HENRY E. HUDSON, District Judge.
Billy Rouser, a federal inmate proceeding pro se, filed suit
On January 28, 2014, Rouser, a federal inmate proceeding pro se, filed suit in the Circuit Court against "Bureau of Prisons, Inc., (BOP)" and "Warden Wilson, CEO/Agent." (Compl. 3.)
On August 29, 2014, Defendant Wilson filed a Notice of Removal of State Court Action to United States District Court. ("Notice of Removal," ECF No. 1.) On September 5, 2014, Defendant Wilson filed a Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 2) and a Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 3).
On September 15, 2014, Rouser filed a "Notice for Remand to State Court for Lack of Jurisdiction" ("Motion to Remand," ECF No. 6), which the Court construes as a Motion to Remand.
On October 8, 2014, Rouser filed a Motion to Amend (ECF No. 10). Defendant Wilson responded with an Opposition to Motion to Amend (ECF No. 11).
Rouser's Complaint alleges a variety of conditions at his correctional institution that he finds unsuitable. These conditions include "violating fire codes" (id. at. 6), "inmates being subjected to second hand smoke" (id. at 7), "officers stealing food from the kitchen" (id.), and "violating code regarding capacity of facilities buildings, 1,287 individuals"
"Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and are empowered to act only in those specific instances authorized by Congress." Goldsmith v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 845 F.2d 61, 63 (4th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). "[A] federal court is obliged to dismiss a case whenever it appears the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.... Determining the question of subject matter jurisdiction at the outset of the litigation is often the most efficient procedure." Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). As explained below, because the Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction over Rouser's claims, so too does this Court.
"Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit. Sovereign immunity is jurisdictional in nature. Indeed, the terms of [the United States'] consent to be sued in any court define that court's jurisdiction to entertain the suit." FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994) (alteration in original) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (citing United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983); United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941)).
The statutes and regulation Rouser cites in his Complaint, 18 U.S.C. §§ 4002,
The most applicable statute for Rouser's contract claims, where the United States has waived sovereign immunity, is the "Big Tucker Act," 28 U.S.C. § 1491. This Act grants the Court of Federal Claims exclusive jurisdiction over breach of contract claims against the United States where the amount in controversy exceeds $10,000. Smeltzer v. United States, 131 F.3d 136 (4th Cir. 1997). The Act does not grant state courts jurisdiction over these claims.
Defendant Wilson removed under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1),
Although styled as a state law breach of contract claim, Rouser may only bring his initial complaint against the United States pursuant to the "Big Tucker Act." 28 U.S.C. § 1491. The Circuit Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over claims brought pursuant to that Act. Bullock, 666 F.3d at 285 (observing that "state courts do not have presumptive jurisdiction to decide suits against the United States"). Pursuant to the doctrine of derivative jurisdiction, this Court's jurisdiction over a removed case is the same as that of the state court from which the case originated. Palmer, 498 F.3d at 244.
Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") this Court must dismiss any action filed by a prisoner if the Court determines the action (1) "is frivolous" or (2) "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). A complaint "is frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). "[A] matter of law is frivolous where `[none] of the legal points [are] arguable on their merits.'" Id. (quoting Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967)). Accordingly, because this Court lacks jurisdiction and cannot legally adjudicate Rouser's claims, dismissal is appropriate under § 1915A(b)(1).
Defendant Wilson failed to raise the issue of derivative jurisdiction in his Motion to Dismiss. Instead, he argues that Rouser's initial pleading fell under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims, as he demanded $60,000,000 in damages from the United States for breach of contract. (Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 3, ECF No. 4.) Accordingly, Defendant's removal of the case to this Court was improper. Nevertheless, because the Court, in fact, lacks subject matter jurisdiction,
Because the Court lacks jurisdiction over the matter, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 3) will be denied. Rouser's Motion for Remand (ECF No. 6) and Rouser's Motion to Amend)
For the reasons set forth, Defendant Wilson's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 2) will be granted. Defendant Wilson's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 3), Rouser's Motion for Remand (ECF No. 6), and Rouser's Motion to Amend (ECF No. 10) will be denied. The action will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
An appropriate Final Order will accompany this Memorandum Opinion.
18 U.S.C. § 4002 (emphasis added). This statute is irrelevant to Rouser, as he is held in a federal facility.
18 U.S.C. § 4042(a).
While the Court liberally construes pro se complaints, Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978), it does not act as the inmate's advocate, sua sponte developing statutory and constitutional claims the inmate failed to clearly raise on the face of his complaint. See Brock v. Carroll, 107 F.3d 241, 243 (4th Cir. 1997) (Luttig, J., concurring); Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). Furthermore, had Rouser properly raised an FTCA claim, the Court would still lack jurisdiction pursuant to the doctrine of derivative jurisdiction. Palmer v. City Nat'l Bank of W. Va., 498 F.3d 236, 247 (4th Cir. 2007); see Part III.B. infra. If Rouser wishes, he "remains free to bring a separate action against the federal defendants in . . . a district court, for [his tort] claims, in accordance with the FTCA." Palmer, 498 F.3d at 247. Dismissal of an FTCA claim does not infringe on "any fundamental right of judicial access . . . [because Rouser] has not yet availed [him]self of the appropriate federal fora for resolving its claims against the federal defendants." Id.
28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1).
