GILBERTSON, Chief Justice.
[¶ 1.] Peggy Hewitt appeals a jury verdict awarding no damages in a personal injury suit against Shelli Rae Felderman. Hewitt argues the evidence did not support the verdict, the court erred in denying a motion for directed verdict, and the court erred in denying attorney's fees and costs. Felderman challenges the court's denial of costs and disbursements and the admissibility of certain expert testimony offered at trial. We affirm.
[¶ 2.] Peggy Hewitt was involved in two separate rear-end collisions that were the subject of the trial court action below. Hewitt was in the front vehicle during both accidents. The first accident occurred in the morning hours of January 11, 2007. Hewitt was stopped at a stop sign off the Benson Road exit of I-229 in Sioux Falls when she was rear-ended by Dwight Berens. Berens admitted fault in the accident and is not a party to this appeal.
[¶ 3.] Following the first accident, Hewitt complained of pain and numbness in her head, neck, and left arm. She was diagnosed with spinal sprain and strain injuries. A chiropractor, a physical therapist, and other medical specialists treated Hewitt for loss of sensation, pain, headaches, and range of motion problems. Hewitt was receiving treatment on a regular basis at the time of the second accident.
[¶ 4.] The second accident occurred at approximately 7:30 a.m. on June 27, 2008.
[¶ 5.] Felderman was given a citation for following too closely and paid the fine without objection. Before and during trial, Felderman admitted to the uncontested citation, but maintained that she was not negligent in causing the accident. Hewitt filed suit against both Berens and Felderman for injuries sustained in the two accidents. The two lawsuits were combined in a single jury trial held December 10-14, 2012.
[¶ 6.] At the close of the case, Hewitt moved for a directed verdict against Felderman on the issue of negligence. The trial court denied the motion. The trial court noted that there were reasonable grounds for the jury to find that the sudden emergency doctrine excused any negligence on the part of Felderman.
[¶ 7.] The jury found Berens liable in the 2007 collision, and awarded Hewitt $60,000 against Berens for past and future medical expenses and pain and suffering arising from the first accident. The jury awarded no damages to Hewitt against Felderman for the 2008 collision. The jury's decision was rendered through special verdict. When asked "Was Shelli Felderman negligent in causing the June 27, 2008 collision?" the jury responded affirmatively. However, when asked "Was Shelli Felderman's negligence a legal cause of plaintiff's injuries or damages, if any?" the jury responded in the negative.
[¶ 8.] After trial, Hewitt filed a motion for a new trial on the issue of damages, arguing insufficiency of evidence to support the verdict and inadequate damages. Hewitt also filed a motion for attorney's fees and costs, arguing that Felderman's failure to admit negligence unnecessarily increased the time and cost associated with bringing the case to trial. The court denied these motions. Felderman moved as the prevailing party to recover specific costs and disbursements in the amount of $2,883.57. The court also denied this motion, finding that neither party prevailed.
[¶ 9.] The parties raise five issues in this appeal:
[¶ 11.] Hewitt first argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying Hewitt's motion for a directed verdict on the issue of Felderman's negligence. However, after the motion was denied, the jury rendered a verdict that did find Felderman negligent under the circumstances. "An appeal will be dismissed
[¶ 12.] Hewitt urges this Court to find there was no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for Felderman on the issue of negligence. The controversy Hewitt puts before this Court — whether Felderman acted negligently — was already resolved by the jury in favor of Hewitt. It becomes a purely academic exercise for this Court to determine whether the question of negligence should have been submitted to the jury. Because this Court has no "effectual relief" to grant, the issue is moot.
