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Bevis v. United States, 91-1665 (1992)

Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Number: 91-1665 Visitors: 13
Filed: Jan. 24, 1992
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: January 24, 1992 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT ___________________ No. 91-1665 LAWRENCE S. BEVIS, JR., ETC., Plaintiff, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant, Appellee.
USCA1 Opinion









January 24, 1992
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

___________________




No. 91-1665


LAWRENCE S. BEVIS, JR., ETC.,
Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant, Appellee.

____________________

ERRATA SHEET



Please make the following correction on opinion issued
January 15, 1992:

Cover sheet: delete "and Paul Levenson".





___________________


No. 91-1665




LAWRENCE S. BEVIS, JR., ETC.,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant, Appellee.
















__________________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. A. David Mazzone, U.S. District Judge]
___________________

___________________

Before

Campbell, Selya and Cyr,
Circuit Judges.
______________

___________________

William T. Desmond on brief for appellant.
__________________
Wayne A. Budd, United States Attorney, and William L.
______________ ___________
Parker, Assistant United States Attorney, on Motion for Summary
______
Affirmance for appellee.


__________________

__________________










































Per Curiam. On August 8, 1988, the Lowell Sun
___________

published a photo of a patient being attended by doctors in an

intensive care unit of a veterans hospital. Claiming that the

patient in the photograph was Lawrence S. Bevis, Sr., and that

the photograph had been taken without Bevis's permission, the

administrator of Bevis's estate filed law suits complaining of

the actions of government employees in allowing Bevis to be

photographed. The administrator contended that photographing

Bevis violated Bevis's constitutional and state law (Mass. G. L.

ch. 214, 1B) right to privacy as well as 5 U.S.C. 552a(b).

The government moved for summary judgment. It

submitted a copy of the photo and asserted, among other things,

that Bevis's privacy rights could not possibly have been violated

because the patient in the photograph was obscured by equipment

and personnel and was not identifiable.

Accompanying the government's motion were affidavits

from the public affairs specialist at the VA hospital and the

Lowell Sun photographer who had taken the picture. The special

affairs officer asserted that the public "has general access to

the hospital. Accordingly, patients in their beds are subject to

being observed by visitors, contractors, volunteers, interns,

residents and the news media, among others ...." It was her

opinion that "patients have no expectation of privacy from being

observed while in the hospital." She had accompanied the Lowell

Sun photographer on a tour of the hospital and had explained to

him that VA policy precluded the taking of "pictures of patients


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who could be identified without first obtaining their written

consent on VA form 10-3203." The photo had been taken in the

intensive care unit with the public affairs specialist's consent,

from a position in which the patient was not identifiable, and

with the agreement that the photo would not be published in the

unlikely event that the patient could be identified.

An affidavit from the then director of the intensive

care unit stated that on July 17 (the day the ICU was

photographed), Bevis had become unconscious. He died two days

later without gaining consciousness.

Plaintiff administrator opposed the government's motion

for summary judgment, but filed no counter affidavits. The

district court thereafter entered summary judgment for the

government on the ground that no invasion of privacy had occurred

as the patient was unidentifiable. Plaintiff administrator has

appealed.

I
_

We have examined the photograph. To be sure, the

question whether a photograph identifies the plaintiff may often

present a fact question. See, e.g., Cohen v. Herbal Concepts
___ ___ _____ _______________

Inc., 100 A.D.2d 175, 473 N.Y.S.2d 426 (App. Div. 1984)
___

(identity of nude subjects whose faces were not shown but one of

whom had distinctive short hair and dimples was factual issue for

trial), aff'd, 63 N.Y.2d 379, 472 N.E.2d 307, 482 N.Y.S.2d 457
_____

(1984). Here, however, we agree with the district court that the

patient in the photograph is not identifiable as a matter of law.


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The foreground of the photo shows medical equipment and a nurse.

