THORNE, Judge:
¶ 1 D.V. appeals from the juvenile court's adjudication finding him in contempt of court. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
¶ 2 On May 10, 2006, the juvenile court entered an order placing D.V. in the interim custody of the Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS). On May 10, 2009, D.V.
¶ 3 The juvenile court held a trial on the contempt allegation. The State called two witnesses: Adam Attridge, D.V.'s DCFS caseworker, and Jose Trujillo, D.V.'s counselor at Valley Mental Health. D.V.'s DCFS caseworker testified about statements D.V.'s foster mother made to him on the day D.V. did not return to his foster placement.
¶ 4 The juvenile court, in its oral ruling, found D.V. in contempt, stating as follows:
Following trial on the contempt allegation, the juvenile court ordered D.V. to continue in the custody of DCFS and that D.V. be held in detention pending placement within forty-eight hours. D.V. timely appealed from the juvenile court's contempt order.
¶ 5 D.V. argues that the juvenile court erred by admitting hearsay testimony of statements D.V.'s mother, his grandmother, and his foster mother made to his DCFS caseworker and his counselor. "The question of whether evidence is admissible can be either a question of discretion, which we review for abuse of discretion, or a question of law, which we review for correctness." State v. Bujan, 2006 UT App 322, ¶ 14, 142 P.3d 581 (internal quotation marks omitted). "In this instance, because [D.V. essentially requests this court] to address the meaning of a rule of evidence, there is a question of law and we assess the trial court's ruling for correctness." Id.
¶ 6 D.V. also argues that there was insufficient evidence for the juvenile court to find him in contempt of the order placing him in the interim custody of DCFS. "When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of the evidence we must sustain the trial court's judgment unless it is against the clear weight of the evidence, or if [we] otherwise reach[]
¶ 7 D.V. first argues that the juvenile court erred by admitting hearsay testimony of statements D.V.'s mother, his grandmother, and his foster mother made to his DCFS caseworker and his counselor. The juvenile court ruled that the evidence was admissible under rule 1101 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, which provides that the rules of evidence are inapplicable in "[c]ontempt proceedings in which the court may act summarily." Utah R. Evid. 1101(b)(4). On appeal D.V. argues that the rule does not apply because his contempt charge was not subject to summary action, as it was not "committed in the immediate view and presence of the court, or judge at chambers." See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-302 (2008) (distinguishing between contempt that may be punished summarily and contempt that requires a hearing). Additionally, because a defendant has the right to confront witnesses in a contempt proceeding where the contempt was committed outside the presence of the court, see Gardiner v. York, 2010 UT App 108, ¶ 44, 233 P.3d 500, cert. denied, 238 P.3d 443 (Utah 2010); see also Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320, 1322 (Utah 1982), D.V. argues that the juvenile court's admission of hearsay evidence violated his rights under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, see U.S. Const. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him. . . .").
¶ 8 The State argues that D.V.'s claims are not preserved. "Utah courts require specific objections in order to bring all claimed errors to the trial court's attention to give the court an opportunity to correct the errors if appropriate." State v. Johnson, 2006 UT App 3, ¶ 13, 129 P.3d 282 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also In re K.F., 2009 UT 4, ¶ 62, 201 P.3d 985 ("`[I]n order to preserve an issue for appeal[,] the issue must be presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue.'" (second alteration in original) (quoting 438 Main St. v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, ¶ 51, 99 P.3d 801)); Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, ¶ 15, 164 P.3d 366 ("[A] party may not claim to have preserved an issue for appeal by merely mentioning . . . an issue without introducing supporting evidence or relevant legal authority." (omission in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). At trial, D.V. objected to the testimony of the DCFS caseworker on hearsay grounds. The State conceded that the challenged testimony was hearsay, but argued that it was nevertheless admissible as an exception under rule 1101.
¶ 9 We conclude that D.V.'s challenge to the applicability of rule 1101 was not preserved because the arguments he advances on appeal were not raised below. First, the issue on appeal is not whether the admitted testimony was hearsay but whether the rule 1101 exception applies in a nonsummary contempt proceeding. D.V.'s hearsay challenge was not specific enough to preserve his challenge to the applicability of rule 1101, particularly given his failure to make an argument on that issue when specifically invited to do so by the court. See generally Blecha v. People, 962 P.2d 931, 940 (Colo. 1998) (observing that to preserve a hearsay challenge, "[f]urther argument by the attorney may be appropriate if the proponent
¶ 10 D.V. next argues that there was insufficient evidence for the juvenile court to find him in contempt. D.V. challenges the juvenile court's conclusion that D.V. knew that running away from his foster placement was a violation of the juvenile court's orders. "When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of the evidence, we must sustain the trial court's judgment unless it is against the clear weight of the evidence, or if [we] otherwise reach[] a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." American Fork City, 2000 UT App 277, ¶ 4, 12 P.3d 108 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). In order to establish that D.V. was guilty of contempt, the State was required to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that D.V. "knew what was required, had the ability to comply, and intentionally failed or refused to do so." Von Hake, 759 P.2d at 1172. Thus, to hold D.V. in contempt, the evidence must support a finding that D.V. knew his action of running away from his foster placement violated the juvenile court's order. See id.
