MURPHY, J.

In the case at bar, this Court granted both a petition and cross-petition for a writ of certiorari to address two issues of public importance: (1) the extent to which the First Amendment's "ministerial exception" is applicable to a sixteen count civil action asserted against a church by a former employee who claims that she was the victim of sexual harassment and employment discrimination; and (2) whether the former employee's "hostile work environment" claim was timely filed under the "continuing violation doctrine" exception to the applicable statute of limitations. 409 Md. 47, 972 A.2d 861 (2009). Before addressing these issues, however, it is necessary that we clear away a good deal of flotsam and jetsam produced by the two hundred seventy-five paragraph,1 fifty-one page Complaint in which the former employee asserted her sixteen claims.

At this point in these needlessly complicated proceedings, there are four Petitioners/Cross Respondents ("Petitioners"): (1) Prince of Peace Lutheran Church ("the Church"), (2) Rufus S. Lusk, III ("Lusk"), (3) the Metropolitan Washington D.C. Synod of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America ("the Synod"), and (4) Bishop Theodore Schneider ("Schneider"). Having ultimately prevailed in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, they argue that the Court of Special Appeals has erroneously concluded that Respondent/Cross Petitioner, Mary Linklater (Respondent) is entitled to a new trial on four of the claims asserted in her Complaint.2 Respondent, who was awarded compensatory and punitive damages by a jury, argues that the Court of Special Appeals has erroneously concluded that she is not entitled to the entry of a judgment that conforms to that verdict.3 For the reasons that follow, we hold that (1) the ministerial exception does not apply to two of the claims that Respondent has asserted, and (2) the "continuing violation doctrine" is applicable to those claims.

Background

As the issues before us involve questions of law rather than questions of fact, there is no need to set forth each and every item of conflicting evidence in the record of this "she said, they said" case.4 Suffice it to say that the evidence was sufficient to establish that Respondent (1) was the victim of sexual harassment, (2) complained about the harassment, and (3) was the victim of additional harassment and retaliation as a result of her complaints.

On October 16, 2002, Respondent filed a Complaint against the Petitioners in which she asserted the following causes of action:

Respondent's Complaint included the following assertions:

Respondent's Complaint included the following Prayer for Relief:

The first Circuit Court ruling of consequence occurred on March 10, 2003, when the pretrial motions hearing court resolved Petitioners' motions to dismiss in an on-the-record proceeding during which it stated:

The second Circuit Court ruling of consequence occurred on January 19, 2005, when the trial court filed a Memorandum Opinion and Order that included the following findings and conclusions:

Prior to trial, Lusk and the Church filed a motion in limine to exclude any evidence of Lusk's net worth, but the Circuit Court made no pretrial ruling on that issue. At trial, Respondent introduced into evidence a financial statement that listed the income and marital property of both Lusk and his wife. The trial court entered a judgment in favor of Petitioners on Respondent's injurious falsehood claim, so only Count V (the IIED claim), and Count VI (the invasion of privacy and false light claim) were submitted to the jury.

The jury returned its verdicts on a "special" VERDICT SHEET that includes the following questions and answers:

Numerous post-trial motions were filed by all parties. At the first post-trial motions hearing, the trial court concluded that it had made a "fatal error" by admitting the joint financial statement before the jury had made a finding that would entitle Respondent to argue for an award of punitive damages.5 Ultimately, after the trial court recused itself on its own motion, another member of the Circuit Court granted the Church and Lusk a new trial on the IIED count.

The final Circuit Court rulings of consequence were made by a fourth member of the court, who (1) citing the ministerial exception, granted the Church's motion in limine to exclude all evidence of Respondent's job performance, and (2) thereafter granted renewed motions for summary judgment made by the Church and Lusk. Respondent noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, and filed a brief that did not include argument that the Circuit Court erred in entering judgments on Counts VI, VII, and VIII.