[¶ 14.] Hewitt next argues that the trial court erred by denying her motion for a new trial on the issue of damages. A trial court's denial of a motion for a new trial is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Alvine Family Ltd. P'ship v. Hagemann, 2010 S.D. 28, ¶ 18, 780 N.W.2d 507, 512-13 (citation omitted). This Court will uphold a jury verdict "if the jury's verdict can be explained with reference to the evidence," viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict. Id. ¶ 18 (citing Itzen v. Wilsey, 440 N.W.2d 312, 314 (S.D.1989)). This Court should only set a jury's verdict aside in "extreme cases" where the jury has acted under passion or prejudice or where "the jury has palpably mistaken the rules of law." Roth v. Farner-Bocken Co., 2003 S.D. 80, ¶ 10, 667 N.W.2d 651, 659 (quoting Biegler v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2001 S.D. 13, ¶ 32, 621 N.W.2d 592, 601). In its order denying the motion for new trial, the trial court found "the verdict can be explained with reference to the evidence[.]" We agree.
[¶ 15.] Hewitt argues that the jury ignored uncontested causation and damages evidence in this case,
[¶ 16.] "In order to prevail in a suit based on negligence, a plaintiff must prove duty, breach of that duty, proximate and factual causation, and actual injury." Highmark Fed. Credit Union v. Hunter, 2012 S.D. 37, ¶ 9, 814 N.W.2d 413, 415 (citation omitted). In this case, the jury was asked in Special Verdict Form 2, "Was Shelli Felderman's negligence a legal cause of plaintiff's injuries or damages, if any?" The jury responded, "no." By this response the jury indicated that Hewitt failed to establish the causation element of her negligence case against Felderman. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that this verdict can be explained with reference to the evidence presented.
[¶ 17.] To prove causation, Hewitt relied heavily on the testimony of her doctors. Hewitt argues that she presented undisputed "medical legal causation" evidence at trial. Although the jury heard expert testimony stating that Hewitt likely sustained a mild cervical sprain or aggravation during the crash, "the jury is not obligated to accept an expert's opinion and may disregard the testimony if it desires." Andreson v. Black Hills Power & Light Co., 1997 S.D. 12, ¶ 10, 559 N.W.2d 886, 889 (citing State v. McCord, 505 N.W.2d 388, 394 (S.D. 1993)). "[T]he purpose of expert testimony is to assist the jury as the trier of fact and not to supplant it." Bridge v. Karl's, Inc., 538 N.W.2d 521, 525 (S.D.1995) (citation omitted). "This state is not a trial-by-expert jurisdiction." Id.
[¶ 18.] The jury had several reasons to reject the expert testimony presented. First, most of the medical expert testimony offered in this case was based on Hewitt's subjective complaints of pain. The jury was presented with significant evidence calling into question the credibility of these complaints. Hewitt's primary claim against Felderman was for injuries to the right side of Hewitt's neck and her right shoulder, but Hewitt's own testimony was inconsistent as to when she first started complaining of pain in these areas. Contrary to Hewitt's testimony, Hewitt's doctors testified that Hewitt complained of pain and tenderness in her right arm, shoulder, and neck, and restricted range of motion before the accident with Felderman. Furthermore, jurors were presented with evidence that on at least one occasion, Hewitt reported significant pain to one of her doctors, and the same day reported feeling "well" to another doctor.
[¶ 19.] Other evidence presented in this case further undermined the causal link between Felderman's negligence and the alleged injuries for which Hewitt sought damages. After the accident, Hewitt told Felderman that she was not injured. Hewitt's daughter, a nurse, came to the scene of the accident and left without rendering aid or taking her mother to the emergency room. Furthermore, the jury was presented with evidence that Felderman's vehicle may not have been damaged at all in the collision.
[¶ 21.] Given this evidence which supports the jury's verdict, this Court is not inclined to supplant the jury's important role as finder of fact. Hewitt has failed to prove that the jury acted under passion or prejudice, or that the jury palpably mistook the rules of law in reaching its verdict. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Hewitt's motion for a new trial.
