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United States v. Romero, 93-1573 (1993)

Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Number: 93-1573 Visitors: 26
Filed: Nov. 22, 1993
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: November 22, 1993 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION] UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT ____________________ No. 93-1573 UNITED STATES, Appellee, v. JESUS M. ROMERO, Defendant, Appellant. The district court found as fact that Romero was responsible for fifty firearms.
USCA1 Opinion









November 22, 1993
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________


No. 93-1573

UNITED STATES,

Appellee,

v.

JESUS M. ROMERO,

Defendant, Appellant.


____________________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND


[Hon. Francis J. Boyle, Senior U.S. District Judge]
__________________________

____________________

Before

Breyer, Chief Judge,
___________
Selya and Cyr, Circuit Judges.
______________

____________________

Van L. Hayhow on brief for appellant.
_____________
Edwin J. Gale, United States Attorney, and Zechariah Chafee,
______________ _________________
Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for appellee.


____________________


____________________






















Per Curiam. After purchasing multiple handguns in Rhode
__________

Island and delivering them to New York for illegal resale,

defendant-appellant Jesus M. Romero pled guilty to a twenty

count indictment charging him with nine counts of possession

of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C.

922(g)(1), nine counts of making a false statement to affect

the purchase of firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C.

922(a)(6) and 924(a)(1)(B), and two counts of unlawful

transportation of firearms in interstate commerce, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(a)(1)(A), 923(a), and

924(a)(1)(D). Romero appeals from the imposition of

sentence, claiming that the district court erred in adding a

four level enhancement to the base offense level, pursuant to

U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(5),1 based on a finding by the court

that Romero knew or had reason to believe that the firearms

would be used at some time in the future in connection with

another felony offense.

I. BACKGROUND






____________________

1. The guideline provides in relevant part:

If the defendant used or possessed any firearm or
ammunition in connection with another felony
offense; or possessed or transferred any firearm or
ammunition with knowledge, intent, or reason to
believe that it would be used or possessed in
connection with another felony offense, increase by
four levels.

U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(5) (Nov. 1992).















We take the relevant facts from the pre-sentence

investigation report (PSI) and the transcript of the

sentencing hearing. See, e.g., United States v. Connell, 960
___ ____ _____________ _______

F.2d 191, 192-93 (1st Cir. 1992). On April 24, 1992, Romero

went to Continental Gun and Engraving (Continental) in

Cranston, Rhode Island and purchased ten .380 caliber

pistols. During the transaction, Romero filled out Bureau of

Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Form 4473 (ATF 4473), which is

required for all gun transactions with licensed gun dealers.

Romero answered "no" to the question on the ATF that asked

whether he had been previously convicted of a felony. In

fact, Romero had been convicted of larceny of a motor

vehicle, a Massachusetts felony, on June 17, 1991.

On May 1, 1992, Romero returned to Continental and

bought fourteen more pistols. These guns were ten .25

caliber pistols, three .380 caliber pistols, and one .22

caliber pistol. Romero again indicated on the ATF 4473 that

he had not been previously convicted of a felony. The Bureau

of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) began investigating

Romero's activities after receiving its Notice of Multiple

Purchases from Continental on May 5, 1992.

On May 13, 1992, the New York City Police recovered one

of the guns that Romero had bought from Continental. The

police found the gun in the possession of a 17 year old male

during a drug raid in the Bronx.



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Between June 4, 1992 and August 28, 1992, Romero bought

six more handguns from Continental on six separate occasions.

In mid-October, Romero and a man named Luis F. Lugo attempted

to buy ten more handguns from Continental. This time,

however, Continental refused to sell so many guns at a single

time.

On November 6, 1992, ATF agents observed Romero,

accompanied by Lugo, buy ten .380 caliber handguns at D & C

Shooting Supplies in Warwick, Rhode Island. Again, Romero

filled out an ATF 4473 form in which he indicated that he had

not previously been convicted of a felony. ATF agents

followed Romero home and asked him to accompany them to ATF

headquarters in Providence. Romero voluntarily went to the

ATF headquarters. After receiving his Miranda warnings,
_______

Romero acknowledged that he had bought guns from Continental

the previous April and May. He stated that he got the money

for those guns from an individual named William Delgado of

New York City. Romero said that once he got the guns, he

drove to New York City and gave them to Delgado.

