Filed: May 12, 2005
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: Opinions of the United 2005 Decisions States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 5-12-2005 Lucas v. Twp of Bethel Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential Docket No. 04-1128 Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2005 Recommended Citation "Lucas v. Twp of Bethel" (2005). 2005 Decisions. Paper 1206. http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2005/1206 This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions
Summary: Opinions of the United 2005 Decisions States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 5-12-2005 Lucas v. Twp of Bethel Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential Docket No. 04-1128 Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2005 Recommended Citation "Lucas v. Twp of Bethel" (2005). 2005 Decisions. Paper 1206. http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2005/1206 This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions o..
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Opinions of the United
2005 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
5-12-2005
Lucas v. Twp of Bethel
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 04-1128
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2005
Recommended Citation
"Lucas v. Twp of Bethel" (2005). 2005 Decisions. Paper 1206.
http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2005/1206
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova
University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2005 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 04-1128
WILLIAM A. LUCAS; AUGUST LUCAS;
DAVID J. KUSHON; JANIE B. KUSHON,
Appellants
v.
TOWNSHIP OF BETHEL; JAMES RIEDERER;
ROBERT E. PRUNTY; MARGARETTA REED
v.
ALLEGHENY VALLEY LAND TRUST,
Third-Party-Defendant
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 98-cv-01928)
District Judge:Doneta W. Ambrose
Argued on January 13, 2005
BEFORE: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, ROTH, Circuit Judges, and
IRENAS,* District Judge
____________
*Honorable Joseph E. Irenas, United States District Court Judge for the District of
New Jersey, sitting by designation.
(Opinion Filed May 12, 2005)
Donald B. Smith, Esquire (Argued)
William C. Smith, Esquire
7800 Perry Highway
Pittsburgh, PA 15237
Counsel for Appellants
Karen E. Chilcote, Esquire (Argued)
Dennis J. Mulvihill, Esquire
Robb, Leonard & Mulvihill
One Mellon Bank Center, Suite 2300
Pittsburgh, PA 15219
Daniel M. Taylor, Jr., Esquire (Argued)
Swartz Campbell
4750 U. S. Steel Tower
600 Grant Street
Pittsburgh, PA 15219
Counsel for Appellees
OPINION
ROTH, Circuit Judge:
This case involves a dispute between the Allegheny Valley Land Trust (AVLT),
the Township of Bethel, and various individual landowners over a former railroad grade
and materials removed from it. The background of this case is discussed in detail in this
Court’s opinion in Lucas v. Township of Bethel, 319 F.3d 595 (3d Cir. 2002) (Lucas I).
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The question before this Court is whether the District Court properly granted summary
judgment against Plaintiffs’ claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and properly declined to
exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ pendent state law claims. For the reasons that
follow, the District Court’s grant of summary judgment and remand of the state law
claims will be affirmed.
After this Court remanded this case in Lucas I, the District Court adopted the
Report and Recommendation of a Magistrate, granting summary judgment for AVLT and
the Township on Plaintiffs’ federal claims and remanding the state law claims to the
Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas. Plaintiffs claimed that they suffered constitutional
violations due to entry onto the right of way and removal of materials from the right of
way and were entitled to relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Magistrate concluded that
any entry onto the right of way would not constitute a federal violation but, rather, only
implicates the state law of trespass. The Magistrate also concluded that the materials
removed from the right of way were ballast, which was personalty rather than a part of the
right of way. Thus, the Magistrate concluded, Plaintiffs’ failure to produce evidence that
the ballast was anything but materials originally deposited by the railroad means that they
did not support a federal claim. The Magistrate then concluded that the law of
supplemental jurisdiction required the remaining state law claims to be remanded to the
state court.
As explained in Lucas I, the District Court had federal question jurisdiction over
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Appellants’ claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and pendent jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’
state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). This Court has
jurisdiction over the appeal from the District Court’s grant of summary judgment and
remand of the state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
The standard of review from a grant of summary judgment is plenary. Gottshall v.
Consolidated Rail Corp., 56 F.3d 530, 533 (3d Cir. 1995). Summary judgment is only
appropriate if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In reviewing the District Court’s grant
of summary judgment, this Court must view the facts in a light most favorable to the
non-moving party.
Id. This Court employs an abuse of discretion standard to review a
district court’s decision to decline jurisdiction over a pendent claim. Edelstein v. Wilentz,
812 F.2d 128, 133-34 (3d Cir. 1987).
I.Summary Judgment
The District Court concluded that, even if Plaintiffs could show ownership of the
right of way, the Township’s entry would only constitute trespass. This conclusion was
correct, as Plaintiffs did not state a constitutional deprivation in this regard. Plaintiffs did
attempt to state a deprivation, however, regarding the removal of materials from the right
of way. A review of the District Court’s decision reveals that there was sufficient
evidence to support the District Court’s finding that the materials were ballast and did not
belong to Plaintiffs and that the District Court correctly concluded that the removal of
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ballast was the only basis for Plaintiffs’ federal claims.