In the "CONCLUSION" section of her brief, Respondent requested that the Court of Special Appeals provide the following relief:

In an unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals held that (1) the IIED claim asserted in Count V "fails, as a matter of law, to meet the high threshold required for liability," (2) that Respondent "alleged at least one instance of retaliatory conduct that fell within the statute of limitations, so her claims [in Counts I and III] are not time-barred, because they are saved by the continuing violation rule," and (3) "[b]ecause Schneider and the Synod are not `employers' under the Montgomery County Code, . . . the hostile work environment and gender discrimination counts [Counts I and III] cannot be brought against them." On the basis of these holdings, the Court of Special Appeals ordered a "remand [of] this case for further proceedings on Counts I, III and IV against Lusk, Counts I, III, IV and XV against the church, and Counts IV and XIV (Breach of Contract) against Schneider and the Synod." Thus, if we affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals in its entirety, the case at bar will be remanded for further proceedings on the following Counts against the following Petitioners:

The brief that Respondent filed in this Court did not include argument that the Court of Special Appeals erred in affirming the judgments entered by the Circuit Court on Counts VI, VII, VIII, IX, XI, XII, XIII and XVI. She has therefore waived any claim that the judgments entered on those counts should be reversed.6 In the "CONCLUSION" section of her brief, Respondent requests that this Court provide the following relief:

Petitioners request that we direct that all of the judgments in their favor be affirmed. We must therefore determine the issue of whether the claims asserted in Counts I, II, III, and IV were timely filed under the "continuing violation doctrine," and the extent to which the ministerial exception is applicable to the claims asserted in Counts I, II, III, IV, V, X, XIV, and XV of Respondent's complaints.

DISCUSSION

On the date that Respondent filed her Complaint, M.C.C. § 27-19, in pertinent part, provided:

Md.Code (1957, 2003 Repl.Vol.), Art. 49B § 42(a),7 in pertinent part, provides:

On October 16, 2002, Art. 49B, § 42(b) provided:

I. The Ministerial Exception and Sexual Harassment

The "ministerial exception" is rooted in both the "Free exercise" and "Establishment" clauses of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.8 The Free Exercise Clause prohibits governmental action that "encroaches upon the ability of a church to manage its internal affairs." EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 460 (D.C.Cir.1996) (citing Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 116, 73 S.Ct. 143, 154-155, 97 L.Ed. 120 (1952)) (explaining that the free exercise clause protects the power of religious organizations "to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine"). The Establishment Clause prohibits "excessive entanglement" between government and religion.9 In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971), the United States Supreme Court established the following three part test to determine whether the ministerial exception is applicable to a particular statute:

Id. at 612-13, 91 S.Ct. at 2111 (internal citations omitted). M.C.C. § 27-19, like its federal counterpart, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) [(42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.) has an obvious secular purpose, and neither advances nor inhibits religion.

Petitioners argue that (in the words of their brief) "the ministerial exception applies not just to matters of religious scriptures or dogma but also more broadly to matters of church governance." Although some federal appellate courts have applied the ministerial exception broadly,10 we agree with the following analysis by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit:

Bollard v. California Province of the Soc'y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 945 (9th Cir.1999).

In Sanders v. Casa View Baptist Church, 134 F.3d 331 (5th Cir.1998), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated:

Id. at 335-36.

Sanders was cited with approval by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in McKelvey v. Pierce, 173 N.J. 26, 800 A.2d 840 (2002). While reversing the dismissal of sexual harassment claims asserted by a former seminarian, the McKelvey Court stated:

Id. at 52-53, 800 A.2d at 856-57.

In Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715 (Minn.App.1991), an associate pastor of a Lutheran church asserted sexual harassment and related claims against her supervising pastor, alleging that "[the supervising pastor] repeatedly made unwelcome sexual advances toward her including referring to the two of them as "lovers," physically contacting her in a sexual manner, and insisting on her companionship outside the work place, despite her objections." Id. at 717-718.

471 N.W.2d at 720-721 (internal citations omitted).

In the case at bar, the Church has not argued that there is any doctrinal reason for the harassment alleged by Respondent. Moreover, the Church has promulgated the following sexual harassment policy:

We agree with the above quoted analysis and therefore hold that the ministerial exception does not operate to bar every claim of sexual harassment asserted against church officials by a former ministerial employee.

Counts I-III

The opinion of the Court of Special Appeals includes the following analysis:

We agree with the Court of Special Appeals that, "adjudicating the quid pro quo claim would require the court to assess whether Linklater was `otherwise qualified to receive a job benefit,'" and thus would "necessitate an evaluation of Linklater's job performance which would run afoul of the ministerial exception." We therefore hold that the ministerial exception prohibits Respondent from proceeding to trial on Count II of her Complaint.

