Filed: Dec. 23, 2009
Latest Update: Feb. 22, 2020
Summary: DORAL FINANCIAL CORPORATION;, BALDOCK, Circuit Judge.80) and 29 L.P.R.A § 194a (Law No. 115).Plaintiff began working for Defendant on May 6, 1999.the Puerto Rico lawsuit on January 26, 2004.must be reviewed since there is an ongoing complaint.mere pretext.district courts decision in this manner.
Not for Publication in West’s Federal Reporter
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
___________________
No. 08-1214
LUZ VILLANUEVA-BATISTA,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
DORAL FINANCIAL CORPORATION; FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants, Appellees.
___________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. José Antonio Fusté, U.S. District Judge]
___________________
Before
Torruella, Baldock, * and Howard, Circuit Judges.
___________________
Arturo Luciano Delgado, on brief for appellant. **
Pedro Manzano Yates, D i a n a M . E s p í n o s a N ú ñ e z a n d
Fiddler González & Rodríguez, PSC on brief for appellee
Doral Financial Corporation.
December 23, 2009
*
Of the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation.
**
Attorney Delgado failed to appear at oral argument,
so this case was submitted on the briefs. He explains in
his show cause letter that he was medically unable to attend
oral argument.
BALDOCK, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Luz Villanueva
Batista appeals from the district court’s grant of summary
judgment for Defendants Doral Financial Corporation and
Federal Ins. Co. on her claims for unjust dismissal and
retaliatory termination under 29 L.P.R.A. § 185a (Law No.
80) and 29 L.P.R.A § 194a (Law No. 115). The district court
exercised diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and
affirm.
We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary
judgment and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party. Sonoran Scanners, Inc. v. Perkinelmer,
Inc., 585 F.3d 535, 539-40 (1st Cir. 2009). The parties are
familiar with the facts and procedural history of this case,
and we do not repeat them here except where necessary.
Plaintiff first argues the district court erred in
concluding she failed to demonstrate Defendant’s reason for
terminating her was a mere pretext. Under Law No. 115(c),
once an employer has provided a legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason for firing an employee, the
employee bears the ultimate burden of "demonstrat[ing] that
the alleged reason provided by the employer was a mere
pretext for the discharge." 29 L.P.R.A. § 194a(c). See
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Rivera Rodríguez v. Sears Roebuck de Puerto Rico, 432 F.3d
379, 383 n.2 (1st Cir. 2005).
Plaintiff began working for Defendant on May 6, 1999.
From February 6, 2001 until she was terminated on March 29,
2004, Plaintiff received several reprimands and complaints
about her performance and interaction with other employees.
She also filed complaints of her own concerning the behavior
of other employees. Plaintiff’s supervisors met with her
numerous times to discuss both Plaintiff’s complaints and
those filed against her, as well as her infractions of
company rules. Additionally, Plaintiff was suspended
without pay from August 14 to 20, 2003. On August 22, 2003,
she filed a lawsuit against Defendant in Puerto Rico local
court to recover unpaid bonuses and commissions. Defendant
received the summons on August 27, 2003. Additional
disciplinary problems arose, and Plaintiff’s supervisors met
with her again. Several written communications informed
Plaintiff that she would be terminated if her behavior did
not improve. Plaintiff began giving deposition testimony in
the Puerto Rico lawsuit on January 26, 2004. Further
problems arose with Plaintiff’s behavior at work. Though
her supervisors attempted to meet with her to discuss these
problems, Plaintiff refused to discuss anything. On March
29, 2004, Plaintiff’s supervisors notified her that they
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were terminating her employment with Defendant because of
her history of violating company regulations and her refusal
to cooperate in an internal investigation.
We agree with the district court that Defendant
presented ample evidence to show Plaintiff’s termination was
the culmination of an unsuccessful disciplinary process.
Plaintiff’s only evidence of pretext is an October 20, 2003
email from Human Resources to one of Plaintiff’s supervisors
advising him to “remember that the actions with [Plaintiff]
must be reviewed since there is an ongoing complaint.”
Taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, this
statement is, at best, ambiguous in many ways: It is
unclear whether “complaint” refers to Plaintiff’s lawsuit or
her internal complaints; it is unclear what “reviewed”
means; and it is unclear whether the writer had any
retaliatory intent or was merely reminding the recipient to
document interactions with Plaintiff. Therefore, this email
is insufficient to show that the Defendant’s reasons are a
mere pretext. See Velez v. Thermo King de Puerto Rico,
Inc., 585 F.3d 441, 452 (1st Cir. 2009) (explaining in an
ADEA case that a plaintiff must “elucidate specific facts”
demonstrating the employer’s justification is a sham
intended to hide an actual unlawful motive).
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Plaintiff’s second contention seems to be that the
district court erred by concluding her retaliation claim was
based on an internal complaint rather than her deposition
testimony beginning January 26, 2004. We do not read the
district court’s decision in this manner. Instead, the
district court first explained that Plaintiff engaged in
protected activity by filing a lawsuit and Defendant
discharged her, then concluded Defendant satisfied its
burden to provide a legitimate reason for Plaintiff’s
termination. Plaintiff, however, did not demonstrate that
Defendant’s reason was a mere pretext, so the district court
concluded her retaliation claim failed. Next, the district
court reasoned that even if Defendant’s actions amounted to
retaliation against Plaintiff for her November 2002 internal
complaint about unpaid bonuses and commissions, those
actions began before Plaintiff filed her lawsuit or gave her
deposition. Moreover, Law No. 115 protects only "testimony,
expression or information . . . before a legislative,
administrative, or judicial forum," not internal complaints.
29 L.P.R.A § 194a. Because the district court properly
found that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate pretext and,
additionally, could not base her retaliation claim on
internal complaints, the court did not err when it granted
summary judgment for Defendant.
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Upon careful consideration of the briefs, the record,
and the applicable law, in light of the applicable standard
of review, we discern no reversible error presented in this
case. AFFIRMED.
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