Filed: Jun. 01, 2018
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _ No. 17-1084 _ SPIRIDON SPIREAS, Appellant v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE _ On Appeal from the United States Tax Court (T.C. No. 13-10729) Tax Court Judge: Honorable Albert G. Lauber _ Argued October 10, 2017 Before: HARDIMAN, SHWARTZ, and ROTH, Circuit Judges. ORDER AMENDING OPINION IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the opinion in the above case, filed March 26, 2018, be amended as follows: Page 15, footnote 9, line 3, which read:
Summary: PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _ No. 17-1084 _ SPIRIDON SPIREAS, Appellant v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE _ On Appeal from the United States Tax Court (T.C. No. 13-10729) Tax Court Judge: Honorable Albert G. Lauber _ Argued October 10, 2017 Before: HARDIMAN, SHWARTZ, and ROTH, Circuit Judges. ORDER AMENDING OPINION IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the opinion in the above case, filed March 26, 2018, be amended as follows: Page 15, footnote 9, line 3, which read: A..
More
PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 17-1084
___________
SPIRIDON SPIREAS,
Appellant
v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
__________
On Appeal from the United States Tax Court
(T.C. No. 13-10729)
Tax Court Judge: Honorable Albert G. Lauber
___________
Argued October 10, 2017
Before: HARDIMAN, SHWARTZ, and ROTH, Circuit Judges.
ORDER AMENDING OPINION
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the opinion in the above case, filed March
26, 2018, be amended as follows:
Page 15, footnote 9, line 3, which read:
As the dissent points out, the prudential roots of the civil waiver doctrine
differentiate it from its criminal analogues with respect to the second and
third questions—failure to raise an argument in a civil case is generally met
with relatively softer consequences, and is more readily excused, than in a
criminal case. But Joseph addressed (and this appeal implicates) only the
threshold question of whether an argument was made in the first place.
shall read:
As the dissent points out, the prudential roots of the civil waiver doctrine
differentiate it from its criminal analogues with respect to the second and
third questions—failure to raise an argument in a civil case is generally met
with relatively softer consequences, and is more readily excused, than in a
criminal case. Indeed, we have recognized our discretion to reach an
argument that was not made to the district court in a number of
circumstances, such as where it presents a purely legal question we think it
is in the public interest to resolve. See, e.g., Covertech Fabricating, Inc. v.
TVM Bldg. Prods., Inc.,
855 F.3d 163, 172 n.4 (3d Cir. 2017). But Joseph
addressed (and this appeal implicates) only the threshold question of
whether an argument was made in the first place.
Page 15, footnote 9, line 16, which read:
And because Spireas does not ask for any waiver to be excused, there is no
reason for our analysis to proceed onward to consider whether it might be
prudent to do so. We decline to sua sponte “waive the waiver” to reach an
argument that Spireas specifically disclaimed in the Tax Court. Cf.
Washington, 869 F.3d at 208.
shall read:
Under that rule, Spireas failed to raise his prospective transfer argument in
the Tax Court, and we decline to exercise our discretion to reach it on
appeal.
BY THE COURT,
s/ Thomas M. Hardiman
Circuit Judge
Dated: June 1, 2018