¶ 11 Here, the juvenile court determined, in its oral ruling on July 6, 2009, that D.V. knew what was required of him based on the May 10, 2006 order, which ordered fourteen-year-old D.V. "placed in the interim custody of [DCFS]." The juvenile court, in its oral ruling, also found "the evidence that [D.V.] called his foster mother, that he also called his grandmother and said that he needed some money and that he needed help is evidence that he knew that he wasn't supposed to be on the run and that he wasn't supposed to leave the placement." D.V. argues that alone this evidence does not necessarily establish that he knew the legal consequences of running from his foster placement. Acknowledging a need for help and requesting it is not necessarily proof that a juvenile knows he is violating a court order directing him to do, or refrain from, some particular action. Nor is it sufficient proof that a juvenile knows he is violating a court order simply because a court determines that the juvenile "understands" that he is not supposed to do something such as running away from his foster placement. A juvenile may not know that such an action would have any different consequence than running away from home prior to the existence of a court order.
¶ 12 The juvenile court also took judicial notice of the fact that the court had previously, on at least six occasions, reiterated to D.V. that he was in the custody of DCFS. However, D.V. argues that neither the written nor verbal evidence supports the juvenile court's finding that D.V. knew what was required of him. D.V. argues that the order is not sufficiently specific as it relates to D.V., see State v. L.A., 2010 UT App 356, ¶ 13, 245 P.3d 213, and that the evidence at trial does not demonstrate that D.V. had been given specific and clear notice of either what was required of him or the potential consequences for failure to comply, see Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162, 1172 (Utah 1988).
¶ 13 The order directed, "[D.V.] is/are placed in the interim custody of [DCFS]." There is, however, no evidence that D.V. ever
¶ 14 The pertinent portions of the order are as follows:
Here, the order's undefined placement of D.V. without any command directed at D.V., related to that placement, results in an order that was not so specific and definite as to give D.V. real notice that he had been court-ordered to remain in a specific, or any foster placement. In contrast to the unclear placement language, the juvenile court in that same paragraph specifically commands that "[t]he parent(s) are ordered to contact the Office of Recovery Services to determine a support amount for the child[]." The contrasting language of the order further compounds the clarity problems of the juvenile court's direction to D.V.
¶ 15 Likewise, the contempt language of the order does not make it clear that failure to comply with said order might result in D.V. being held in contempt of court. The contempt section appears after various segments wherein the court made orders pertaining to D.V., his parents, and the agency. The order enumerated several consequences, in addition to a possible contempt finding, for failure to comply that did not apply to the then fourteen-year-old D.V., such as "the loss of your driver license, and/or forfeiture of any or all of your Utah State Income Tax Refund."
¶ 16 Arguably, the placement language and contempt section may be sufficient to put an adult on notice of what is expected. But applying such unclear terms to a child is problematic due to the child's youth and does not ensure that the child would have a sufficient level of understanding. See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 2394, 2397, 180 L.Ed.2d 310 (2011) ("The law has historically reflected the . . . assumption that children characteristically lack the capacity to exercise mature judgment and possess only an incomplete ability to understand the world around them."); see also In re K.M., 2007 UT 93, ¶¶ 12-15, 173 P.3d 1279
¶ 17 Based on these circumstances, the juvenile court's written order was not sufficiently clear to demonstrate that D.V. knew that he, rather than or in conjunction with his parents, could be held in contempt for failing to comply with the juvenile court's order.
¶ 18 The juvenile court, in addition to considering the notice provided in the written order, took judicial notice of the fact that the court had previously on at least six occasions reiterated to D.V. that he was in the custody of DCFS. This evidence, however, does not support that D.V. was verbally provided with clear notice of what was required of him or the possibility of a finding of contempt for his failure to comply with the order. Nor is there other record evidence demonstrating that either the juvenile court or the caseworker explained to D.V. that the court order required him to remain with his foster placement and failure to do so may result in a contempt finding against D.V. The juvenile court's statement that it had, on at least six previous occasions, reiterated to D.V. the fact that he was in the custody of DCFS does not carry sufficient clarity and detail that a fourteen-year-old would have known what these statements meant at the time they were spoken—other than he could not live with his grandmother at the time as he wished—and that in fact he was to remain with the foster placement or he may be found in contempt of court and punished should he leave that placement. The court's verbal notifications suffer from many of the same deficiencies as the written order. The evidence of the juvenile court's repeated declarations of D.V.'s placement merely demonstrates that D.V. was told on several occasions that he was placed in the interim custody of DCFS without further explanation of what exactly was required of him or any discussion of the consequences if he did not comply with the placement order. The Supreme Court has observed that children "generally are less mature and responsible than adults, that they often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them[.]" J.D.B., 131 S.Ct. at 2403 (citation omitted).
