BURKE, Justice.
[¶ 1] The Department of Transportation disqualified James McCallie from driving commercial vehicles for one year on the basis that he had driven a commercial vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.04% or greater.
[¶ 2] Mr. McCallie presents two issues:
[¶ 3] Mr. McCallie drove his commercial vehicle to the port of entry near Evanston, Wyoming, at about 10:45 p.m., on September
[¶ 4] Believing that Mr. McCallie was driving while under the influence of alcohol, the port authority worker contacted the highway patrol. The Trooper arrived, smelled a "moderate" amount of alcohol on Mr. McCallie's breath, and observed that his speech was "normal" but his balance was "poor." The Trooper administered another breath test, and the result was 0.05% blood alcohol. The Trooper asked Mr. McCallie if he had been drinking, and he responded that he had been drinking the previous night, and also drank part of a beer approximately 12 hours earlier. The Trooper administered field sobriety tests, and observed that in the horizontal gaze nystagmus test Mr. McCallie displayed "maximum deviation." In the walk and turn test he "left gaps of over ½ inch on three steps, stepped offline once." In the one leg stand test he "raised arms on two occasions to maintain balance." The Trooper arrested Mr. McCallie and administered two Intoximeter tests, which showed blood alcohol levels of 0.043% and 0.04%.
[¶ 5] Subsequently, the Trooper notified the Wyoming Department of Transportation of the test results.
[¶ 6] The hearing examiner upheld the Department's decision disqualifying Mr. McCallie from driving commercial vehicles for the period of one year. Mr. McCallie petitioned for judicial review of the agency decision, and the district court affirmed the license disqualification. Mr. McCallie now brings his appeal before this Court.
[¶ 7] Mr. McCallie contends that the Trooper in this case did not have probable cause to arrest him, and that the hearing examiner's findings of fact regarding probable cause are not supported by substantial evidence in the record. Pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (LexisNexis 2009), "we review the entire record to determine if the agency findings are supported by substantial evidence." Bradshaw v. Wyoming Dep't of Transportation, 2006 WY 70, ¶ 11, 135 P.3d 612, 616 (Wyo.2006).
Batten v. Wyoming Dep't of Transportation, 2007 WY 173, ¶ 7, 170 P.3d 1236, 1240 (Wyo. 2007). It is well established that, in reviewing for probable cause, we consider the "totality of the circumstances." See, e.g., Kimsey v. Wyoming Dep't of Transportation, 2002 WY 15, ¶ 16, 39 P.3d 425, 428 (Wyo. 2002).
Batten, ¶ 16, 170 P.3d at 1242.
[¶ 8] The hearing examiner's findings of fact relating to probable cause are as follows:
[¶ 9] In challenging these findings, Mr. McCallie contrasts the facts in his case to the facts recited in our Bradshaw decision. In that case, the deputy observed that Mr. Bradshaw "walked with a staggering gait, slurred his words when he spoke and smelled of alcohol." He admitted that he had "consumed four or five shots of whiskey and some beer." Field sobriety tests were administered by one deputy, and repeated by another with the same results. Bradshaw, ¶ 15, 135 P.3d at 617. We ruled that these facts were sufficient to establish probable cause.
[¶ 10] Mr. McCallie contends that the facts are weaker in his case. The Trooper's observations of Mr. McCallie were limited to the "moderate" smell of alcohol, normal speech, and poor balance. Mr. McCallie told the Trooper he had drunk alcohol the night before and part of one beer several hours earlier. Mr. McCallie also asserts that the Trooper failed to "score" his field sobriety tests, and reported the results in much less detail than in Bradshaw.
[¶ 11] With regard to the field sobriety tests, he relies on his hearing testimony that the results were affected by the caffeine he had consumed in the form of soda and pills, and that the tests were administered on an uneven and broken surface. He also points out that he performed the tests while wearing "cowboy boots with a one-inch heel." Mr. McCallie asserts that, in contrast to Bradshaw, the evidence in his case was insufficient to support the hearing examiner's finding of probable cause.
[¶ 12] However, "Our job is not to re-weigh the evidence or determine credibility of witnesses. That is the responsibility of the finder of fact." Batten, ¶ 20, 170 P.3d at 1243. Our responsibility is to determine whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the agency's evaluation of the evidence. We have determined that there is.
[¶ 13] The Trooper came to the port of entry based on the report of a worker who believed Mr. McCallie may be driving while under the influence.
[¶ 14] This constitutes substantial evidence to support the hearing examiner's findings. Furthermore, considering the totality of the circumstances, including the results of Mr. McCallie's field sobriety tests, the "moderate" smell of alcohol on his breath, his poor balance, and his admission to having consumed alcohol, we affirm the hearing examiner's determination that the Trooper had probable cause to arrest Mr. McCallie.
[¶ 15] As his second issue, Mr. McCallie contends that the hearing examiner's decision to uphold the license disqualification was not supported by accurate or substantial evidence. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-7-305(a)(ii) provides for license disqualification for "Driving or in actual physical control of a commercial motor vehicle while the alcohol concentration of the person's blood, breath or other bodily substance is four one-hundredths of one percent (0.04%) or more." The only facts at issue under this provision are: (1) whether Mr. McCallie was driving or in control of a commercial motor vehicle; and (2) whether he had an alcohol concentration of 0.04% or more at the time.
[¶ 16] The record contains substantial evidence to support the hearing examiner's findings on these two facts. In his hearing testimony, Mr. McCallie admitted he was driving a commercial motor vehicle, and he does not dispute that now. There is evidence in the record that his blood alcohol level tested at 0.12%, 0.06%, 0.05%, 0.043%, and 0.04%. Based on this evidence, it was reasonable for the hearing examiner to determine that the Department had established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Mr. McCallie was driving a commercial vehicle while the alcohol concentration of his blood was 0.04% or more.
[¶ 17] While Mr. McCallie acknowledges that the breath and Intoximeter tests showed blood alcohol levels above the legal limit, he maintains that this was the result of using a medicated mouthwash, not because he had been drinking. Again, however, this argument goes to the strength of the evidence. The hearing examiner considered Mr. McCallie's alternative explanation, and specifically found it was not credible. The hearing examiner relied instead on the test results, and those results provide substantial evidence supporting the determination that Mr. McCallie had been driving while his blood alcohol level was above the 0.04% limit.
[¶ 18] We therefore affirm the hearing examiner's decision, but we also find it necessary to respond to Mr. McCallie's argument that the hearing examiner's findings of fact are inaccurate. The first finding of fact states that Mr. McCallie was cited on "September 8, 2008." While he arrived at the port of entry late on the night of September 8, the record is clear that he was cited on September 9. The second finding of fact states that the test administered by the Trooper "indicated a blood alcohol content of.07%." Mr. McCallie admitted to test results of 0.12%, 0.06%, 0.05%, 0.043%, and 0.04%, but there is no evidence that he ever tested at a level of 0.07%. Paragraph 10 includes the finding that "The Trooper's testimony is consistent and is credible." The Trooper did not testify.
[¶ 19] While we cannot condone such inaccuracies, we are convinced that the errors are harmless and do not require us to reverse the hearing examiner's decision. It is of no legal significance in this case whether Mr. McCallie was cited on September 8 or September 9. There is no evidence that Mr.
[¶ 20] Affirmed.