Filed: Jun. 15, 2016
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _ No. 15-1595 _ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. JAMES EDWARD CLARK, Appellant _ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. No. 2-08-cr-00508-001) District Judge: Honorable Robert F. Kelly _ Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) March 4, 2016 Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, SMITH, and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges. (Filed: June 15, 2016) _ OPINION* _ * This disposition is not an opi
Summary: NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _ No. 15-1595 _ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. JAMES EDWARD CLARK, Appellant _ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. No. 2-08-cr-00508-001) District Judge: Honorable Robert F. Kelly _ Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) March 4, 2016 Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, SMITH, and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges. (Filed: June 15, 2016) _ OPINION* _ * This disposition is not an opin..
More
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 15-1595
____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
JAMES EDWARD CLARK,
Appellant
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 2-08-cr-00508-001)
District Judge: Honorable Robert F. Kelly
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
March 4, 2016
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, SMITH, and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: June 15, 2016)
____________
OPINION*
____________
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does
not constitute binding precedent.
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
James Edward Clark appeals the District Court’s order denying his motion to
vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Because we agree with
the District Court that Clark’s defense counsel was not ineffective, we will affirm.
I
Clark was indicted by a federal grand jury on one count of attempting to
manufacture methamphetamine under 18 U.S.C. § 846 and one count of possessing red
phosphorous under 18 U.S.C. § 841(c)(1). After a three-day jury trial, he was convicted
on both counts and the District Court sentenced him to 360 months’ imprisonment. We
upheld Clark’s convictions and sentence on direct appeal. See United States v. Clark, 419
F. App’x 248, 251 (3d Cir. 2011).
The Government’s case at trial relied principally on testimony from a confidential
informant who had agreed to cook methamphetamine for Clark. Clark in turn supplied the
informant with precursor materials and equipment, including laboratory-grade glassware,
red phosphorous, and ephedrine. The ephedrine that Clark provided, however, was
actually a mixture of niacinamide, dimethyl sulfone, and nicotinic acid. None of these
compounds are chemical precursors to methamphetamine or implicated in its synthesis,
facts that the Government conceded in its opening and closing arguments and that Clark’s
defense counsel repeatedly emphasized. Clark’s defense revolved around a theory that he
2
had intentionally supplied fake ephedrine in the hopes of either defrauding the informant
or taking revenge on the informant for past debts.
Following his unsuccessful direct appeal, Clark filed a pro se motion under 28
U.S.C. § 2255 in the District Court asserting several collateral attacks on his criminal
sentence. The District Court appointed new counsel for Clark and conducted two
evidentiary hearings, at one of which Clark presented expert testimony from a forensic
chemist. Clark’s trial counsel also testified. Clark then filed a counseled motion asserting
that his trial counsel was constitutionally deficient for: (1) not retaining a forensic
chemist to rebut the Government’s expert; (2) advising Clark not to testify in his own
defense; and (3) failing to investigate and present several witnesses to testify on Clark’s
behalf. The District Court considered each of Clark’s arguments, but denied his motion.
Clark appealed.1
II
Whether counsel’s performance is deficient under the Sixth Amendment requires a
showing that: (1) discrete acts or omissions by counsel “were outside the wide range of
professionally competent assistance” and not the “result of reasonable professional
judgment”; and (2) as a consequence, “there is a reasonable probability that, but for
1
The District Court had jurisdiction over Clark’s habeas petition under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 and issued a certificate of appealability on March 20, 2015. We have appellate
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253. We review the District Court’s factual findings for
clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Travillion, 759 F.3d 281,
289 (3d Cir. 2014).
3
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690, 694 (1984). “A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”
Id. at 694. We “indulge a
strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance,” i.e., that “the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial
strategy.’”
Id. at 689 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana,
350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)).
A
Clark first claims that his counsel was ineffective because he failed to retain a
forensic chemist to rebut the Government’s expert witness. He suggests that a defense
expert could have undermined the Government’s claim that he intended to manufacture
methamphetamine by testifying that the materials Clark provided could not have been
turned into methamphetamine. He further argues that the expert could have testified
about Clark’s sophistication in providing the informant with laboratory-grade
glassware—implying that Clark would have known the ephedrine was fake—and that
Clark did not provide the informant with all necessary materials (such as iodine) for a
successful synthesis.
The District Court considered each of these contentions and found them
unpersuasive. As the Court observed: (1) the Government readily conceded that it would
have been impossible for the informant to synthesize methamphetamine from Clark’s
supplies; (2) Clark’s counsel repeatedly challenged the Government’s witnesses—
including the informant and the Government’s forensic chemist—on this point; and (3)
4
the jury was made aware of the fact that Clark had supplied a laboratory-grade flask and
other necessary reagents, both indicative of his knowledge and sophistication.
