OPINION BY PANELLA, J.:
Appellant, Harry Galendez, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered on September 11, 2007, by the Honorable George W. Overton, Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. After careful review, we affirm in part and vacate in part.
In this appeal, we consider whether a police officer's knowledge that a person has an outstanding scofflaw warrant and is wanted for questioning in another matter gives that officer probable cause to make a warrantless arrest. We conclude that knowledge that a person has an outstanding warrant and is wanted for questioning is sufficient to give a police officer probable cause to make a warrantless arrest. We also consider whether a trial court may impose probationary conditions permitting searches of defendant's residence absent reasonable suspicion and if a trial court can impose parole conditions where defendant's sentence was for two or more years. Pursuant to this Court's recent decision in Commonwealth v. Alexander, 16 A.3d 1152, 1156 (Pa.Super.2011) (en banc), we conclude that such probationary conditions are illegal and that the parole conditions are a legal nullity. The facts and procedural history are as follows.
On October 25, 2006, Officer Steven Johnson of the Philadelphia Police Department observed Galendez walking down Westmoreland Avenue at 7:30 p.m. Officer Johnson knew that Galendez was wanted on a scofflaw warrant and was wanted for questioning pertaining to a carjacking. After Galendez entered a barber shop, Officer Johnson and other officers entered the shop and arrested him. During a subsequent search, the officers found a loaded handgun in Galendez's waistband.
Prior to trial, Galendez filed a motion to suppress the gun recovered during his arrest claiming that there was no legal basis or justification for his warrantless arrest. The suppression court denied the motion on the basis that Galendez's arresting officer testified that he knew Galendez was wanted on a scofflaw warrant and for questioning in a carjacking. The suppression court also reasoned that the defense
The case proceeded to trial in Gun Court, before the Honorable George W. Overton, after which Galendez was sentenced to a term of 2-4 years of imprisonment for possession of a firearm,
On appeal, Galendez raises the following issues:
Appellant's Brief, at 3.
The standard of review of an appeal from a denial of a motion to suppress is as follows:
Commonwealth v. Reppert, 814 A.2d 1196, 1200 (Pa.Super.2002) (en banc) (internal citations omitted).
Likewise, the standard for a warrantless arrest is also well settled, as stated by our esteemed colleague Judge Susan Gantman:
Commonwealth v. Williams, 941 A.2d 14, 27 (Pa.Super.2008) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Furthermore, as succinctly explained by then Judge, now President Judge, Correale Stevens: "[p]robable cause does not involve certainties, but rather `the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men act.'" Commonwealth v. Dommel, 885 A.2d 998, 1002 (Pa.Super.2005) (quoting Commonwealth v. Wright, 867 A.2d 1265, 1268 (Pa.Super.2005)). It is the facts and circumstances within the personal knowledge of the police officer that frames the determination of the existence of probable cause. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lawson, 454 Pa. 23, 27, 309 A.2d 391, 394 (1973) ("Probable cause exists if the facts and circumstances known to the officer warrant a prudent man in believing that [an] offense has been committed.").
Galendez's argument, that the suppression court erred in denying his suppression motion, centers on his assertion that the police arrested him without probable cause. He argues that probable cause was lacking because the arresting officer merely testified that Galendez was wanted on a scofflaw warrant and was wanted for questioning, and that this testimony, by itself, did not provide a basis for a warrantless arrest. In other words, Galendez contends that it was incumbent upon the Commonwealth to prove the validity of the outstanding warrant, by producing a copy of the warrant at the suppression hearing, to support a determination of probable cause justifying the warrantless arrest. We find Galendez's argument to be unfounded.
In this case, Officer Johnson had the following information within his personal knowledge at the time he observed Galendez:
The suppression court accepted the officer's testimony as credible, a clearly reasonable
Therefore, at the suppression hearing, the Commonwealth presented evidence pertaining to the facts and circumstances known to the officer at the time of arrest. The officer's testimony was more than sufficient to support a finding that the officer knew Galendez and knew that a warrant was outstanding for Galendez's arrest. In response to Officer Johnson's testimony, Galendez failed to argue that there was no valid warrant for his arrest or that he was not wanted by the police. As such, the Commonwealth met its burden of proof and we find that the suppression court properly denied Galendez's suppression motion. Any other conclusion would mean nothing less than a rejection of Officer Johnson's sworn, uncontroverted testimony. Given the legal standards set forth above, there was simply no need for the Commonwealth to present any additional evidence.