Behind the equipment and partially blocked by it is the patient,

draped with a sheet. Neither the patient's face nor any other

part of the patient's body is discernable. Consequently, to the

extent the claim of invasion of privacy was based on the

publication of the photograph, summary judgment was properly

granted for the government.1

II
__

Plaintiff argues, however, that an invasion of privacy

occurs when a photographer is allowed by the hospital to

photograph a patient without the patient's permission regardless

whether the picture is ever published or the patient is

identifiable. Consequently, plaintiff argues, even if the

patient in the photograph can not be identified, that fact is not

fatal to plaintiff's cause of action. We turn to this argument,

addressing each of plaintiff's three legal bases.

1. FTCA Claim

Under the FTCA, the government is liable for injuries

caused by a government employee "if a private person would be

liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place

where the act or omission occurred." 28 U.S.C. 1346(b). Here,

the actions occurred in Massachusetts, so Massachusetts law

____________________

1 Since the photograph can not be said to identify the
deceased, we need not address whether the publication of a photo
after the subject's death could ever be actionable. Miller v.
______
National Broadcasting Company, 187 Cal. App. 3d 1463, 1485, 232
_____________________________
Cal. Rptr. 668 (1986) (right of privacy dies with the person); W.
Prosser, Law of Torts 815 (no common law right of action for a
publication concerning one who is dead).

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controls. Massachusetts law provides as follow: "A person shall

have a right against unreasonable, substantial or serious

interference with his privacy." Mass. G.L. ch. 214, 1B. The

precise contours of the privacy right have not been spelled out,

but Massachusetts courts have looked to the Restatement (Second)

of Torts for reference. See, e.g. Cefalu v. Globe Newspaper Co,
___ ___ ______ __________________

8 Mass. App. Ct. 71, 391 N.E.2d 935 (1979) (noting distinction

Restatement (Second) of Torts draws between publication of a

picture taken on a public street (which is not an invasion of

privacy) and one taken in a private place (which would be an

invasion of privacy) and concluding that a newspaper photo of

plaintiff standing with others in a line for unemployment

benefits did not violate plaintiff's privacy as plaintiff was in

a public place), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1060 (1980).
____ ______

Although neither party refers to it, the Restatement,

in turn, provides perhaps the strongest support for plaintiff's

argument that the mere photographing of a patient -- even if the

photo is never published -- may violate the patient's privacy.

The relevant provision provides as follows:

652B. Intrusion upon Seclusion

One who intentionally intrudes, physically or
otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or
his private affairs or concerns, is subject to
liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if
the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person.

Restatement (Second) of Torts 652B (1977). Comments a and b

underscore that publication is not required:

a. The form of invasion of privacy covered by this

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Section does not depend upon any publicity given to the
person whose interest is invaded or to his affairs. It
consists solely of an intentional interference with his
interest in solitude or seclusion, either as to his
person or as to his private affairs or concerns, of a
kind that would be highly offensive to a reasonable
man.

. . .

b. . . . . The intrusion itself makes the defendant
subject to liability, even though there is no
publication or other use of any kind of the photograph
or information outlined.

As an example of an actionable intrusion upon seclusion, the

Restatement refers to a reporter photographing a hospital patient

without the patient's permission:


Illustrations:

1. A, a woman, is sick in a hospital with a rare
disease that arouses public curiosity. B, a newspaper
reporter, calls her on the telephone and asks for an
interview, but she refuses to see him. B then goes to
the hospital, enters A's room and over her objection
takes her photograph. B has invaded A's privacy.

Causes of action have been stated in various

circumstances involving unreasonable intrusion upon hospital

patients' privacy. See, e.g., Barber v. Time, Inc, 348 Mo. 1199,
___ ___ ______ _________

159 S.W.2d 291 (1942) (close-up photo of patient taken in her

hospital room without her permission); Noble v. Sears, Roebuck &
_____ ________________

Co., 33 Cal. App. 3d 654, 659, 109 Cal. Rptr. 269 (1973) (if
__

private investigator did in fact gain entrance to patient's

hospital room and obtain information by deception, then his

conduct may indeed have been unreasonably intrusive);