Although Counts I and III stem from the harassment itself and would not involve the court in "matters of church governance," these counts were dismissed by the Circuit Court on the ground that they were barred by the statute of limitations. The Court of Special Appeals, however, held that because Respondent had "alleged at least one instance of retaliatory conduct that fell within the statute of limitations, [Count I and Count III] are saved by the continuing violation rule." While we agree that the continuing violation doctrine is applicable to Count I and Count III, our conclusion is based upon an incident that is alleged to have occurred within the period of limitations and has nothing whatsoever to do with church governance.

In Richards v. CH2M Hill, Inc., 26 Cal.4th 798, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 87, 29 P.3d 175 (2001), while holding that an employer may be held liable for disability related harassment and discrimination actions occurring outside the limitations period,11 the Supreme Court of California noted that federal cases interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) [(42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.) have taken four different approaches to the continuing violation doctrine:

Richards, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 87, 29 P.3d at 183-185. (Emphasis supplied).

The Richards Court also noted that "the Berry test has been widely adopted by the federal courts."12 We are persuaded, however, that the "course of conduct" test is most compatible with National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002), in which the United States Supreme Court held that Title VII

Id. at 105, 122 S.Ct. at 2068.

The Circuit Court and the Court of Special Appeals were both correct in concluding that Respondent may not benefit from the continuing violation doctrine on the basis of conduct that is inadmissible under the ministerial exception. The Court of Special Appeals held that Lusk's February 4, 2001 speech, at the annual report to the congregation, was not barred by the ministerial exception and therefore could serve to "rescue" her otherwise untimely claims. We do not agree with that holding. The ministerial exception is applicable to a speech in which a pastor (1) informs the congregation of a pending lawsuit that could affect the Church, and (2) proclaims that he or she is innocent of misconduct.

It is impossible, however, to hypothesize a religious justification for stabbing a photograph of Respondent with multiple holes through the head, eyes, and chest, and then posting that photograph in the hallway across from her office. This is clearly an act of retaliation to which the "course of conduct" test is applicable. Petitioners argue that any act of retaliation that occurred after October 16, 2002 cannot "rescue" the claims asserted in Count I and Count III. In Birschtein, supra, the Court of Appeal of California, First Appellate District, rejected a similar argument, stating:

Id. at 351-53. We agree with that analysis, and therefore hold that the continuing violation doctrine is applicable to Respondent's allegations of (1) sexual harassment that occurred more than two years before she filed her Complaint, and (2) retaliatory actions taken against her that occurred within the period of limitations. We therefore affirm the holding of the Court of Special Appeals that Count I and Count III of Respondent's Complaint are not barred by limitations.

Counts IV, V, X, XIV and XV

We hold that the claims asserted in Counts IV, V, X, XIV and XV would necessarily involve judicial inquiry into church governance, and such an inquiry is prohibited by the First Amendment. The uniform line of cases that are consistent with this holding include Black v. Snyder, supra. In that case, while holding that the plaintiff was entitled to proceed on her sexual harassment claim, the Minnesota Court of Appeals explained why she was not entitled to proceed on her breach of contract, reprisal, retaliation, and defamation claims:

471 N.W.2d at 720.

A trial on the merits of the claim asserted in Count IV would necessarily involve an inquiry into the various employment actions taken by the Church, and would therefore "encroach on the ability of a church to manage its internal affairs." EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 460 (D.C.Cir.1996). A trial on the merits of the claim asserted in Count V would necessarily involve an inquiry into various employment actions taken by the Church, as well as an inquiry into matters of church governance. A trial on the merits of the claim asserted in Count X would necessarily involve an inquiry into the Church's employment decisions, and "[t]he [ministerial] exception precludes any inquiry whatsoever into the reasons behind a church's ministerial employment decision." EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 213 F.3d 795, 801 (4th Cir.2000). A trial on the merits of the claims asserted in Counts XIV and XV would necessarily involve an inquiry into matters of church governance and discipline.