After defendant pled guilty on March 22, 1993, the PSI

was prepared.2 The base offense level (BOL) was established

at level 14, because the defendant was a "prohibited person"

within the meaning of U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a)(6). A six level



____________________

2. The November 1992 version of the Sentencing Guidelines
was used to determine Romero's guideline sentencing range.

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increase was made to the BOL, pursuant to 2K2.1(b)(1),

because 50 weapons were involved.3 The offense level was

adjusted upward another four levels, pursuant to

2K2.1(b)(2), because the defendant had reason to believe that

the firearms would be used or possessed in connection with

another felony offense. The defendant received a three level

downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. This

yielded a total offense level of 21. Since the defendant's

criminal history category was II, the guidelines sentencing

range was determined to be forty-one to fifty-one months.

At sentencing, Romero objected to two conclusions in the

PSI. First, Romero denied attempting to purchase ten

handguns from Continental in October. Romero maintained that

he should be held responsible only for the forty firearms

that he actually purchased. The government called as a

witness a clerk from the store who testified anent the

defendant's attempt to buy the guns. Defendant put on no

witnesses. The district court found as fact that Romero was

responsible for fifty firearms. Defendant does not appeal

this finding.

Romero also objected to the conclusion in the PSI that

the base offense level should be increased by four levels,

pursuant to U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(5), because Romero


____________________

3. The number of weapons included the forty weapons Romero
purchased, as well as the ten weapons he unsuccessfully
attempted to purchase from Continental in October.

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transferred the firearms to a person in New York City with

knowledge, intent or reason to believe that the guns would be

used or possessed in connection with another felony

offense.4 Defense counsel argued that the court should

accept Romero's statement in the PSI that he had been asked

by a man named Luis Lugo to assist him in buying handguns for

shop and business owners in New York who wanted to purchase

handguns for protection and did not wish to comply with New

York's "well-known" and "difficult" licensing procedures.5

Defense counsel further argued that if Romero had been "a

little bit smarter, a little bit more sophisticated," he

probably would have guessed that the guns he took to New York

would be used in a further crime, but that his client was

too naive to understand this risk.6





____________________

4. Neither the defense nor the prosecution presented
evidence at the sentencing hearing specific to this issue.
Both counsel argued from the presentence report, which
included the government's version of the offense and a
statement by the defendant.

5. In his statement, Romero stated that Lugo "indicated" to
him "that he knew various store owners and other people who
ran offices and otherwise were business people in New York
that wanted to buy guns." Romero also stated that he was
"shocked to learn that one of the guns involved had been
recovered during a drug arrest in New York city" and never
would have entered into the arrangement if he had known Lugo
intended to sell the guns to drug dealers.

6. At the time of the offense, Romero was 21 years old. He
had completed eight years of education in Spanish-speaking
schools in Puerto Rico.

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The district court overruled defense counsel's objection

and found that Romero knew or had reason to believe that the

firearms he purchased and transported to New York would be

used at some time in the future in connection with another

felony offense. In support of this ruling, the court stated:

I've already indicated I can't think of any other
reason for having the firearms except to fire them
at some person. There may be some people in our
society who do not understand that when one
delivers 10 handguns to New York City that they
could be expected to be used in the perpetration of
a crime. But they are few and far between and the
Defendant is not one of them. He had to know that
there was no legitimate purpose here involved.
That the firearms would ultimately end up in the
possession of people who couldn't otherwise get
them, and that includes felons, and that itself is
a felony. So that it seems to me the Defendant had
every reason to believe that what he was doing was
wrong, and to know it. So I overrule that
objection.

The court adopted the findings and recommendations contained

in the PSI and sentenced the defendant to forty-one months

imprisonment, the bottom end of the applicable guideline

sentencing range.