The District Court concluded that there was no factual issue that the materials
removed from the right of way by the Township were materials originally deposited by
Conrail or its predecessors. Although Plaintiffs allege in their briefs that there is evidence
that the removed materials did not originate with the railroad, the record does not reveal
any factual evidence and Plaintiffs could not point to any evidence at oral argument in
support of this position. Further, there is uncontroverted testimony in support of the
Township’s position that only ballast materials, consistent with those deposited by
railroads, were removed from the right of way. Thus, there is no issue of material fact
that only ballast was removed from the right of way.
The District Court, having found no issue of fact regarding the content of materials
removed from the right of way and no issue of fact that the ballast was originally
deposited by the railroad, concluded that Plaintiffs had not shown that they owned the
ballast, regardless of whether they owned the right of way. The District Court’s
conclusion relied on In the Matter of Reading Company, 77 B.R. 452 (E.D.Pa. 1987).
Reading stands for the proposition that ballast is personalty rather than real property and,
if ballast is brought onto the right of way by a railroad, it retains its nature as personalty.
Reading, 77 B.R. at 454. Thus, so long as the railroad has an ownership interest in the
ballast, it can remove the ballast from the right of way, regardless of whether the railroad
has an ownership interest in the right of way.
Reading, 77 B.R. at 455.
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The District Court’s legal conclusion that the ballast is personalty that can be
removed was correct. There is no issue of fact that the materials removed from the right
of way were ballast and that this ballast was put on the right of way by the railroad. Thus,
the ballast retained its nature as personalty and could be conveyed to AVLT by the
railroad and Plaintiffs have not shown an issue of fact in support of their federal claim
regarding the ballast. Thus, the only remaining issue to be resolved is the ownership of
the property itself, which is an issue that remains only under the state law doctrine of
abandonment.
II.Jurisdiction Over State Law Claims
The District Court concluded that because Plaintiffs had not raised an issue of fact
regarding a federal claim, its original jurisdiction was extinguished, and the case should
be remanded to the state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), Borough of West Mifflin v.
Lancaster, 45 F.3d 780, 788 (1995)(holding that when original jurisdiction claims are
dismissed before trial, the district court must decline to exercise jurisdiction over pendent
state claims unless there is an affirmative justification for doing so). Plaintiffs argue that
the District Court should exercise jurisdiction because the issue of abandonment involves
both federal and state law and because there is a potential conflict between this Court’s
decision in Lucas I and a Pennsylvania decision, Buffalo Township. v. Jones,
571 Pa.
637,
813 A.2d 659 (Pa. 2003).
Plaintiffs suggest that the potential conflict between the Pennsylvania Supreme
6
Court ruling in Buffalo Township and this Court’s decision in Lucas I is a sufficient
justification for the District Court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. Plaintiffs’
argument overstates the holding of Buffalo Township, which is not incompatible with
Lucas I. Lucas I held that the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)
is extinguished after it unconditionally authorizes a railroad’s abandonment, if the
railroad has not asked the ICC to intervene and prevent abandonment under the National
Trail Systems Act, 16 § U.S.C. 1247(d). This Court’s conclusion reflects the fact that,
although the broad issue of ownership of rights of way by railroads is covered by both
federal law, in the form of ICC regulation, and state law, in the area of property rights, the
issue of abandonment is not a mixed question of federal and state law. Rather, once the
regulatory oversight of the ICC ends, as it has in this case, the issue of who owns a right
of way is decided as a matter of state law.
Buffalo Township holds that, when adjudicating whether a right of way has been
abandoned by a railroad, Pennsylvania law requires consideration of whether there was an
intention to abandon the property and external acts by which such abandonment was
carried out. See Lawson, 417 A.2d at 160. The court further held that the intent to
abandon is determined by a variety of factors, including whether the railroad filed a
request to abandon with the ICC, salvaged the rails from the right of way, and negotiated
with a third party for an alternate use of the land. Buffalo
Township, 813 A.2d at 665.
Thus, these two holdings are not incompatible, as Plaintiffs suggest, and certainly do not
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justify the District Court exercising jurisdiction if only pendent state law claims remain.
In addition, because there is a related state court action in this case, it would be in the
interest of judicial efficiency for the state courts to consider the claims arising out of this
dispute in their entirety.
III.Conclusion
The District Court did not err in finding that Plaintiffs have not presented a
material issue of fact regarding their federal claims. In addition, the District Court did not
err in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.
Thus, the District Court’s decision is affirmed.
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