Commonwealth v. Wiseman, 356 Mass. 251, 249 N.E.2d 610 (1969)
____________ _______

(restricting audience which may view film of patients at

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Bridgewater State Hospital), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 960 (1970).
____ ______

Superficially, there may be a resemblance between the

present case and the Restatement illustration. In both cases, a

patient was photographed without the patient's permission. But,

in addition to the fact that the defendants in the present case

were the hospital employees rather than the photographer, there

is a major and dispositive difference between the illustration

which, we think, assumes unilateral action by a reporter

unauthorized by the hospital, and the present case, where the

photographer was accompanied by hospital personnel and directed

not to take photos in which any patient would be identifiable.

Escorting by hospital personnel, whose jobs render them more

sensitive to and protective of patients' concerns than would the

unchecked photographer roaming at will, provides a safeguard

against unreasonable intrusion. To be sure, it may not be

foolproof. In other words, we do not now decide whether a

hospital escort would invariably foreclose any claim for the

intrusion upon seclusion branch of the tort of invasion of

privacy.2 But, in the present case, the uncontradicted

affidavits disclose nothing unduly intrusive or unreasonable.


____________________

2 See, e.g. Knight v. Penobscot Bay Medical Center, 420 A.2d
___ ___ ______ ____________________________
915, 917, 918 (Me. 1980) (invasion of privacy action in which
hospital nurse permitted nurse's husband to view the delivery of
plaintiff's baby submitted to the jury; jury found for
defendants); Y.G. v. The Jewish Hosp. of St. Louis, 795 S.W. 2d
____ ______________________________
488 (Mo. App. 1990) (allegations that hospital invited
participants in the in vitro fertilization program to a social
gathering assuring them that no publicity would occur, but then
permitted a news team to film the event, stated a cause of action
for invasion of privacy).

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The photographer, according to his affidavit, stood 20 feet from

the patient's bed. The patient did not face the camera, did not

appear to be aware of the photographer, and was "not undressed or

in a compromising position." The photographer's obscured viewing

of the patient was no more intrusive than that of, say, a flower

delivery person passing through the unit or another patient's

wayward visitor. In other words, by accompanying the

photographer through the unit and allowing photos only so long as

the patient could not be identified, the hospital did not subject

patients to any materially different disturbance or intrusion

than that to which they are normally exposed in the daily

operation of the hospital. To be actionable, an intrusion

must be "highly offensive to a reasonable person." Restatement

(Second) of Torts 652B (1977). See also Restatement (Second)
___ ____

of Torts, 652B, comment d (1977) ("there is . . . no liability

unless the interference with the plaintiff's seclusion is a

substantial one, of a kind that would be highly offensive to the

ordinary reasonable man, as the result of conduct to which the

reasonable man would strongly object"). Defendants'

uncontradicted affidavits reveal nothing "highly offensive."

Plaintiff failed to present any genuine issue of material fact

for trial. Consequently, summary judgment on the FTCA claim was

proper.3

____________________

3In view of our disposition, we need not decide whether a
cause of action for the intrusion upon seclusion branch of
invasion of privacy would survive the injured party's death. See
___
Pine v. Rust, 404 Mass 411, 535 N.E.2d 1247 (1989) (cause of
____ ____
action under G.L. ch. 272, 99 for illegal interception of

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2. 5 U.S.C. 552a(b)

This statute, which forbids any agency from disclosing

any "record which is contained in a system of records" except

under specified circumstances is irrelevant as there is no

indication that any record was disclosed. Plaintiff failed to

articulate any violation.

3. Constitution

As we have concluded as a matter of law that the

patient in the photograph is unrecognizable and that no

unreasonable intrusion occurred, no federal constitutional

privacy right was violated.

Affirmed.
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____________________

private communications did not survive plaintiff's death);
Harrison v. Royal Protective Life Ins. Co., 379 Mass. 212, 396
________ ______________________________
N.E.2d 987 (1979) (tort action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress survives death of injured party).

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Source:  CourtListener

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