ROBERT J. SHELBY, District Judge.
The Securities and Exchange Commission brought this enforcement action against a former day trader, Defendant Roger Bliss. The court froze Mr. Bliss's assets and appointed a Receiver to locate, take control of, and preserve the assets. The court also stayed all ancillary litigation. Intervenor Lakeview Custom Cabins, LLC moves to lift the stay so it can pursue a foreclosure action on property the Receiver has seized. For the reasons stated below, the court denies Lakeview's motion.
The Commission's enforcement action is based on allegations that Mr. Bliss violated the federal securities laws while running a so-called investment club in which he purported to use investors' funds to day trade stock.
Lakeview acted as the general contractor for construction of a cabin Mr. Bliss built in Bear Lake County, Idaho.
The court permitted Lakeview to intervene based on its claim that it has an interest in the cabin and the court's litigation stay impairs that interest.
Lakeview urges the court to lift the litigation stay for two reasons. Lakeview first argues the court improperly enjoined Lakeview's foreclosure action because the Idaho state court was the first court to assume jurisdiction over the cabin. Lakeview next argues it will lose its rights in the lien unless the stay is lifted so it can pursue its foreclosure action in Idaho state court. Neither argument is persuasive.
District courts have "broad powers and wide discretion" to fashion relief and administer federal receiverships.
Lakeview first contends that the court improperly stayed Lakeview's foreclosure action because the Idaho state court was the first court to exercise jurisdiction over the cabin.
Both Lakeview and the Receiver agree that the Anti-Injunction Act does not prevent the court from staying ancillary state court proceedings after appointing a receiver in an enforcement action brought by the Commission.
The doctrine of prior exclusive jurisdiction provides "that when a state or federal court of competent jurisdiction has obtained possession, custody, or control of particular property, that authority and power over the property may not be disturbed by any other court."
This doctrine imposes a jurisdictional limitation on federal courts and is based on judicial comity considerations.
Here, Lakeview argues that the Idaho state court was the first court to assume jurisdiction over the cabin because Lakeview instituted its foreclosure action before the court appointed the Receiver and entered the litigation stay. To be sure, Lakeview filed its foreclosure action in Idaho state court in May 2015, before the court appointed the Receiver in June 2015. But the court froze Mr. Bliss's assets in February 2015.
Lakeview next urges the court to lift the stay so it can protect its lien. Lakeview contends that if the court does not provide it relief from the stay, then it will lose its rights under the lien and lose its ability to recover its state law remedies.
A court may impose a litigation stay to allow the receiver "to do the important job of marshaling and untangling . . . assets without being forced into court by every investor or claimant."
First, maintaining the stay preserves the status quo. Lakeview asserts that continuing the stay upsets the status quo because it impedes its ability to perfect and protect its lien in the cabin, giving the Commission or the Receiver a "super priority" over Lakeview's interest in the cabin. Lakeview attempts to bolster this argument by pointing to Idaho Code Section 45-510, which states that "[n]o lien . . . binds any building, mining claim, improvement or structure for a period longer than six (6) months after the claim has been filed, unless proceedings be commenced in a proper court within that time to enforce such lien. . . ."
The court agrees with the Receiver that, because Lakeview has already commenced its foreclosure action in Idaho state court, Lakeview has already either met or missed the six-month deadline. The court likewise agrees that the stay does not give the Commission or the Receiver any priority over Lakeview's state law security interest—the stay merely preserves Lakeview's claimed interest for later resolution by the court. Moreover, if Lakeview is in fact a secured interest holder, it may receive preferential treatment under any eventual distribution plan.
Second, Lakeview's motion is premature. The timing inquiry is "case-specific."
In total, roughly nine months have passed since the Commission filed this suit and about five months have passed since the court appointed the Receiver. Since her appointment, Ms. Georgelas has diligently inventoried and marshaled the assets. Forcing her to litigate Lakeview's claim now in Idaho state court would hinder her assigned duties. "Very early in a receivership even the most meritorious claims might fail to justify lifting a stay given the possible disruption of the receiver's duties."
Third, even assuming Lakeview's claim has merit, that the other factors weigh in favor of maintaining the stay is dispositive.
Lakeview will have its day in court. That day will be after the Receiver markets and liquidates the cabin, but before the Receiver makes final distributions to the estate's beneficiaries under the claims resolution procedure. As this case moves forward, the court will afford due process to all creditors and third parties who assert claims or interests different than those asserted by defrauded investors. All interest holders, including Lakeview, will have an opportunity to be heard before the court approves any final distributions by the Receiver. In the meantime, the Receiver may market the cabin.
For the reasons stated above, the court DENIES Lakeview's motion to rescind the stay and for immediate relief (Dkt. 96).
SO ORDERED.