We agree with the District Court. At best, the expert testimony Clark sought
would have been duplicative of evidence and arguments introduced by counsel through
other means. At worst, the expert’s testimony could have cut against Clark, for example
by showing that he intended to rely on the informant’s assistance or that he was
sophisticated in the business of making and selling methamphetamine. Accordingly,
Clark’s claim fails to overcome the presumption that his counsel’s decision not to employ
an expert was strategic.2
B
Next, Clark contends his counsel was ineffective because he advised Clark not to
testify. According to Clark, his testimony would have been the only direct evidence of his
intent, the need for which was particularly acute because the District Court had already
ruled that his involvement in a 2007 methamphetamine cook was admissible. As the
District Court observed, however, counsel had “a number of sound tactical reasons” for
giving this advice. App. 16. Clark’s testimony would have opened him to cross-
examination on statements made shortly after his arrest. In those statements, Clark agreed
2
Clark also complains that the Government notified him of its intention to
introduce expert testimony just three days before trial—in violation of Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(G)—and that his counsel failed to object or ask for a
continuance despite this obvious error. In fact, the record shows that the Government
gave Clark notice of its expert on November 10, 2008, three months before trial.
5
to turn over nineteen additional pounds of ephedrine, which subsequent testing revealed
to be niacinamide, the same substance he had supplied to the informant. Such testimony
would have seriously undermined the defense, which turned entirely on Clark knowing
the ephedrine was fake. And Clark would have had to explain away a number of
practically “unexplainable” statements recorded by the informant, as well as account for
exactly why he was in possession of paraphernalia associated with “clandestine
methamphetamine laboratories.” App. 279, 499. For these reasons, we agree with the
District Court that advising Clark not to testify was an exercise of “reasonable
professional judgment,” well within the “wide range” of reasonable conduct permitted
under Strickland. 466 U.S. at 690–91.
C
Finally, Clark asserts that counsel failed to investigate and present several
potential defense witnesses: Ron Lavan, Sherry Baker, and Mary Lynn Hallas, and Eric
Rolfing.3 We have recognized that, in certain circumstances, “a complete failure to
investigate potentially corroborating witnesses” can constitute ineffective assistance. See,
e.g., United States v. Gray, 878 F.2d 702, 711 (3d Cir. 1989) (quoting United States v.
Debango,
780 F.2d 81, 85 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).
As part of Clark’s habeas case, Lavan, Baker, and Hallas submitted affidavits
setting forth the general content of what their testimony would have been at trial, and
3
The parties do not agree on the spelling of Rolfing’s name, so we have adopted
the District Court’s version.
6
stating that they would have been willing to testify on Clark’s behalf had they been
asked. Lavan’s affidavit avers that he observed Clark using “Vitablend” as a “supplement
in protein drinks,” and that he helped transfer the supplement into plastic bags Clark gave
to the informant and later turned over to federal agents. Supp. App. 65–66. Baker and
Hallas’s affidavits aver that they helped Clark order Vitablend about a year before the
events giving rise to his indictment.
Notwithstanding their support for Clark, none of these potential witnesses testified
at either of the evidentiary hearings conducted by the District Court. Clark’s trial counsel,
however, did testify, and stated that he interviewed both Lavan and Baker, but did not
recall anything about Hallas. The Court’s decision to credit trial counsel’s testimony that
he investigated these potential witnesses is therefore not clearly erroneous.4 We also
agree that counsel had tactical reasons for not calling these witnesses. Clark’s post-arrest
statements implicated Lavan as the source of the (fake) ephedrine, which severely
undercut Lavan’s value as a defense witness. Baker and Hallas’s testimony about events
in 2007 would have been minimally probative about Clark’s activities in 2008, and only
tangentially relevant to whether he believed the fake ephedrine to be real. Moreover, trial
counsel testified that, with respect to Baker and Hallas, “a couple witnesses . . . did not
4
We also note that when a district court holds an evidentiary hearing on a § 2255
motion, parties must do more than just submit affidavits when the facts are in dispute, as
“contested fact issues in section 2255 cases cannot be resolved on the basis of affidavits
alone.” Gov’t of V.I. v. Nicholas, 759 F.2d 1073, 1077 (3d Cir. 1985).
7
want to get involved, and I believe that they made that decision fairly close in time to the
trial date.” App. 507.5
* * *
For the reasons stated, we will affirm the District Court’s order.
5
As to Rolfing, there is no evidence of record establishing what his testimony
would have been. Clark’s pro se motion mentions a forthcoming affidavit from Rolfing,
but no such affidavit was submitted. Nor did Rolfing testify during Clark’s evidentiary
hearings. Accordingly, Clark’s argument regarding Rolfing’s potential testimony
amounts to “mere speculation” insufficient to sustain a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel. Gray, 878 F.2d at 712.
8