¶ 19 Neither does the testimony of D.V.'s DCFS caseworker provide evidence that D.V. was put on notice that he may be found in contempt of court if he ran away from his placement. The caseworker specifically testified as follows,
At most, the caseworker's testimony demonstrates that D.V.'s desires were discussed by adults and that D.V. was (1) told to stay at his placement while the caseworker and the other individuals on the case investigated the possibility of D.V. going to live with his grandmother and (2) told that if he ran away from his foster placement there would be a pickup order out for him and that he would either go to detention or youth services, depending on what the juvenile court decided. This may be sufficient to show that D.V. was aware that he should not leave his foster placement. It is not, however, sufficient to establish that D.V. knew that by leaving his placement he was acting in violation of a court order, as opposed to simply a DCFS directive, and might be found in contempt of court. See State v. L.A., 2010 UT App 356, ¶ 17, 245 P.3d 213 ("There is simply no evidence from the contempt hearing to support a finding that [m]other knew she was violating the juvenile court's order, as opposed to merely defying [the probation officer].").
¶ 20 D.V. argues that the juvenile court erred in ruling that the testimony of the DCFS caseworker was admissible under rule 1101 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. At trial, D.V. objected to the testimony of the DCFS caseworker on hearsay grounds. The juvenile court admitted the testimony as an exception under rule 1101 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. D.V. did not raise an objection to the application of rule 1101 even when invited to do so by the court. Because D.V. did not object to the admission of the caseworker's testimony based on rule 1101, he failed to preserve the issue and cannot now raise that challenge for the first time on appeal. Therefore, we affirm the juvenile court's decision to admit the hearsay testimony of statements D.V.'s mother, grandmother, and foster mother made to his caseworker.
¶ 21 D.V. asserts that there was insufficient evidence for the juvenile court to find him in contempt. D.V. challenges the court's conclusion that D.V. knew that running away from his foster placement was a violation of the juvenile court's orders. The juvenile court, in its oral ruling, determined that D.V. knew what was required of him based on the order that placed D.V. in the interim custody of DCFS and that the court had previously on several occasions informed D.V. that he was in the custody of DCFS. The written order, however, is not sufficiently specific to inform D.V. what was required of him or the potential consequences for failure to comply. Neither is there other record evidence to demonstrate D.V. was verbally provided with such notice. As a result, we determine that the evidence was not sufficient to support a finding of contempt beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, we reverse the juvenile court's contempt finding.
¶ 22 I CONCUR: JUDITH M. BILLINGS, Senior Judge.
¶ 23 I agree with the majority's reasoning and conclusion regarding D.V.'s challenge to the juvenile court's ruling on the admissibility of the hearsay evidence. However, I disagree with the majority's conclusion that there was insufficient evidence for the juvenile court to find D.V. in contempt.
¶ 24 I believe that the evidence before the juvenile court, particularly considered in its totality, was sufficient to establish that D.V. knew that running away from his foster placement was a violation of the juvenile court's orders. At the 2006 hearing that D.V. attended, the court clearly ordered D.V. into the custody of DCFS and expressly indicated that failure to comply with the court's order could result in his being found in contempt. Furthermore, the juvenile court took judicial notice of the fact that it had previously reiterated to D.V. on at least six occasions that he was in the custody of DCFS. D.V. argues that the court's order did not specifically mandate that he "comply with the terms of his placement" and that therefore the order did not put him on notice that he would be in contempt of court by running away from his foster placement. However, D.V. was clearly on notice that he had been ordered into DCFS custody and that he was obligated to comply with the court's order, so removing himself from that custody by running away was a clear violation of that order. Most significantly, D.V.'s caseworker opined that D.V. "knew what was expected of him," and testified that he had personally informed D.V. on multiple occasions of the potential consequences for running away from his foster placement. While the 2006 order certainly could have been more explicit, the fact that D.V. was subject to the order for three years prior to running away, during which time he was continually reminded by the court and his caseworker of the terms of the order, strongly suggests to me that D.V. knew what was required of him. Given this evidence, and in light of the deferential standard of review we must apply to sufficiency of the evidence challenges, see American Fork City v. Rothe, 2000 UT App 277, ¶ 4, 12 P.3d 108 ("When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of the evidence, we must sustain the trial court's judgment unless it is against the clear weight of the evidence, or if [we] otherwise reach[] a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)), I would affirm the juvenile court's contempt ruling.