[¶ 23.] Finally, Hewitt contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying Hewitt's motion for attorney's fees and costs. A trial court's ruling on the award of attorney's fees and costs is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Eagle Ridge Estates Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Anderson, 2013 S.D. 21, ¶ 13, 827 N.W.2d 859, 865 (citation omitted). A trial court has "broad discretion with regard to sanctions imposed." Novak v. Novak, 2007 S.D. 108, ¶ 16, 741 N.W.2d 222, 228 (citing Stull v. Sparrow, 92 Cal.App.4th 860, 864-66, 112 Cal.Rptr.2d 239 (2001)). South Dakota generally follows the "American Rule" on attorney's fees, under which each party usually bears the cost of their own attorneys. Rupert v. City of Rapid City, 2013 S.D. 13, ¶ 32, 827 N.W.2d 55, 67 (citation omitted). However, an exception to this rule exists if attorney's fees are authorized by statute. Id. (citation omitted).
[¶ 24.] Prior to trial, Hewitt served requests for admissions on Felderman, asking Felderman to admit negligence in causing the accident. Felderman responded by denying that she was negligent. Hewitt asserts that because Felderman denied being negligent, Hewitt "incurred attorney's fees and costs in the amount of $35,094.26 to prove negligence and liability
[¶ 25.] Although SDCL 15-6-37(c) says "the court shall" order payment of fees incurred in making the proof, the exceptions found in SDCL 15-6-37(c)(2) specifically grant the court discretion to deny the award of attorney's fees and expenses if the court finds "good reason" existed for a party to deny a request for admission.
[¶ 26.] In this case, Felderman had good reason to deny the request for admission, including a reasonable belief that she "might prevail on the matter." In denying Hewitt's motion for directed verdict and submitting the issue of negligence to the jury, the trial judge found that the issue of negligence involved a reasonable question of fact to be determined by the jury. Although the jury did find Felderman negligent, she had at least a reasonably defensible position. We therefore cannot conclude that the judge could not find any "good reason" for Felderman to deny the request for admission. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the attorney's fees requested by Hewitt.
[¶ 28.] We review the award of costs and disbursements, including the determination of who was the prevailing party, under an abuse of discretion standard. Crisman v. Determan Chiropractic, Inc., 2004 S.D. 103, ¶ 19, 687 N.W.2d 507, 512 (citation omitted); Fix v. First State Bank of Roscoe, 2011 S.D. 80, ¶ 32, 807 N.W.2d 612, 621 (citation omitted). The "prevailing party" in a civil action may recover specific costs and disbursements "necessarily incurred in gathering and procuring evidence or bringing the matter to trial." SDCL 15-17-37. The prevailing party is "the party in whose favor the decision or verdict is or should be rendered and judgment entered." Picardi v. Zimmiond, 2005 S.D. 24, ¶ 16, 693 N.W.2d 656, 661 (citation omitted).
[¶ 29.] The trial court denied Felderman's application for taxation of disbursements, finding that "neither plaintiff nor defendant are prevailing parties." Felderman argues that the trial court abused its discretion in finding there was no prevailing party, because judgment was rendered in Felderman's favor when the jury awarded zero damages. As the prevailing party, Felderman argues that the trial court should have allowed her to recover costs under SDCL 15-17-37.
[¶ 30.] Even if Felderman were the prevailing party, the trial court has broad discretion under SDCL 15-17-52 to limit disbursements to a prevailing party "in the interest of justice."
Full House, Inc. v. Stell, 2002 S.D. 14, ¶ 25, 640 N.W.2d 61, 67 (quoting Culhane, 2000 S.D. 101, ¶ 33, 615 N.W.2d at 590 (alterations and internal citations omitted)). Felderman has failed to carry her burden of convincing this Court that the trial court's order was not "in the interests of justice," and thereby an abuse of discretion. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion and we affirm the trial court's denial of costs and disbursements.
[¶ 32.] Finally, Felderman argues that the trial court erred in allowing testimony regarding Hewitt's potential need for future medical treatment. Because we are affirming the jury's complete denial of damages in this case, the issue is moot.
[¶ 33.] Hewitt and Felderman have both failed to prove abuse of discretion by the trial court. For the above stated reasons, we affirm the trial court on all issues.
[¶ 34.] KONENKAMP, ZINTER and SEVERSON, Justices, and DAY, Circuit Court Judge, concur.
SDCL 15-6-36 provides in part:
