Filed: Mar. 16, 2012
Latest Update: Feb. 22, 2020
Summary: NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _ No. 11-1902 _ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. ANTHONY HADAWAY, a/k/a VINCENT LAMONT JONES a/k/a LAMONT JONES, Appellant _ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania D.C. Criminal No. 09-cr-00161-001 (Honorable J. Curtis Joyner) _ Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) March 5, 2012 Before: SCIRICA, AMBRO and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges. (Filed: March 16, 2012) _ OPINION OF
Summary: NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _ No. 11-1902 _ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. ANTHONY HADAWAY, a/k/a VINCENT LAMONT JONES a/k/a LAMONT JONES, Appellant _ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania D.C. Criminal No. 09-cr-00161-001 (Honorable J. Curtis Joyner) _ Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) March 5, 2012 Before: SCIRICA, AMBRO and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges. (Filed: March 16, 2012) _ OPINION OF ..
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 11-1902
___________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
ANTHONY HADAWAY,
a/k/a VINCENT LAMONT JONES
a/k/a LAMONT JONES,
Appellant
_______________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
D.C. Criminal No. 09-cr-00161-001
(Honorable J. Curtis Joyner)
______________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 5, 2012
Before: SCIRICA, AMBRO and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: March 16, 2012)
_________________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_________________
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge.
Anthony Hadaway was tried and convicted in federal court for interference of
interstate commerce by robbery (18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)). He was sentenced to 293 months’
imprisonment. He raises two arguments on appeal. First, he contends the court abused its
discretion in denying his pretrial motion to sever his charges. Second, he argues the court
erred in allowing the government to introduce fingerprint reports assembled by the
Philadelphia Police Department, because these reports contained prejudicial hearsay and
their entry into evidence violated his rights under Confrontation Clause. We will affirm.
I.
In August 2008, Hadaway committed two robberies at commercial establishments
in Southwest Philadelphia. First, on August 1, he entered Fashion Unlimited, a clothing
store located at 6127 Woodland Avenue, and pretended to shop for goods. He left without
buying anything, and returned approximately fifteen minutes later. Hadaway asked the
shopkeeper to fetch him two pieces of merchandise from a wall display. When she did so,
Hadaway beat and seriously wounded her, leaving her unconscious. He stole a gold
necklace from the shopkeeper’s neck, moved the cash register to the back of the store,
and stole $600 to $800 from the register. He then fled.
Next, on August 6, 2008, Hadaway entered E-Z Cleaners, a drycleaners located at
701 S. 52nd Street. He dropped off two items, was handed a receipt, and departed.
Approximately thirty minutes later, Hadaway returned to E-Z Cleaners and told M.N., the
sole owner and employee, that he wanted to retrieve his clothing because the fee was too
high. He handed over the receipt, which M.N. put in the trashcan. Hadaway took out a
handgun, pointed it at M.N., and climbed over the counter. He stole $100-130 from the
register, and took $30, a debit and credit card, and two cell phones from M.N. Hadaway
forced M.N. to the back of the store at knife-point, tied her up, and fled.
2
On the day each robbery was committed, Philadelphia police officers investigated
the scene promptly. At Fashion Unlimited, they found a latent fingerprint on the cash
register. At E-Z Cleaners, they found a fingerprint on Hadaway’s receipt in the trashcan.
Both fingerprints were analyzed, and each was found to match a set of known prints
belonging to the defendant. Hadaway was arrested on August 13, 2008. At the police
station, he waived his Miranda rights and confessed to both robberies. With respect to the
robbery at Fashion Unlimited, Hadaway stated, “I went in there and robbed it.” With
respect to E-Z Cleaners, Hadaway confessed, “I went in there and asked for the money. . .
. I pointed a knife at her [the store employee]. . . . It was a steak knife.” He also admitted
to “jump[ing] over” the counter, stealing money from the store, and taking two cell
phones from the employee.
On March 12, 2009, a grand jury in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania returned a
three-count indictment against Hadaway, charging him with two counts of interference of
interstate commerce by robbery (18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)), and one count of using and
carrying a firearm during a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)). Before trial, Hadaway
filed a motion to sever under Fed. R. Crim. P. 14. He argued that consolidating the
robbery counts would cause him unfair prejudice, because it would lead the jury to
believe he was more likely to be culpable given the presence of two similar crimes. The
court denied Hadaway’s motion.
Hadaway proceeded to trial. The government’s evidence against him consisted of
testimony from employees at each store; testimony from the Philadelphia police officers
who obtained latent fingerprints from the crime scenes; testimony from Clifford Parson, a
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fingerprint technician for the Philadelphia Police Department; and testimony from the
detective who heard Hadaway’s confession. The jury found Hadaway guilty of
interference of interstate commerce by robbery, but not guilty of using a firearm during a
crime of violence. As noted, the District Court sentenced him to 293 months’
imprisonment, as well as ordered three years’ supervised release.
II. 1
Hadaway contends the District Court erred in denying his motion to sever. We
review for abuse of discretion. United States v. Hart, 273 F.3d 363, 369 (3d Cir. 2001).
Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(a) provides for the joinder of two or more offenses in an
indictment or information when they are “of the same or similar character, or are based
on the same act or transaction, or are connected with or constitute parts of a common
scheme or plan.” Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 14(a), meanwhile, a “court may order separate
trials of counts, sever the defendants’ trials, or provide any other relief that justice
requires,” where joinder “appears to prejudice a defendant.” Hadaway concedes joinder
of the three offenses was proper in the indictment, but contends the court should have
exercised its discretion under Rule 14(a) to sever the offenses at trial.
Hadaway’s claim is unavailing. A district court enjoys considerable latitude in
deciding whether to sever offenses under Rule 14, with the touchstone being whether a
“substantial potential for prejudice” will arise if the trials are consolidated. United States
v. Joshua, 976 F.2d 844, 848 (3d Cir. 1992). “Mere allegations of prejudice are not
1
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291.
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enough; and it is not sufficient simply to establish that severance would improve the
defendant’s chance of acquittal.” United States v. Reicherter, 647 F.2d 397, 400 (3d Cir.
1981). In Hadaway’s case, the court reasonably concluded that a “substantial potential
for prejudice” would not arise from a single trial. The jury could “reasonably be expected
to compartmentalize the evidence” against Hadaway for each offense, given that he was
being tried for two relatively simple robberies, one of which allegedly involved a gun.
Id.
at 400; United States v. Weber,
437 F.2d 327, 332 (3d Cir. 1970). We have upheld a
jury’s ability to consider multiple charges in cases far more complex than that here. E.g.
United States v. Thomas,
610 F.2d 1166 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding severance was
unnecessary in a case with 31 bank fraud charges).
The District Court properly instructed the jury to consider each offense
separately, stating “[t]he number of offenses charged is not evidence of guilt and this
should not influence your decision in any way.” That the jury convicted Hadaway on
Counts One and Two (the two robbery counts) but not on Count Three (using a gun
during a crime of violence) confirms it compartmentalized the evidence against him, and
was not substantially prejudiced by the joinder of the offenses at trial.
III.
Next, Hadaway contends the District Court erred in admitting evidence of two
“Investigation Reports” produced by the Philadelphia Police Department, each
concluding that a latent fingerprint found at one of the crime scenes matched the known
prints of Hadaway. We review for abuse of discretion. United States v. Serafini, 233 F.3d
758, 768 (3d Cir. 2000).