Remaining Issues

Petitioners mount a three prong attack on the M.C.C. First they argue that because "employer" was defined by the M.C.C. as an entity with six or more persons prior to August of 2001,13 it would be inconsistent to impose individual liability on a "person." Furthermore, the M.C.C. was changed in August 2001 to define "employer" as "anyone who has hired a single individual." Petitioners also argue that the M.C.C. does not apply to them because, at all times relevant to the case at bar, they did not have the requisite number of employees. Finally, they challenge the constitutionality of Article 49B, § 42. None of these arguments were presented to the Circuit Court, so they have not been preserved for appellate review. Petitioners now argue that they are entitled to review of their challenge to the statute on the ground that "the constitutionality of the statute is jurisdictional in nature." It is clear, however, that Petitioners' argument does not involve an issue of "jurisdiction," i.e., the power of the court to hear a case. They now argue that Article 49B, § 42 violates their "constitutional rights" by permitting variation in county laws. In the words of their brief, "[Prince of Peace] with only three employees find themselves subjected to claims and uncapped liability that would not have applied in a vast majority of jurisdictions." They have waived appellate review of this argument by failing to present it to the Circuit Court.

Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, we affirm the holding of the Court of Special Appeals that Count I and Count III be remanded for further proceedings against Lusk and the Church, and we reverse the holding that the Circuit Court conduct further proceedings on Counts IV, XIV and XV.

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED IN PART; CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO REVERSE THE JUDGMENTS ENTERED BY THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY ON COUNT I AND COUNT III OF RESPONDENT'S COMPLAINT, AND REMAND TO THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION; JUDGMENT OTHERWISE AFFIRMED; 65% OF THE COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY PETITIONERS; 35% OF SAID COSTS TO BE PAID BY RESPONDENT.

BELL, C.J., BATTAGLIA and ADKINS, JJ., concur and dissent.

ADKINS, J., concurring and dissenting, in which BELL, C.J., and BATTAGLIA, J., join.

I agree with the majority in large part. I respectfully concur and dissent, however, because I think the majority adopts an unduly broad interpretation of the "ministerial exception" to state laws against employment discrimination. Although the majority allows Counts I and III to survive after application of the ministerial exception, its broad reading of the exception leads to its rejection of Linklater's retaliatory firing claim and other counts of her complaint. The majority views the ministerial exception as barring judicial inquiry into any matter involving "church governance,"1 and it defines church governance liberally. Applying this broad standard, it concludes that Linklater's other counts would "necessarily involve judicial inquiry into church governance, and such an inquiry is prohibited by the First Amendment." Maj. Op. at 696, 28 A.3d at 1189. I submit that, in doing so, the majority blazes an unduly broad trail for the ministerial exception, and that the retaliatory discharge count and others should survive its application.2

I disagree with the majority's rationale in one other significant respect. In my view, the majority improperly expands the ministerial exception when it holds that the exception protects, and thus bars Linklater's use of, the entirety of Pastor Rufus S. Lusk's February 4, 2001, statements to the congregation.3

I. The Ministerial Exception

A. Scope

The "ministerial exception" to antidiscrimination laws typically prohibits state inquiry into religious-based employment decisions by churches and other religious organizations. See Montrose Christian Sch. Corp. v. Walsh, 363 Md. 565, 593, 770 A.2d 111, 127 (2001) (holding that a church was entitled to employ only members of its faith). Religious-based employment decisions typically involve the hiring and firing of "ministers," which can also include nonclergy.4

This case presents two conflicting values that the ministerial exception must reconcile: churches' ability to make spiritual decisions autonomously and the need for churches to abide by the "profound state interest" in assuring equal employment opportunities for all, regardless of sex. EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 213 F.3d 795, 801 (4th Cir.2000); see also Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th Cir.1985).

The cases upon which the majority relies support the general proposition that many of a church's employment decisions are insulated from judicial review. Such insulation exists to prevent excessive government intrusion into religious decision making. The majority cites favorably several federal appellate courts explaining, e.g., that "the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom cannot be construed to protect secular beliefs and behavior, even when they comprise part of an otherwise religious relationship. . . ." Maj. Op. at 687, 28 A.3d at 1184 (citing Sanders v. Casa View Baptist Church, 134 F.3d 331, 335-36 (5th Cir.1998)).

But the cases do not categorically prevent all government scrutiny of church employment decisions. Instead, they suggest a more nuanced approach, one that insulates decisions from judicial review only when they are rooted in spiritual matters. The majority recognizes this qualification to a degree, holding that the exception cannot preclude sexual harassment claims. Yet it declines to apply the same qualification when considering the retaliation claim. A quick review of the pertinent cases reveals that the limited contour of the ministerial exception does not warrant its application to Petitioner's retaliation claim.

