UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

SANDRA E. ELLIS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

OFFICE MAX, INCORPORATED; SCOTT
LYNCH; KEN STERN; TERRY VAUGHN,
                                                                      No. 99-2595
Defendants-Appellees,

and

MATT HEFFNER,
Defendant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte.
Graham C. Mullen, Chief District Judge.
(CA-98-390-3-MU)

Submitted: August 22, 2000

Decided: September 20, 2000

Before NIEMEYER, LUTTIG, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

N. Clifton Cannon, Jr., Gastonia, North Carolina, for Appellant. W.
T. Cranfill, Jr., Bruce M. Steen, Robert B. Meyer, MCGUIRE,
WOODS, BATTLE & BOOTHE, L.L.P., Charlotte, North Carolina,
for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Sandra E. Ellis appeals from the dismissal of her wrongful dis-
charge suit against Office Max, Inc. and four of its employees. We
affirm.

Ellis' opening brief contends that she never received the Defen-
dants' motion to dismiss. This issue was first raised in a motion for
reconsideration, which Ellis filed after noting her appeal. Because she
has not amended her notice of appeal, the issue of whether she
received the Defendants' dispositive motion is not before us. See Fed.
R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii).

Ellis' reply brief reiterates her claim that she never received the
Defendants' motion and further argues that the motion was meritless.
We do not address the latter claim, because it was not raised below
or in Ellis' opening brief. See Lewis v. INS, 

, 547 n.9
(4th Cir. 1999); Skipper v. French, 

, 610 (4th Cir. 1997).

For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argu-
ment would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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