Justice NEHRING, opinion of the Court:
¶ 1 Aequitas Enterprises, LLC, and Interstate Investment Group, LLC, entered into a real estate contract for the sale of 388 properties, all located outside the state of Utah. Aequitas subsequently sued Interstate Investment Group for breach of contract. To protect its interest in the properties, Aequitas also filed a motion requesting an extraterritorial prejudgment writ of attachment on all the properties. The district court granted Aequitas's motion for prejudgment writ of attachment and entered an order vesting title to all the properties in Aequitas. We hold that the district court lacked the requisite authority to enter an order directly affecting interests in real property located in other states. Therefore, we reverse the district court's decision and vacate its order.
¶ 2 Aequitas Enterprises, LLC, is a limited liability company located in Provo, Utah. Interstate Investment Group, LLC, is a limited liability company located in South Carolina. In November 2008, Aequitas and Interstate entered into a contract for the sale of 388 real estate properties. The properties are located in twenty-eight states across the nation; none of the properties is located in Utah. Most of the properties are "Real Estate Owned," which typically refers to a property owned by a bank after an unsuccessful foreclosure sale. The parties' contract was a "bulk deal" in which Aequitas agreed to pay approximately $2.6 million in exchange for title to all the properties. Aequitas paid the amount due under the contract but claims that Interstate failed to deliver title to the properties as promised. Aequitas blames Interstate for this failure, and Interstate argues that its failure to deliver title to all the properties was due to reasons beyond its control.
¶ 3 In July 2009, Aequitas sued Interstate in personam for breach of contract. Aequitas sought damages and, to protect its interests in the properties, filed a motion for a prejudgment writ of attachment. Aequitas asked the court to attach all 388 properties and declare that title to the properties immediately vest in Aequitas. Aequitas argued that a prejudgment writ of attachment was necessary "to secure its place in the chain of title."
¶ 4 At a hearing on Aequitas's motion, Interstate argued that the court lacked jurisdiction to issue a writ on property located outside the territorial boundaries of the state. The trial court asked the parties to brief this issue. A few days later, Interstate moved to dismiss Aequitas's Complaint, arguing that Interstate did not have sufficient
¶ 5 The district court granted Aequitas's motion to attach the properties. In its findings, the district court concluded it had "jurisdiction to issue [the w]rit, even though the subject properties involved . . . may be located outside of the State of Utah." The district court did not explain how it reached this conclusion. The district court also vested legal title to all 388 properties in Aequitas effective immediately and authorized the manager of Aequitas "to sign warranty deeds or other records of conveyance on [Interstate]'s. . . behalf in order to facilitate transfer of legal documents conveying title for the 388 properties."
¶ 6 Interstate filed its petition for permission to appeal the interlocutory order and also moved the district court to rule on the question of personal jurisdiction, which it had not yet done. We granted the interlocutory appeal. Subsequently, the district court determined that Interstate had sufficient minimum contacts with the state of Utah, and that the court, therefore, had personal jurisdiction. Interstate has not appealed this ruling. We have jurisdiction under Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)(j).
¶ 7 Interstate asks us to determine whether the district court erred when it issued prejudgment writs of attachment for real property located outside Utah. Any such authority stems from the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
¶ 8 Interstate also asks us to determine whether the trial court erred when it granted an order allowing Aequitas to convey and deed Interstate's real property, vesting title in Aequitas. Because we conclude that the district court lacked the authority to issue the extraterritorial prejudgment writ of attachment, we necessarily conclude that the district court lacked authority to take the further step of vesting title to the properties in Aequitas. It is therefore unnecessary to address this issue.
¶ 9 We begin by noting that the district court determined that it had personal jurisdiction over the parties and that Interstate has not appealed that decision. Instead, on appeal, Interstate asserts that a Utah court lacks in rem jurisdiction to attach extraterritorial property. Interstate cites our decision in Employers Mutual ofWassau v. Montrose Steel Co.,
¶ 10 The distinction between in rem and in personam jurisdiction is critical:
In other words, if a court has jurisdiction over only the property, the case is an in rem proceeding and the court may act only on that property. By contrast, when a court has personal jurisdiction over the parties to a case, the court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the parties' interests in real property, even if the property is not located in that state.
