of Strickland to require a showing that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, [petitioner] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).
Curtis's assertion that he would not have pled guilty if he had received better assistance from counsel is not dispositive of the issue of prejudice. See United States v. Mora-Gomez, 875 F.Supp. 1208, 1214 (E.D. Va. 1995). Rather, "[t]his is an objective inquiry and [highly] dependent on the likely outcome of a trial had the defendant not pleaded guilty." Meyer v. Branker, 506 F.3d 358, 369 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal citation omitted) (citing Hill, 474 U.S. at 59-60). The Court looks to all the facts and circumstances surrounding a petitioner's plea, including the likelihood of conviction and any potential sentencing benefit to pleading guilty. Id. at 369-70. In conducting this inquiry, the representations of the defendant, his lawyer, and the prosecutor during the plea proceedings, "as well as any findings made by the judge accepting the plea, constitute a formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings." Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977).
In his claims, Curtis suggests that he would not have pled guilty to all of the charges if he had received better assistance from counsel regarding the rape charge and the forcible sodomy charge that required the prosecution to prove that the rape or sodomy had occurred against the will of the victim. Given the incontrovertible evidence of Curtis's guilt with respect to most of the charges and the certainty of a mandatory life sentence in the absence of Curtis's plea of guilty, Curtis simply cannot show any prejudice flowing from the deficiency of counsel. See Meyer, 506 F.3d at 370 ("[S]ometimes it is the nature of the evidence, rather than the acts of the lawyer, that `prejudice' the defendant."). For example, Curtis had no defense to the charge that he had raped K.Y. in that he had sexual intercourse with her when she was under the age of 13. K.Y.'s testimony concerning that charge would have been corroborated by K.Y.'s accurate description of Curtis's genitalia, by the letter Curtis sent to his wife, by his recorded telephone conversation to his wife from the RRJ, and by Mr. Strainer's testimony that Curtis had admitted to having sex with K.Y.
In exchange for Curtis's plea of guilty, the prosecution agreed to forego the mandatory term of life imprisonment provided by section 18.2-67.5:3 of the Virginia Code. Thus, a guilty plea offered Curtis's only chance to avoid a mandatory life sentence. "Faced with virtually no chance to succeed [in avoiding a conviction for rape] at trial," Curtis cannot demonstrate "that an objective defendant would have insisted on going to trial" to contest that a few of the sexual acts were committed with K.Y.'s consent,
An appropriate Order shall accompany this Memorandum Opinion.
Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-67.5:3(A) (West 2004).