II. DISCUSSION

On appeal, Romero argues that there was insufficient

support for the district court's finding that he knew or had

reason to believe that the guns would be used in a future

felony. We disagree.

An appellate tribunal "shall accept the findings of fact

of the district court unless they are clearly erroneous and

shall give due deference to the district court's application


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of the guidelines to the facts." 18 U.S.C. 3742(e) (1988).

We have interpreted this statute as requiring, in most

instances, that the court of appeals review a trial court's

application of a sentencing guideline to the facts only for

clear error.7 See, e.g., United States v. Mariano, 983 F.2d
___ ____ _____________ _______

1150, 1158 (1st Cir. 1993); United States v. Ruiz, 905 F.2d
_____________ ____

499, 507 (1st Cir. 1990). In the instant case, the record

adequately supports the district court's factual finding that

the defendant must have understood that the weapons he

delivered to New York City would wind up in the hands of

criminals for use in future crimes. The defendant was

dealing with persons of unknown backgrounds who asked him to

get involved in a clandestine operation delivering multiple

weapons to a city with a high crime rate. The weapons were

inexpensive handguns, unsuited for hunting or legitimate

pursuits, and unlikely to be used in such quantities for

anything but illegal purposes. The defendant admittedly knew

that the guns would be resold to persons who wished to buy

weapons illegally. The district court was not required to


____________________

7. To be sure, Romero also argues, as a matter of law, that
the scienter requirement of 2K2.1(b)(5)--that the defendant
have "knowledge, intent, or reason to believe" that the
firearm will be used in a future felony offense--should be
narrowly interpreted to require that the defendant have
subjective knowledge. We review a guideline's meaning and
scope de novo. See United States v. Brewster, 1 F.3d 51, 54
_______ ___ _____________ ________
(1st Cir. 1993). Romero, however, cites no meaningful
authority for his position. At any rate, we need not address
this asseveration as, here, the district court supportably
found that Romero possessed such subjective knowledge.

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discard common sense and accept the defendant's assertion

that he believed that the guns would be purchased by

legitimate businessmen for self-protection. See United
___ ______

States v. Sklar, 920 F.2d 107, 112 (1st Cir. 1990) (court
______ _____

need not "divorce [itself] from common sense").

Romero also argues that it was impermissible double

counting to predicate the 2K2.1(b)(5) increase on the

number of weapons involved since the 2K2.1(b)(1) increase

was based on this same fact. But the district court relied

on much more than the number of weapons involved--for

example, the nature of the weapons and their destination8--

in concluding that Romero knew, or had reason to believe,

that the weapons would be used in future felony offenses. We

therefore find no impermissible double counting.9 Cf.
___

United States v. Balogun, 989 F.2d 20, 23-24 (1st Cir. 1993)
_____________ _______

(finding no improper double counting where fact already

accounted for in previous enhancement was one of several

factors relied upon by the court in support of additional

enhancement); United States v. Sanders, 982 F.2d 4, 8 (1st
_____________ _______

Cir. 1992) (concluding that, as the guidelines have been



____________________

8. The district court noted that the weapons involved were
"cheap handgun[s]" which have only one use--injuring or
killing people.

9. We further reject, as without merit, Romero's contention
that the illegal behavior which provided the foundation for
his conviction was subsequently used to justify the
2K2.1(b)(5) enhancement.

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explicit where double counting is to be avoided, an exception

should not be created where none is stated).

Finally, Romero contends that the 2K2.1(b)(5) increase

cannot be predicated on his knowledge that the weapons would

be illegally resold. Defendant correctly points out that

Application Note 18 of the Commentary to U.S.S.G. 2K2.1

states in relevant part:

As used in subsection (b)(5) and (c)(1), "another
felony offense" and "another offense" refer to
offenses other than explosives or firearms
possession or trafficking offenses.

The district court, however, heeded this mandate and viewed

the likely range of felonious activity as far broader then

mere illegal possession or trafficking.

Finding no error, we affirm the judgment below. See
______ ___

Loc. R. 27.1.
























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Source:  CourtListener

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