Instead of suppressing the evidence obtained by Officer Johnson, we commend the officer in his efforts to protect the public. Indeed, at the subsequent bench trial, the Commonwealth introduced all nonhearsay testimony from the suppression hearing, as well as evidence that:
With regard to Galendez's final two issues on appeal, the validity of the probation and parole condition authorizing random searches of his residence imposed two days after sentencing, we must note that we have been unsuccessful in obtaining a signed, certified copy of the order entered by the trial court imposing the condition. Despite our Court ordering the trial court to certify and transmit a copy of the order in a supplemental record and our Prothonotary Office's informal inquiry
We begin by noting that an en banc panel of this Court recently held that probationary conditions permitting searches absent reasonable suspicion are illegal. See Commonwealth v. Alexander, 16 A.3d 1152, 1156 (Pa.Super.2011) (en
In any event, even apart from Alexander, we would find the probationary condition a legal nullity. The parties allege that the condition was imposed two days after Galendez was sentenced in open court. To further complicate matters, Galendez avers and the Commonwealth concedes that the trial court's order authorizing imposition of this condition was signed without either Galendez or his attorney present.
Finally, we also recognize that the trial court did not have the authority to impose the random residential search condition on Galendez's parole, whether at or after sentencing, as the maximum term of Galendez's sentence was two or more years. See Alexander, 16 A.3d at 1156 (vacating portion of sentencing order that imposed parole conditions where maximum sentence was two or more years as sentencing court had no authority to impose parole conditions). See also Commonwealth v. Wilson, 11 A.3d 519, 530 (Pa.Super.2010) (Opinion in Support of Affirmance by Panella, J., with eight Judges joining) (en banc). Thus, we also find the condition imposed on Galendez's parole a legal nullity. We, therefore, vacate that portion of his sentence as it relates to parole.
Judgment of sentence affirmed in part and vacated in part. Case remanded for proceedings consistent with this memorandum. Jurisdiction relinquished.
LAZARUS, J. files a concurring and dissenting opinion in which Judge DONOHUE joins.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY LAZARUS, J.:
I join in the majority's decision regarding the validity of Galendez's probation and parole condition which authorized random searches of his residence and was imposed two days after sentencing. The probationary condition is not only invalid because it was entered without notice to or in the presence of Galendez and his attorney two days following sentencing, but, as our full Court held in Commonwealth v. Alexander, 16 A.3d 1152 (Pa.Super.2011), such conditions are illegal when they are
I write separately, however, because I disagree with the majority's conclusion that Officer Johnson had probable cause to arrest Galendez without a warrant. Specifically, the majority states that "a police officer's knowledge that a person has an outstanding scofflaw warrant and is wanted for questioning in another matter gives that officer probable cause to make a warrantless arrest." Majority Opinion at 1044. I believe that these unverified facts, at most, gave the officer reasonable suspicion to conduct a stop of Galendez; they do not rise to the level of probable cause to arrest him.
Case law states that probable cause exists "when the facts and circumstances which are within the knowledge of the officer at the time of the arrest, and of which he has reasonable trustworthy information, are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the suspect has committed or is committing a crime." Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 526 Pa. 268, 585 A.2d 988, 990 (1991) (emphasis added). The only information supporting Officer Johnson forcing Galendez to the barber shop floor at gunpoint was: (1) he knew Galendez as a regular in the neighborhood; (2) he knew Galendez from previous incidents; (3) he knew Galendez had an outstanding scofflaw warrant; and (4) he knew Galendez was wanted "in the east division" for questioning in a carjacking. N.T. Suppression Hearing, 9/11/2007, at 6. Even looking at these facts in total, as we must, the arresting officer's information does not qualify as "reasonably trustworthy." Rodriguez, supra.
Officer Johnson neither indicated how he uncovered this outstanding warrant or questioning information, nor supported his statements by a reasonably trustworthy authority or basis (such as police database records, confidential informant tips, or even a photocopy of the alleged warrant).
Because the factual findings do not support Galendez's warrantless arrest, I