Filed: Nov. 15, 2017
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _ No. 17-1828 _ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. COURTNEY D. MARTIN, a/k/a “C” Courtney D. Martin, Appellant _ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (D.C. No. 3-09-cr-00024-001) District Judge: Honorable Kim R. Gibson _ Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) November 9, 2017 Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge, and BRANN, District Judge.* (Filed: November 15,
Summary: NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _ No. 17-1828 _ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. COURTNEY D. MARTIN, a/k/a “C” Courtney D. Martin, Appellant _ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (D.C. No. 3-09-cr-00024-001) District Judge: Honorable Kim R. Gibson _ Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) November 9, 2017 Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge, and BRANN, District Judge.* (Filed: November 15, ..
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 17-1828
____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
v.
COURTNEY D. MARTIN,
a/k/a “C”
Courtney D. Martin,
Appellant
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 3-09-cr-00024-001)
District Judge: Honorable Kim R. Gibson
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
November 9, 2017
Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge, and
BRANN, District Judge.*
(Filed: November 15, 2017)
*
The Honorable Matthew W. Brann, United States District Judge for the Middle
District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
____________
OPINION**
____________
BRANN, District Judge.
Courtney D. Martin appeals the judgment of sentence imposed for violating the
terms of his supervised release. Because the District Court did not abuse its discretion, we
will affirm the sentence as substantively reasonable.
I
Because we write primarily for the benefit of the parties, we recount only the facts
essential to our discussion.
On October 16, 2013, Martin began serving a three (3) year term of supervised
release. On April 1, 2016, the United States Probation Office for the Western District of
Pennsylvania sought to modify the terms of Martin’s conditions of supervised release and
provide for closer monitoring.1 This modification request stemmed from Martin’s “poor
to fair” adjustment to supervision, which included his admitted use of marijuana and
failure to find employment. These modifications required Martin: 1) to submit to searches
performed by a United States Probation Officer; 2) to participate in the probation office’s
Intermediate Sanction Program; and 3) to participate in mental health assessment and
**
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does
not constitute binding precedent.
1
The probation officer had previously reported Martin’s various violations to the District
Court, but did not charge him because he was under the supervision of the Pennsylvania
Board of Probation and Parole at the time and was subject to sanctions from that state law
enforcement entity. Martin was under state supervision until May 13, 2015.
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treatment. Martin waived a hearing and the Court entered an Order on April 5, 2016,
imposing these modifications.
On August 12, 2016, the probation officer filed a Petition for Warrant or Show
Cause Hearing for Offender Under Supervision charging Martin with violating eight
terms of his supervised release. At a subsequent hearing held on October 24, 2016,
Martin, the probation officer, and the government agreed that two violations would be
withdrawn, and Martin admitted to the remaining six violations. Based in part on positive
drug tests taken on August 28, 2015, February 24, 2016, March 18, 2016, March 25,
2016, and April 21, 2016, these violations included, inter alia, a failure to “participate in
a program of testing and, if necessary, treatment for substance abuse,” and a refusal to
enroll in the U.S. Probation Office’s Substance Abuse Testing Program. App. 186. The
District Court revoked Martin’s supervised release, but, upon joint request, deferred the
sentencing stage of the hearing for 90 days to allow Martin to “demonstrate that he is
willing to undergo certain treatment and abide by the conditions.” App. 200–201.
Thereafter, Martin failed to appear for his December 15, 2016 sentencing. The District
Court issued an arrest warrant and Martin was taken into custody.
On March 27, 2017, the District Court held the previously deferred sentencing
hearing. At this hearing, the parties did not challenge the calculated guideline range
within the violation worksheet, and the Court adopted the 12 to 18 month range of
imprisonment, with 60 months of supervision to follow. Martin’s counsel thereafter
requested that the Court vary downward and give him “a sentence of time served,
released on a period of supervision, with mental health and substance abuse treatment as
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a condition of that release, and that whatever supervision this Court impose . . . be six
months.” App. 222. The government asked that the Court vary upward and impose a
sentence of 24 months with no supervision to follow.
The District Court sentenced Martin at the top of the guideline range to 18 months
of imprisonment with no period of supervision to follow. The District Court stated as
reasons for this sentence that Martin had “engaged in continued criminal activity,” and
that his failure to abide by the conditions of his supervised release made him “a danger to
the community.” App. 231. The District Court further reasoned that, because Martin had
not “taken his supervision conditions seriously,” the incarcerative sentence was required
to “ensure prevention of further crimes committed by him” and reflected the “seriousness
of his violations.” App. 232.
II
The District Court had jurisdiction over this criminal matter pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3231 and 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). We have jurisdiction to review the final decision of
the District Court and Martin’s sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. §
3742(a).
III
Martin argues that the 18 month incarcerative sentence imposed by the District
Court is substantively unreasonable. The substantive reasonableness of a district court’s
sentencing decision is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. United States v.
Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc). The “touchstone” of this inquiry is
“whether the record as a whole reflects rational and meaningful consideration of the
4
factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Id. (quoting United States v. Grier,
475 F.3d
556, 571 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc) (citation omitted). When making this inquiry, “[t]he
fact that the appellate court might reasonably have concluded that a different sentence
was appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal of the district court.” Gall v. United
States,
552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Rather, “[t]he substantive reasonableness of each sentence
must be evaluated on its own terms, based on the reasons that the district court provided
and in light of the particular facts and circumstances of the case.”
Tomko, 562 F.3d at
574.
At the outset, we note that Martin makes no argument that his sentence was
procedurally unsound. In such a circumstance, “[w]e will affirm a procedurally sound
sentence as substantively reasonable ‘unless no reasonable sentencing court would have
imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the District Court
provided.’” United States v. Friedman, 658 F.3d 342, 360 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting
Tomko,
562 F.3d at 568)). Upon review of the record, we find the District Court’s sentence within
the advisory guideline range to be well within the ambit of reasonable dispositions.
Indeed, while Martin questions the substantive reasonableness of his sentence given that
his violations stemmed from substance abuse and untreated mental health issues,
Appellant Br. at 15, we note that the District Court had previously continued the
sentencing to permit Martin additional time to “undergo certain treatment” and
demonstrate an ability to abide by the conditions of his release. As evidenced by his
absence at the aborted December 15, 2016 sentencing, Martin failed to seize this
opportunity.
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When a sentence is imposed for violation of a supervised release condition, we
have previously held that the term fashioned must “primarily . . . sanction the defendant’s
breach of trust while taking into account, to a limited degree, the seriousness of the
underlying violation and the criminal history of the violator.” United States v. Dees, 467
F.3d 847, 853 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ch. 7, pt. A,
introductory cmt.). Here, the District Court noted that Martin had not “taken his
supervision conditions seriously,” and that the sentence imposed was necessary to
“ensure prevention of further crimes committed by him” and to reflect the “seriousness of
his violations.” App. 232. Although brief, we find that the District Court’s reasoning
demonstrates consideration of the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and the
parties’ arguments. See Rita v. United States,
551 U.S. 338, 358 (2007) (“In the present
case the sentencing judge’s statement of reasons was brief but legally sufficient . . . The
record makes clear that the sentencing judge listened to each argument.”). Accordingly,
we conclude that the sentence imposed was substantively reasonable.
IV
Based on the above reasoning, the March 28, 2017 sentence imposed by the
District Court will be affirmed.
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