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Little v. Warden, 95-1162 (1995)

Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Number: 95-1162 Visitors: 10
Filed: Jun. 16, 1995
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: MICHAEL CUNNINGHAM, WARDEN, ETC., ET AL. Petitioner-appellant Paul Little, SELYA, Circuit Judge.imposed in a New Hampshire state court.The historical facts are largely undisputed.Hampshire Supreme Court vacated the sentence.Canada, 960 F.2d 263, 269-70 (1st Cir.U.S. 832 (1988).
USCA1 Opinion









June 16, 1995 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION] [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

_________________________

No. 95-1162

PAUL LITTLE,

Petitioner, Appellant,

v.

MICHAEL CUNNINGHAM, WARDEN, ETC., ET AL.,

Respondents, Appellees.

_________________________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

[Hon. Martin F. Loughlin, Senior U.S. District Judge] __________________________

_________________________

Before

Selya, Circuit Judge, _____________

Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge, ____________________

and Cyr, Circuit Judge. _____________

_________________________

Paul J. Twomey, with whom Twomey & Sisti Law Offices was on _______________ __________________________
brief, for appellant.
Joseph N. Laplante, Assistant Attorney General, with whom ___________________
Jeffrey R. Howard, Attorney General, was on brief, for appellees. _________________

_________________________

_________________________



















SELYA, Circuit Judge. Petitioner-appellant Paul Little SELYA, Circuit Judge. _____________

asked the federal district court to invoke its habeas corpus

powers, 28 U.S.C. 2241-2254 (1988), and set aside a sentence

imposed in a New Hampshire state court.

The historical facts are largely undisputed. The

parties entered into an agreement for a "naked plea," i.e., a ____

guilty plea that would merit a mutually agreed sentencing

recommendation by the prosecutor without purporting to bind the

sentencing court to accept the recommendation. The state

initially failed to make the agreed recommendation and the

superior court levied a more severe sentence. On appeal, the New

Hampshire Supreme Court vacated the sentence. Petitioner was

resentenced before a different judge, and a prosecutor who was

new to the case represented the state at resentencing. In

petitioner's view, she gave mere lip service to the state's

promise and thereby deprived petitioner who again received a

stiffer sentence than the state had agreed to suggest of due

process. When petitioner appealed, the state supreme court

refused to set the sentence aside. This habeas corpus proceeding

followed. The gravamen of Little's petition is his charge that

the state, having agreed to recommend a specific sentence in

exchange for petitioner's guilty plea, effectively subverted the

bargain.

We share petitioner's major premise: the Due Process

Clause proscribes not only the explicit repudiation of a

prosecutor's assurances to the defendant, but also forbids end-


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runs around those assurances. See, e.g., United States v. ___ ____ ______________

Canada, 960 F.2d 263, 269-70 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. ______ _____________

Brown, 500 F.2d 375, 377-78 (4th Cir. 1974); United States v. _____ _____________

Voccola, 600 F. Supp. 1534, 1537 (D.R.I. 1985); see generally _______ ___ _________

Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971). We disagree, __________ _________

however, with petitioner's conclusion that the state violated

this tenet on resentencing.

We will not tarry. The district court, in a thoughtful

rescript, declined to issue the writ. See Little v. Cunningham, ___ ______ __________

No. C-94-523-L (D.N.H. Dec. 29, 1994). We have previously

stated, and today reaffirm, that when a district judge produces a

well-reasoned opinion that reaches the correct result, a

reviewing tribunal should not rush to write at length merely to

put matters in its own words. See, e.g., In re San Juan Dupont ___ ____ _____________________

Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 989 F.2d 36, 38 (1st Cir. 1993). So it ________________________

is here. Consequently, we affirm the district court's dismissal

of petitioner's habeas application for substantially the reasons

set forth in that court's rescript.

We add only a decurate comment. The jurisprudence of

habeas corpus demands that a federal court cede substantial

deference to the state courts' subsidiary findings of fact. See ___

28 U.S.C. 2254(d) (stipulating presumption of correctness that

attaches to state court findings of fact in federal habeas

proceedings); see also Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 112-15 ___ ____ ______ ______

(1985). The issue that petitioner raises here whether the

second prosecutor, although mouthing the agreed recommendation,


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simultaneously subverted it is peculiarly fact-sensitive. The

record, interpreted one way, is capable of supporting

petitioner's view. But interpreted another way, the record is

equally capable of supporting the state courts' findings. Both

interpretations are reasonable. Neither interpretation is

compelled. That ends the matter: where, as here, the record in

a habeas case supports plausible but conflicting factbound

inferences, we think that the state courts' choice between them

is entitled to the presumption of correctness. See Neron v. ___ _____

Tierney, 841 F.2d 1197, 1200 (1st Cir.) (holding that the _______

presumption of correctness "attaches in full flower" where a

state court's factual determinations are "`fairly supported by

the record'") (quoting 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(8)), cert. denied, 488 _____ ______

U.S. 832 (1988).

We need go no further. The judgment below must be



Affirmed. Affirmed. ________




















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Source:  CourtListener

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