Bollard v. The California Province of the Society of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940 (9th Cir.1999), stands for the principle that courts may not inquire into employment decisions if spiritual matters are the motivation behind those decisions. The Bollard court specifically limits its holding to employment decisions made "according to the dictates of faith and conscience." Id. at 945. The case also recognizes that sex discrimination is impermissible for a religious organization. Id.

As the majority indicates, Sanders v. Casa View Baptist Church, supra, instructs that the protection afforded to religious relationships has limitations. Protection from judicial inquiry is given to employment decisions "primarily by preventing the judicial resolution of ecclesiastical disputes turning on matters of `religious doctrine or practice.'" Id. at 336. Thus, Sanders makes clear that employment decisions should not be shielded from judicial scrutiny unless they involve spiritual matters, such as religious doctrine or practice. See id.

McKelvey v. Pierce, 173 N.J. 26, 800 A.2d 840 (2002), and Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715 (Minn.Ct.App.1991), also cited favorably by the majority, strongly support a limited scope for the ministerial exception. The former case held that to "sweep away all of a minister's or seminarian's claims against the church out of fear of encroaching upon the First Amendment" would actually run afoul of the Constitution's religion clauses. McKelvey, 173 N.J. at 52, 800 A.2d 840. The latter case allowed a sexual harassment claim against a church to proceed because it was "unrelated to pastoral qualifications or issues of church doctrine." Black, 471 N.W.2d at 721.

The majority, in disharmonious fashion, both honors and rejects these precedents. To sustain the sexual harassment claim in Count I, the majority relies upon the rationale of these cases, i.e., that religious insulation from the enforcement of antidiscrimination laws must be limited to instances in which the church's conduct is based on theology or doctrine. Yet when it comes to Linklater's retaliatory constructive discharge claim in Count IV, the majority reverses course, relying on Black v. Snyder, supra, for the categorical statement that such claims "would necessarily involve judicial inquiry into church governance, and such an inquiry is prohibited by the First Amendment." Maj. Op. at 696, 28 A.3d at 1189.5 In Black, however, the court denied the retaliatory discharge claim because the church proffered as a reason for the discharge the plaintiff's "inability to conduct the pastoral office efficiently in this congregation in view of local conditions"—and it was the church's proffered reason, not the nature of the claim in general, that would have "require[d] a similar review of . . . an essentially ecclesiastical concern." 471 N.W.2d at 718-720. Although I am skeptical of the distinction drawn in Black between the sexual harassment claim (allowed) and the retaliatory discharge claim (disallowed), at least the church in Black offered up an arguably doctrinal rationale for her termination.6

B. Application

Here, the Church fired Linklater after she failed to show up for one week. Yet, she asserted that she did so only after the Pastor, in retaliation for her filing charges with the Montgomery County Human Relations Commission and in other formalized channels, refused to give her a job performance evaluation, took unfounded disciplinary actions against her, and conducted a campaign to lower her standing in the eyes of the congregation. The Church, in its argument before this Court, proffers no doctrinal or spiritual basis for these actions.

The majority also relies on EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 460 (D.C.Cir.1996), for the proposition that the Free Exercise Clause prohibits governmental action that "encroach[es] on the ability of a church to manage its internal affairs." Maj. Op. at 685, 28 A.3d at 1183. Notwithstanding its use of such broad language, that case actually applies a narrow version of the ministerial exception to resolve a case of "pastoral appointment determination." Id. at 461, 465.

Furthermore, the majority's selective citation of EEOC v. Catholic University of America, supra, does not paint a complete picture. The majority states that the ministerial exception "precludes any inquiry whatsoever into the reasons behind a church's ministerial employment decision." Maj. Op. at 697, 28 A.3d at 1190 (citing Roman Catholic Diocese, 213 F.3d at 801). But Roman Catholic Diocese also held that "the exception shelters certain employment decisions from the scrutiny of civil authorities so as to preserve the independence of religious institutions in performing their spiritual functions." Roman Catholic Diocese, 213 F.3d at 801. Again, the finer language in that case demonstrates that the court engaged in a functional analysis, considering whether the church's decision involved spiritual or doctrinal concerns.