5
The Investigation Reports came into evidence under the business records
exception to the hearsay rule, Fed. R. Evid. 803(6), during the government’s redirect
examination of its expert, Clifford Parson. On direct examination, Parson explained that,
in his professional opinion, the latent fingerprints found at Fashion Unlimited and E-Z
Cleaners matched those of Anthony Hadaway. 2 On cross-examination, the defense sought
to impeach Parson’s credibility by pressing him to concede that, in conducting its
analyses, the Philadelphia Police Department diverged from some of the professionally
recommended standards for conducting “ACE-V” fingerprint identification. The defense
also attacked Parson’s credibility by suggesting his analysis of one of the sets of prints
suffered from “confirmation bias,” given that Parson was not the “initial evaluator” for
that set. On redirect examination, the government responded to the defense’s attack on
Parson by introducing the two Investigation Reports compiled by the Philadelphia Police
Department, in which three technicians – an initial analyst and two verifiers – made
positive identifications of each set of prints. The government’s objective was to show that
the Department had complied with the widely followed standards for conducting ACE-V,
and that Parson’s role in the process provided him a sufficiently informed expert opinion.
The court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the Investigation Reports into
evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). Hadaway contends that while the reports might
have qualified as business records, they contained a second layer of problematic
testimony – namely, the statements of the two fingerprint technicians (besides Parson)
2
The only exhibits the government used during Parson’s direct examination were images
of the latent prints found at each crime scene, and images of Hadaway’s fingerprints.
Parson used the exhibits to demonstrate how he was able to make positive matches.
6
who made positive identifications in each report but did not testify at trial. According to
Hadaway, this second layer of testimony was unsanctioned by Fed. R. Evid. 805
(prescribing that “[h]earsay included within hearsay” is only admissible “if each part of
the combined statements conforms with an exception to the hearsay rule”), as well as by
the Confrontation Clause, see Melendez-Diaz v. Mass., 557 U.S. 305 (2009) (holding that
a forensic analyst’s statements in a laboratory report were “testimonial,” and were
inadmissible unless the analyst appeared at trial). On the Confrontation Clause point,
Hadaway cites Bullcoming v. New Mexico,
131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011), where the Court
recently held it did not satisfy Melendez-Diaz for a scientist to testify about a report
compiled by his colleague, even if the two worked at the same lab. Nonetheless,
Hadaway’s claims are unavailing. On redirect, the government responded to the defense’s
assertions that the Philadelphia Police Department deviated from the protocols, and about
whether Parson’s judgment suffered from confirmation bias, by introducing the
Investigation Reports. The purpose of the reports was to respond to the defense’s attack –
to show that the Department had performed ACE-V in a responsible and professional
manner, and that Parson was an informed participant in that process with a well-founded
expert judgment. Neither Fed. R. Evid. 805 nor the Confrontation Clause were triggered,
because the reports were not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted therein nor
as “testimony” against Hadaway.
Furthermore, any error in admitting the reports was harmless. When a court errs in
making an evidentiary ruling, we may affirm as long as there is a “high probability” it did
not contribute to the verdict. United States v. Molina-Guevara, 96 F.3d 698, 703 (3d Cir.
7
1996). When that error is of constitutional proportions, we may affirm only if “it appears
beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict
obtained.” United States v. Barbosa, 271 F.3d 438, 459 (3d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted); see also United States v. Jimenez,
513 F.3d 62, 78 (3d Cir.
2008 ) (applying harmless error analysis to a Confrontation Clause challenge). Here, both
standards – as to the evidentiary error, and as the Confrontation Clause error– are
satisfied. First, at the time of the reports’ introduction, all of the potentially problematic
testimony included therein had already been challenged by Hadaway. During the
defense’s cross-examination of Parson, Hadaway’s counsel asked whether, and how
many, persons at the Department besides Parson had positively matched the latent prints
to Hadaway’s prints. Parson answered that, for each latent, two additional technicians
made a positive identification. The only new information that came out during the
government’s redirect and its introduction of the reports was the name of the two
technicians. Second, the remaining evidence against Hadaway – from the testimony of
the store employees, to the expert testimony of Clifford Parson on direct, to Hadaway’s
confession – was more than sufficient to convict. These factors show it is clear “beyond a
reasonable doubt that the jury verdict would have been the same absent [any] error.”
Barbosa, 271 F.3d at 460.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of conviction and sentence.
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