UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

BARBARA TEUSCHLER HARRISON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
                                                                     No. 98-2463
COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of North Carolina,
at Winston-Salem.
William L. Osteen, District Judge.
(CA-97-141-6)

Submitted: May 28, 1999

Decided: November 2, 1999

Before WILKINS, NIEMEYER, and TRAXLER,
Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Ellen R. Gelbin, ELLIOT, PISHKO, GELBIN & MORGAN, P.A.,
Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant. Frank W. Hunger,
Assistant Attorney General, Walter C. Holton, Jr., United States
Attorney, Gill P. Beck, Assistant United States Attorney, Mary Ann
Sloan, Chief Counsel, Region IV, Dennis R. Williams, Deputy Chief
Counsel, Malinda C. Hamann, Assistant Regional Counsel, Office of
General Counsel, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Atlanta, Georgia, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Barbara Harrison appeals the district court's order adopting the
report and recommendation of the magistrate judge and affirming the
Commissioner's determination that she was not entitled to either Sup-
plemental Security Income or Disability Insurance Benefits. See 42
U.S.C. § 405(g) (1994). In support of her appeal, Harrison primarily
contends that the district court erred in failing to find that her condi-
tion did not equal the severity of the Listing for"Disturbance of the
labyrinthine-vestibular function." See Listing 2.07, 20 C.F.R. § 404,
subpart P, app. 1 (1993). Finding no error on the part of the district
court, we affirm.

A reviewing court must uphold the findings of the Commissioner
if they are supported by substantial evidence and were reached
through application of the correct legal standard. See 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 405(g) (West Supp. 1998); Coffman v. Bowen, 

, 517
(4th Cir. 1987). The Supreme Court defines substantial evidence as
"such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as ade-
quate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 

,
401 (1971) (internal citation omitted). Substantial evidence "consists
of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less
than a preponderance. If there is evidence to justify a refusal to direct
a verdict were the case before a jury, then there is`substantial evi-
dence.'" Hays v. Sullivan, 

, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990) (quot-
ing Laws v. Celebrezze, 

, 642 (4th Cir. 1966)). In
reviewing for substantial evidence, the reviewing court does not re-

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weigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or sub-
stitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. See Hays v.
Sullivan, 

, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990). If, in the face of con-
flicting evidence, reasonable minds could differ as to whether a
claimant is disabled, it is the Commissioner or the ALJ who makes
the decision. See Walker v. Bowen, 

, 640 (7th Cir. 1987).
Accordingly, the issue before the Court is not whether Harrison "is
disabled, but whether the ALJ's finding that she is not disabled is sup-
ported by substantial evidence and was reached based upon a correct
application of the relevant law." Craig v. Chater, 

, 589
(4th Cir. 1996).

After a review of the record, and in light of the additional evidence
submitted to the Appeals Council, see Wilkins v. Secretary, 

, 96 (4th Cir. 1991) (en banc), we find that the ALJ's determination
was supported by substantial evidence and reached by the application
of the correct legal standard. Accordingly, the district court did not err
in adopting the report and recommendation of the magistrate judge
and declining to disturb the Commissioner's determination. We there-
fore affirm the district court's order. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.

AFFIRMED

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