KESSLER, Presiding Judge:
¶ 1 Plaintiffs/Appellants (collectively "the Seldins")
¶ 2 In September 2011, the Seldins sued PSPRS, alleging, among other things, aiding and abetting fraud and aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty. The claims arose out of a real estate investment gone awry, the specifics of which are not relevant to this appeal. PSPRS moved to dismiss the claims against it under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that it is a state agency covered by Arizona's notice of claim statute, Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") section 12-821.01 (Supp. 2013),
¶ 3 The superior court granted PSPRS's motion to dismiss, concluding that PSPRS is a state agency covered by the notice of claim statute and the one-year statute of limitations. The Seldins timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1) (Supp.2013).
¶ 4 We review the superior court's grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim de novo. See N. Peak Constr., LLC v. Architecture Plus, Ltd., 227 Ariz. 165, 167, ¶ 13, 254 P.3d 404, 406 (App.2011). The sole issue on review is whether PSPRS is a state agency for purposes of the notice of claim statute and the one-year statute of limitations applicable to public entities. We conclude that it is.
¶ 5 "Persons who have claims against a public entity ... shall file claims with the person or persons authorized to accept service for the public entity ... within one hundred eighty days after the cause of action accrues." A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A). The claim must include facts sufficient to allow the public entity to understand and assess liability. Id. "Any claim that is not filed within one hundred eighty days after the cause of action accrues is barred...." Id. The claim statute assists the government from incurring "excess or unwarranted liability and facilitates settlement of claims by allowing the government to investigate the claim ... and budget for settlement or payment of large claims." Yollin v. City of Glendale, 219 Ariz. 24, 29, ¶ 11, 191 P.3d 1040, 1045 (App.2008). Additionally, "[a]ll actions against any public entity ... shall be brought within one year after the cause of action accrues...." A.R.S. § 12-821.
¶ 6 A public entity "includes this state and any political subdivision of this state." A.R.S. § 12-820(7) (Supp.2013).
¶ 7 PSPRS "is the state agency responsible for administering the pensions of Arizona's police and fire fighters." McClead v. Pima Cnty., 174 Ariz. 348, 353, 849 P.2d 1378, 1383 (App.1992). Before July 1968, public safety employees "were covered under various local, municipal and state retirement programs." A.R.S. § 38-841(A)-(B) (2011). Consequently, benefits paid to different groups of public safety employees varied widely. Id. Our
¶ 8 PSPRS is managed by a board of trustees ("PSPRS's board"), whose members are appointed by the Governor with the consent of the Senate through the statutory procedures for appointment of state officers. A.R.S. §§ 38-848(A) (2011), -211(A) (2011). PSPRS's board invests and manages PSPRS's assets, A.R.S. § 38-848(D), which are derived exclusively from deductions from the salaries of public safety employees and contributions by their employers, A.R.S. § 38-843 (Supp.2013).
¶ 9 This Court previously concluded that PSPRS is a state agency based on the fact that it was created by the Legislature, its board is appointed by the Governor, it manages pension funds for state and local public safety employees, the Arizona Attorney General serves as its counsel, and it is subject to state agency sunset laws. See Fund Manager, Pub. Safety Pers. Ret. Sys. v. Ariz. Dept. of Admin., 151 Ariz. 93, 95, 725 P.2d 1127, 1129 (App.1986) (hereinafter "ADOA") ("[W]e conclude that the Fund Manager [the title formerly used for PSPRS's board] is a state agency."); Fund Manager, Pub. Safety Pers. Ret. Sys. v. Cnty. of Maricopa, 152 Ariz. 255, 259, 731 P.2d 620, 624 (App.1986) (hereinafter "Fund Manager") ("The trial court correctly held that the fund manager is a state agency."); see also McClead, 174 Ariz. at 353, 849 P.2d at 1383.
¶ 10 The thrust of the Seldins' argument is that subsequent legislative amendments to A.R.S. § 38-848 — PSPRS's enabling legislation — effectively overruled our prior decisions, necessitating a reevaluation of PSPRS's status as a state agency, and that PSPRS cannot be a state agency because its assets are not derived from the State's general revenues. We conclude otherwise.
¶ 11 In ADOA, we concluded that PSPRS's board was subject to the salary recommendations of the Arizona Department of Administration's Personnel Board ("Personnel Board"). 151 Ariz. at 95-96, 725 P.2d at 1129-30. The Personnel Board "annually recommends a salary range for [state] agency heads and certain other [state] employees" that governs the salaries that can be paid to those individuals. Id. at 94, 725 P.2d at 1128; see A.R.S. §§ 41-743(B)(4) (2013), — 751(B)(4) (2013). At the time, PSPRS's enabling legislation stated that "[t]he administrator and other employees hired by [PSPRS's board] are not under the jurisdiction of the state personnel board or subject to title 41, chapter 4, articles 5 and 6." A.R.S. § 38-848(J)(6) (1985); see also ADOA, 151 Ariz. at 94, 725 P.2d at 1128. PSPRS argued that its exemption from the jurisdiction of the Personnel Board also exempted it from the salary recommendations. ADOA, 151 Ariz. at 94, 725 P.2d at 1128.