¶ 11 Because no one disputes that the court has personal jurisdiction over these parties, the next question before us is whether the district court had authority to enter an extraterritorial prejudgment writ of attachment in a proceeding in which it had in personam jurisdiction over the parties. The authority to issue writs of attachment is grounded entirely in state law.
¶ 12 Rule 64A(b) states that "[t]o obtain a writ of replevin, attachment or garnishment before judgment, plaintiff shall file a motion. . . and an affidavit stating facts showing the grounds for relief and other information required by these rules."
¶ 13 Rule 64C(b) specifically addresses writs of attachment and requires all of the following:
¶ 14 Although these rules set forth many grounds for obtaining a writ of attachment, they offer no answer to the question of whether an attachment may be issued against extraterritorial property. The parties do not dispute that the rules are silent on this issue but they interpret that silence differently. Interstate argues that because the rules contain no language expressly permitting the issuance of extraterritorial writs of attachment, such writs are prohibited. Aequitas argues the opposite: that because the rules do not expressly prohibit the issuance of extraterritorial writs of attachment, such writs are allowable.
¶ 15 "When we interpret a procedural rule, we do so according to our general rules of statutory construction."
¶ 16 Aequitas attempts to circumvent this gap by drawing on the language of other rules. Aequitas directs us to rule 64(a)(9), which defines "property" as "the defendant's property of any type not exempt from seizure. Property includes but is not limited to real and personal property. . . ."
¶ 17 Aequitas's attempt to interpret one rule by drawing on other rules is well taken. Following our rules of statutory construction, "[w]e read the plain language of [our rules of civil procedure] as a whole and interpret [their] provisions in harmony with other [rules]."
¶ 18 This interpretation is consistent with the questions of due process and comity that might arise if we were to issue extraterritorial writs of attachments. For example, the Full Faith and Credit clause found in Article IV, Section 1 of the United States Constitution would not require a sister jurisdiction to enforce a prejudgment writ of attachment; "[c]onstitutional full faith and credit attaches only to `final' judgments,"
¶ 19 Our research indicates that few states have considered whether their courts are empowered to issue an extraterritorial prejudgment writ of attachment while having personal jurisdiction over the parties. The vast majority of cases addressing the issue have done so using in rem jurisdiction. Under somewhat different facts, the California Court of Appeals determined that a district court erred when it issued a prejudgment writ of attachment to the defendant's intangible personal property located outside California.
¶ 20 In contrast, a federal district court in New Jersey upheld an extraterritorial prejudgment writ of attachment issued by a federal district court in Kentucky after concluding that the Kentucky statutes and rules of civil procedure did authorize such a writ.
¶ 21 The federal district court concluded "that extraterritorial application is appropriate if a plaintiff followed procedures for attaching a defendant's property."
¶ 22 We agree with the federal district court that such matters must be resolved on the basis of state rules of civil procedure, and conclude that our rules do not allow the issuance of extraterritorial writs of attachment. In the case before us, where the district court had undisputed personal jurisdiction over the parties, the attachment proceeding was not an in rem proceeding, but merely prejudgment relief aimed at property outside the state. Aequitas sought the writ
¶ 23 Finally, we address Aequitas's concern that our decision will leave it without a remedy. As we have noted, a district court with personal jurisdiction can affect the rights of an out-of-state defendant by acting directly on the defendant. As stated in Fall v. Eastin, a "court, not having jurisdiction of the res, cannot affect it by its decree,"
¶ 24 We conclude that our rules of civil procedure do not authorize a district court to issue a writ of attachment on extraterritorial property. We therefore reverse the decision of the district court and direct it to vacate its order issuing the writ and its accompanying decision vesting title in Aequitas to the properties described in the parties' contract.
Justice NEHRING authored the opinion of the Court in which Chief Justice DURHAM, Associate Chief Justice DURRANT, Justice PARRISH, and Justice LEE joined.