Filed: Sep. 27, 2006
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: Opinions of the United 2006 Decisions States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 9-27-2006 F. v. William Penn Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential Docket No. 05-4490 Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2006 Recommended Citation "F. v. William Penn" (2006). 2006 Decisions. Paper 412. http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2006/412 This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the Uni
Summary: Opinions of the United 2006 Decisions States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 9-27-2006 F. v. William Penn Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential Docket No. 05-4490 Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2006 Recommended Citation "F. v. William Penn" (2006). 2006 Decisions. Paper 412. http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2006/412 This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the Unit..
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Opinions of the United
2006 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
9-27-2006
F. v. William Penn
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 05-4490
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2006
Recommended Citation
"F. v. William Penn" (2006). 2006 Decisions. Paper 412.
http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2006/412
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova
University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2006 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova
University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
__________
NO. 05-4490
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MARISSA F., A minor, by and through
her parents, Mark and Lavinia F.;
MARK F.; LAVINIA F., Adults
individually and on their own behalf,
Appellants
v.
THE WILLIAM PENN SCHOOL DISTRICT
__________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 04-cv-00286)
District Judge: Honorable Louis H. Pollak
__________
Argued September 12, 2006
BEFORE: FUENTES, FISHER, and BRIGHT*, Circuit Judges
(Filed: September 27, 2006)
Dennis C. McAndrews, Esq. (Argued)
Gabrielle C. Sereni, Esq.
McAndrews Law Offices
30 Cassatt Avenue
Berwyn, PA 19312
Counsel for Appellants
Andria B. Saia, Esq. (Argued)
*
Honorable Myron H. Bright, United States Circuit Judge for the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals, sitting by designation.
Levin Legal Group, P.C.
1800 Byberry Road, Suite 1301
Huntingdon Valley, PA 19006
Counsel for Appellee
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OPINION
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BRIGHT, Circuit Judge.
Marissa F. and her parents (collectively, "Marissa") appeal the District Court's
determination that the William Penn School District provided her with a "free appropriate
public education" (FAPE) as required by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. For the reasons set forth herein, we will affirm the
decision of the District Court.
Marissa is a learning disabled child under the IDEA. Although from 1996-2002
her parents communicated with the School District about the possibility of FAPE
services, they never consented to a district evaluation and never enrolled her in a district
school. Rather, they placed Marissa at a private school and received transportation
expense reimbursement from the School District until 2001. In 2001, Marissa's parents
transferred her from one private school to a different private school located more than ten
miles outside the District, causing the School District to stop providing transportation
expenses.
In the Spring of 2002, Marissa's parents initiated mediation and requested a due
process hearing with respect to the denial of transportation benefits. They subsequently
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added claims for tuition reimbursement and compensatory education. Once Marissa's
parents initiated due process, they consented to the District's evaluation of Marissa and
the development of an Individualized Educational Program (IEP). The School District
completed a final IEP in October 2003. The hearing officer found that this IEP
adequately provided Marissa with a meaningful education benefit, denied her
compensatory education claim and her 1996-2001 tuition reimbursement claim, but
awarded tuition reimbursement for the 2001-2003 school years because of the School
District's failure to evaluate Marissa prior to 2002. The special education hearing panel
reversed the award of tuition reimbursement and the District Court affirmed.
This Court has jurisdiction over IDEA cases pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415. We
exercise plenary review of the legal standard the District Court applied and review factual
findings for clear error. L.E. v. Ramsey Bd. of Educ., 435 F.3d 384, 389 (3d Cir. 2006).
Marissa first challenges the District Court's denial of tuition reimbursement for the
2001-2002 school year. In Warren G. v. Cumberland County Sch. Dist., 190 F.3d 80, 84
(3d Cir. 1999), this Court denied tuition reimbursement for the period of time preceding
the parents' request for a due process hearing. We based our decision in Warren G. on
Bernardsville Bd. of Educ. v. J.H.,
42 F.3d 149, 158 (3d Cir. 1994). In Bernardsville, we
explained that a school district should not have to reimburse parents for education
expenses before the district receives sufficient notice, through a request for due process,
that the parents challenge the adequacy of FAPE
provided. 42 F.3d at 158.
In Marissa's case, at the time she sought due process, the School District, although
3
aware of Marissa's existence as a child entitled to FAPE, remained unaware of the
parents' dissatisfaction with the FAPE services it could provide. Indeed, until that time,
the District had not yet been afforded the opportunity to provide FAPE services to
Marissa. Accordingly, the District Court correctly held that Warren G. bars Marissa's
claim for tuition reimbursement for the 2001-2002 school year.
Marissa also challenges the District Court's denial of tuition reimbursement for the
2002-2003 school year. Although Marissa timely requested reimbursement for that year,
the District Court denied her claim because it found that the School District's IEP
provided her with a meaningful educational benefit.
Marissa argues that the District Court failed to conduct a meaningful review of the
IEP. We do not require the District Court to make detailed factual findings unless it
departs from the findings of agency authority. See S.H. v. State-Operated Sch. Dist. of
Newark, 336 F.3d 260, 269-70 (3d Cir. 2003). In Marissa's case, the special education
hearing panel and the District Court agreed with the hearing officer as to the adequacy of
the IEP and we do not therefore require more detail.
The District Court need only find that the IEP provided a meaningful educational
benefit, not the maximum educational benefit. See Id. at 270. The District Court
properly gave "due weight" to the hearing officer's determination and engaged in its own
independent analysis of the record, considering the testimony of four individuals who
supported the IEP and the IEP itself. See L.E. v. Ramsey Bd. of
Educ., 435 F.3d at 389
(articulating a modified de novo standard of review for District Court's review of hearing
4
officer's findings). It found that the IEP offered Marissa a reasonable opportunity to
obtain a meaningful educational benefit. We agree with the District Court's conclusion;
Marissa's claim for tuition reimbursement for the 2002-2003 school year fails.
Finally, we affirm the District Court's denial of Marissa's compensatory education
claim. This Court has explained that cases awarding compensatory education involve
"egregious circumstances or flagrant failure to comply with IDEA." Ridgewood Bd. of
Educ. v. N.E., 172 F.3d 238, 249 (3d Cir. 1999). Marissa's is not such a case.
Compensatory education compensates a child for the failure of her school district;
Marissa has not shown the School District denied her an adequate education.
Accordingly, the District Court did not err by denying Marissa compensatory education.
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
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