Filed: May 08, 2006
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: Opinions of the United 2006 Decisions States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 5-8-2006 Williams v. LaCrosse Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential Docket No. 05-2568 Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2006 Recommended Citation "Williams v. LaCrosse" (2006). 2006 Decisions. Paper 1147. http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2006/1147 This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of th
Summary: Opinions of the United 2006 Decisions States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 5-8-2006 Williams v. LaCrosse Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential Docket No. 05-2568 Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2006 Recommended Citation "Williams v. LaCrosse" (2006). 2006 Decisions. Paper 1147. http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2006/1147 This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the..
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Opinions of the United
2006 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
5-8-2006
Williams v. LaCrosse
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 05-2568
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2006
Recommended Citation
"Williams v. LaCrosse" (2006). 2006 Decisions. Paper 1147.
http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2006/1147
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova
University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2006 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova
University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 05-2568
____________
WILLIAM E. WILLIAMS,
Appellant
v.
THOMAS J. LaCROSSE
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
D.C. Civil Action No. 03-cv-06724
(Honorable Gene E.K. Pratter)
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 25, 2006
Before: FUENTES, STAPLETON and ALARCÓN,* Circuit Judges.
(Filed: May 8, 2006)
____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
ALARCÓN, Circuit Judge.
*
The Honorable Arthur L. Alarcón, Senior Judge, United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.
William E. Williams appeals from the District Court’s judgment in favor of
Captain Thomas J. LaCrosse. Mr. Williams, a former probationary trooper with the
Pennsylvania State Police, brought a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Capt.
LaCrosse, his supervisor. He alleged that Capt. LaCrosse’s recommendation regarding
discipline, which resulted in his discharge, violated his rights to procedural and
substantive due process, equal protection, and free speech. The District Court granted
Capt. LaCrosse’s motion for summary judgment. In this appeal, Mr. Williams argues that
there are genuine issues of material fact with regard to his procedural due process claim,
as it pertains to his asserted liberty interest in his reputation.1 We affirm.
Mr. Williams argues that he was denied procedural due process. Specifically, he
contends that because the accusations against him impugned his reputation and
1
Mr. Williams also argues that he was deprived of his property interest in his
employment without due process of law and that he was denied equal protection.
However, he does not raise these arguments until his reply brief. An argument not raised
and argued in the opening brief is abandoned. See, e.g., Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176,
182 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that all issues must be raised and argued in the opening
brief); Institute for Scientific Info., Inc. v. Gordon & Breach, Science Publishers, Inc.,
931 F.2d 1002, 1011 (3d Cir. 1991) (same). In order to raise an argument properly, “the
appellant’s brief shall contain under appropriate headings a ‘statement of the issues
presented for review’ and . . . the argument section of the brief [must] ‘contain the
contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, and the reasons therefor,
with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the record relied on.’” Lunderstadt v.
Colafella,
885 F.2d 66, 78 (3d Cir. 1989) (quoting Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(2) and (4)). Mr.
Williams’s opening brief contains no argument or citation to authority with regard to his
property interest and equal protection claims. Therefore he has abandoned these claims.
2
deprived him of his employment, he was entitled to a “name-clearing hearing.” Ersek v.
Township of Springfield, 102 F.3d 79, 83-84 (1996). Mr. Williams argues: “[t]hat
interest, however, is not accorded substantive due process protection; rather, the right
accorded is that of procedural due process or more specifically the right to an opportunity
to refute the charges and clear one’s name.” (Appellant’s Br. 51).
“[I]t is well established that failure to raise an issue in the district court constitutes
a waiver of the argument.” Medical Protective Co. v. Watkins, 198 F.3d 100, 105-06 n.3
(3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Brenner v. Local 514, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and
Joiners of America,
927 F.2d 1283, 1298 (3d Cir. 1991)). Mr. Williams failed to argue to
the District Court that the alleged deprivation of his liberty interest, without procedural
due process, violated his rights. In the memorandum he filed in the District Court in
opposition to Capt. LaCrosse’s motion for summary judgment, he argued:
[P]laintiff was terminated from his protected position under
circumstances that were likely to, and did, cause harm to his
reputation together with the extinguishment of his protected
position, all of which are in violation of his rights protected
by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. See generally
Clark v. Twp. Of Falls, 890 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1989).
He did not offer further explanation. Nor did he mention his liberty interest in his
reputation during the oral argument before the District Court.
The District Court understood Mr. Williams’s argument to be that he was deprived
of substantive due process. The District Court concluded,
3
Although it is challenging to discern from the face of the
complaint or his Opposition Memo, Mr. Williams seems to
assert that his substantive due process claim arises from the
fact that his termination caused harm to his reputation that,
when considered with the termination of his employment,
constituted a due process violation in the form of a violation
of his right to liberty.
The District Court analyzed Mr. Williams’s claim using standards applicable to
substantive due process. The District Court did not address Mr. Williams’s claim in
terms of procedural due process. Mr. Williams did nothing to correct this understanding
of his claims. Accordingly, the District Court did not have an opportunity to consider the
argument Mr. Williams now raises. See Lugar v. Texaco, Inc., 755 F.2d 53, 57 n.2 (3d
Cir. 1985) (noting that because “of the failure to present the issue below, the district court
did not make any findings . . . .”).
Mr. Williams failed to argue below that he was deprived of his liberty interest
without procedural due process. He therefore waived the only argument he raises on
appeal.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
4