None of the majority's cases delineate a ministerial exception as broad as the one that the majority applies in rejecting Linklater's retaliatory discharge claim. A better approach, based on my study of the cases, is to hold that a court may examine employment claims against a church if they have nothing to do with the spiritual rationale of the ministerial exception. This includes a retaliatory constructive discharge claim if the church does not offer a reason for dismissal related to the "spiritual function" of the church.

Count IV of Respondent's Complaint, accordingly, survives application of the ministerial exception, as the Church does not assert that it had doctrinal or spiritual grounds for its alleged retaliatory actions. It only argues that the ministerial exception "applies not just to matters of religious scriptures or dogma, but also more broadly to matters of church governance." Similarly, the Church offers no doctrinal or spiritual basis for the actions for the actions alleged in Count II (Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment), Count V (Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress), Count X (Negligent Retention and Supervision), Count XIV (Breach of Contract) and Count XV (Breach of Implied Contract).7

If the church had offered a rationale for firing Linklater related to her spiritual functions, that is, her role as the church's music director, then the ministerial exception would certainly bar judicial review of that employment decision. By requiring a church to proffer that the decision was spiritual in nature, the underlying interests of both employment discrimination statutes and the ministerial exception are served. Here, the church does not argue that there was a doctrinal or spiritual basis for its decision to fire Linklater, and the majority does not even address whether religious doctrine or spiritual church operations were considered in her dismissal.

II. Pastor Lusk's Speech To The Congregation

The question of whether the comments contained in the pastor's speech to the congregation—in which he mentioned the lawsuit, its impact on the congregation, its finances, etc.—has come into play on appeal because Linklater relied on the speech to bring her claim within the applicable period of limitations under the continuing violation doctrine, in response to the Church's defense that her claim was barred by limitations. The majority holds that the speech to the congregation is protected speech in its entirety, and therefore inadmissible, but that Linklater's claim is not barred by limitations (on its face) because she alleges other retaliatory actions that occurred with the two-year limitations period. I agree with the majority that Respondent's claims are not barred by limitations, but do not agree that the entire speech is protected under the First Amendment.

The majority holds that the ministerial exception applies to speech in which a pastor (1) informs the congregation of a pending lawsuit that could affect the church, and (2) proclaims that he or she is innocent of misconduct. Maj. Op. at 695-96, 28 A.3d at 1188-89. I submit that this demarcation of the protective wing of the ministerial exception is overly inclusive, and that in these statements, the pastor spoke and acted outside the range of the exception.8 Indeed, the majority does not cite, and I have not found, any cases suggesting that the discussion of such matters is protected.

The majority's rule is especially perilous because it suggests that simply by adding cursory religious content to a statement, a minister gains unlimited freedom to speak with impunity on almost any subject, protected from Title VII and corresponding state claims, as well as from defamation or other tort claims. This rule could allow an unscrupulous minister to use the pulpit to wage a campaign of continued harassment and defamation, cloaked in but unrelated to doctrine or theology.

Lusk was addressing his congregation during the church's annual meeting. Lusk's remarks on Linklater took up approximately half of his entire address to the congregation, and they had a very personal tone. He protested to the entire congregation about Linklater's claim, singling her out by name. Lusk gave assurances that Linklater's allegations had "no credence." He described his own personal and familial stress and called the lawsuit a "crisis," a "quagmire," and a "personal trial."

The content and tone of his speech could reasonably be interpreted as trying to sway congregational opinion against Linklater. Lusk encouraged the congregation to obtain a public-record copy of the Complaint that Linklater filed. He singled out another church member by name for representing Linklater and for "demanding a $2.5 million settlement," calling the settlement negotiation "disturbing." He even insinuated that Linklater's claim itself was retaliatory, in that she did not make her allegations until after the church council "expressed displeasure with her performance."

Lusk made it very clear that his motivation for speaking about Linklater was not spiritual in nature. He specifically said that he was not speaking "in worship or teaching." His statement had little to do with church governance or an employment decision. Instead, his remarks could reasonably be perceived as an effort to turn congregational sentiment in his own favor and against Linklater. All of these factors operate to remove his remarks from the shelter of the ministerial exception.

For these reasons, I would reach the same result as the majority on Counts I and III, holding that limitations is no bar to Petitioner's claims. But, I would rely on this speech, in addition to the "photograph stabbing" conduct relied on by the majority, to do so.

Chief Judge BELL and Judge BATTAGLIA authorize me to state that they join in the views expressed in this opinion.