Filed: Jul. 13, 2000
Latest Update: Mar. 28, 2017
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT AARON MCKINNEY, SR., Petitioner-Appellant, v. No. 99-6567 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NORTH CAROLINA; DANIEL L. STIENEKE; MICHAEL F. EASLEY, Respondents-Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Durham. Frank W. Bullock, Jr., District Judge. (CA-98-557-1) Submitted: June 27, 2000 Decided: July 13, 2000 Before WILLIAMS, MICHAEL, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges. _ Vacated and remanded
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT AARON MCKINNEY, SR., Petitioner-Appellant, v. No. 99-6567 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NORTH CAROLINA; DANIEL L. STIENEKE; MICHAEL F. EASLEY, Respondents-Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Durham. Frank W. Bullock, Jr., District Judge. (CA-98-557-1) Submitted: June 27, 2000 Decided: July 13, 2000 Before WILLIAMS, MICHAEL, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges. _ Vacated and remanded b..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
AARON MCKINNEY, SR.,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
No. 99-6567
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NORTH
CAROLINA; DANIEL L. STIENEKE;
MICHAEL F. EASLEY,
Respondents-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Durham.
Frank W. Bullock, Jr., District Judge.
(CA-98-557-1)
Submitted: June 27, 2000
Decided: July 13, 2000
Before WILLIAMS, MICHAEL, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________________________________________
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
_________________________________________________________________
COUNSEL
Aaron McKinney, Sr., Appellant Pro Se. Clarence Joe DelForge, III,
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NORTH CARO-
LINA, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellees.
_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
_________________________________________________________________
OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Aaron McKinney, Sr., appeals the district court's order denying
relief on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 1994 &
Supp. 2000). McKinney alleged in his appeal for the first time that the
district judge had served as a juror at McKinney's state court trial and
thus was precluded by a conflict of interest from deciding McKin-
ney's § 2254 petition. In light of this issue we remanded the case to
the district court for the purpose of clarifying whether the juror was
the same person as the district court judge.
Unbeknownst to the judge, he had in fact previously been a juror
in McKinney's case. Because of the nature of McKinney's habeas
corpus claims, a review of the details of the evidence presented to the
trial jury had not been necessary at the district court level, and the dis-
trict judge had not realized the case he was handling was one on
which he had sat as a juror in state court. After the question was
brought to his attention on remand, the district judge recognized the
two cases as being related and he immediately recommended that the
case be assigned to another district judge for a de novo review of the
magistrate judge's report and recommendation in order to avoid even
the appearance of impropriety. We agree with the district judge that,
even though he had not known the connection between the two cases,
the case should be reassigned. See United States v. DeTemple,
162
F.3d 279, 286 (4th Cir. 1998) (discussing standard for recusal under
§ 455(a)), cert. denied,
526 U.S. 1137 (1999); cf. Rice v. McKenzie,
581 F.2d 1114, 1117-18 (4th Cir. 1978) (holding that district court
judge who had no recollection of presiding over case as state court
judge nonetheless required to recuse himself under§ 455(a) because
of the appearance of partiality created).
Accordingly, we grant a certificate of appealability, vacate the dis-
trict court's order, and remand the case to the district court for further
2
proceedings. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED
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