Filed: Jan. 24, 2000
Latest Update: Mar. 28, 2017
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. No. 99-4198 DAVID LEE MCCOY, JR., Defendant-Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Henry C. Morgan, Jr., District Judge; Robert G. Doumar, Senior District Judge. (CR-98-186) Submitted: December 22, 1999 Decided: January 24, 2000 Before WIDENER and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. _ Affirmed b
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. No. 99-4198 DAVID LEE MCCOY, JR., Defendant-Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Henry C. Morgan, Jr., District Judge; Robert G. Doumar, Senior District Judge. (CR-98-186) Submitted: December 22, 1999 Decided: January 24, 2000 Before WIDENER and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. _ Affirmed by..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 99-4198
DAVID LEE MCCOY, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk.
Henry C. Morgan, Jr., District Judge;
Robert G. Doumar, Senior District Judge.
(CR-98-186)
Submitted: December 22, 1999
Decided: January 24, 2000
Before WIDENER and KING, Circuit Judges, and
HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.
_________________________________________________________________
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
_________________________________________________________________
COUNSEL
William A. Lascara, PENDER & COWARD, P.C., Norfolk, Virginia,
for Appellant. Helen F. Fahey, United States Attorney, Darryl J.
Mitchell, Assistant United States Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia, for
Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
_________________________________________________________________
OPINION
PER CURIAM:
David McCoy appeals his conviction for possession of a firearm by
a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C.A. ยง 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2) (West Supp.
1999). McCoy pled guilty, reserving the right to challenge on appeal
the district court's denial of his motion to suppress the firearm found
in the van in which he was seated, as well as his post-arrest state-
ments. Finding no error, we affirm.
Officers of the Portsmouth (Virginia) Police Department saw
McCoy and another man having a heated argument in the Lincoln
Park housing project, a high crime area. McCoy was seated in the pas-
senger seat of a van; the other man, "Mike," was outside of the van.
The officers ordered Mike to depart. McCoy bent forward and
extended his arm under the passenger seat of the van. Fearing that
McCoy was reaching for a weapon, the officers ordered him out of
the van. After the officers informed McCoy of his Miranda rights,
McCoy admitted that he had a firearm. The officers found a loaded
.38 caliber revolver under the passenger seat of the van.
As the district court correctly determined, the combination of the
argument, the nature of the neighborhood, and McCoy's movement
inside the van were sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. See,
e.g., Maryland v. Wilson,
519 U.S. 408, 413-15 (1997); Reid v.
Georgia,
448 U.S. 438, 440 (1980); United States v. Sayki,
160 F.3d
164, 168-69 (4th Cir. 1998); United States v. Lender,
985 F.2d 151,
154 (4th Cir. 1993). Our decision in United States v. Sprinkle,
106
F.3d 613, 617-18 (4th Cir. 1997), is distinguishable because the offi-
cers in this case saw McCoy attempting to hide or remove something
from under the seat, whereas in Sprinkle the officers could see that no
unlawful activity was occurring inside the vehicle. Accordingly, the
search and questioning were proper, and the motion to suppress was
correctly denied.
2
We affirm McCoy's conviction and sentence. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and contentions are adequately pre-
sented in the materials before the court and argument would not sig-
nificantly aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
3