¶ 12 A.R.S. § 38-611 (2011)
Id. (citations omitted).
¶ 13 Later that year, we held in Fund Manager that PSPRS must comply with the procurement code when it hires outside counsel. 152 Ariz. at 260, 731 P.2d at 625. PSPRS contended that it is not subject to the procurement code because it is not a state agency and does not spend public money. Id. at 259, 731 P.2d at 624. We again rejected PSPRS's argument. Acknowledging our earlier determination in ADOA, we explained:
Id.
¶ 14 In 1987, the Legislature amended PSPRS's enabling legislation to exempt its board from A.R.S. § 38-611 and the procurement code. A.R.S. § 38-848(M) (2011).
¶ 15 The Seldins make too much of the 1987 amendment. Instead of classifying PSPRS as something other than a state agency, that amendment simply exempted PSPRS's board from A.R.S. § 38-611 and the procurement code. "There is nothing unique about a state agency being exempt from the personnel system." ADOA, 151 Ariz. at 95, 725 P.2d at 1129. Nor is there anything unique about a state agency being exempt from the procurement code. Fund Manager, 152 Ariz. at 259, 731 P.2d at 624 (noting that the procurement code exempts a number of agencies from its coverage). Thus, although the 1987 amendment superseded ADOA's and Fund Manager's determinations that PSPRS's board is subject to the Personnel Board's salary recommendations and the procurement code, it did not affect our conclusion that PSPRS is a state agency.
¶ 16 Our conclusion is further supported by the fact that, although the Legislature has exempted PSPRS from certain statutes otherwise applicable to state agencies, see A.R.S. § 38-848(M), it has not exempted PSPRS from the liability/immunity provisions of Title 12, which include the notice of claim requirement and the one-year statute of limitations applicable to public entities.
¶ 17 We are not persuaded by the Seldins' argument that entities such as private insurers and charter schools are subject to state supervision and regulation, yet are not state entities. The Seldins' argument ignores that private insurers and charter schools are not created by the Legislature. It is the bundle of statutes that create and regulate an entity that makes it a public entity for purposes of the notice of claim and corresponding limitations statutes. PSPRS is a creature of statute, its board is appointed by the Governor, and it is subject to various levels of state control while being expressly exempted from other controls, yet not exempted from the immunity provisions of Title 12. That combination of factors makes it a state agency subject to the notice of claim and limitations statutes.
¶ 18 The Seldins offer two additional arguments related to a 2006 amendment to PSPRS's enabling legislation that designates it as an "independent trust fund whose assets are separate and apart from all other funds of this state" and specifies that PSPRS is not subject to the debt limits of Article 9, Sections 5 and 8, of the Arizona Constitution. A.R.S. § 38-848(M). The Seldins argue, first, that PSPRS cannot be a state agency because it is designated as an "independent trust fund" and its assets are separate from state funds. Second, the Seldins argue that holding otherwise would render the 2006 amendment unconstitutional because the Legislature cannot statutorily exempt a state agency from applicable constitutional provisions. We do not find these arguments persuasive.
¶ 19 The language designating PSPRS as an "independent trust fund," A.R.S. § 38-848(M), merely codifies part of the Arizona Constitution. Article 29, Section 1(B), of the Arizona Constitution states that "[t]he assets of public retirement systems ... are separate and independent trust funds and shall be invested, administered and distributed as determined by law solely in the interests of the members and beneficiaries of the public retirement systems." That the Legislature statutorily reiterated this constitutional designation does not demonstrate its intent to render PSPRS something other than a state agency. We understand the Seldins' argument to be that PSPRS is not a state agency because its assets are not state money. PSPRS's assets admittedly are not state money. But this means only that its assets are separate from the state treasury. See Grant v. Bd. of Regents, 133 Ariz. 527, 529, 652 P.2d 1374, 1376 (1982) ("`state money' is money in the state treasury credited to a particular fund therein"). PSPRS's assets are still public money. See McClead, 174 Ariz. at 352, 849 P.2d at 1382 (concluding that plaintiffs had taxpayer standing to challenge increases in PSPRS retirement benefits because PSPRS expends public money). Public money is "all [money] coming into the lawful possession, custody or control of state agencies, boards, commissions, or departments or a state officer, employee or agent in his official capacity, irrespective of the source from which, or the manner in which, the [money is] received." Id.; see also A.R.S. § 35-212(B) (2011). State money is a subset of public money, which encompasses a broad range of funds lawfully in the State's possession or under its control, including state employee retirement funds held in independent trust. That PSPRS manages an independent public trust fund rather than a fund appropriated from the state treasury does not defeat its status as a state agency.
¶ 21 PSPRS requested attorneys' fees incurred on appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A) (Supp.2013). In the exercise of our discretion, we decline to award attorneys' fees. However, pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-342 (2003), PSPRS is entitled to its taxable costs on appeal upon timely compliance with ARCAP 21.
¶ 22 For the foregoing reasons, PSPRS is a state agency covered by the notice of claim statute and the one-year statute of limitations applicable to public entities. The Seldins did not provide PSPRS with a notice of claim, nor did they file suit within the one-year limitations period. Accordingly, the superior court properly dismissed the Seldins' claims against PSPRS and we affirm that judgment.