UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                  FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT


DARLENE CURTIS,                           
                   Plaintiff-Appellant,
                  v.
PRINCIPAL RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE
CORPORATION; FIRST PRESTON
MANAGEMENT CORPORATION,
              Defendants-Appellees,                 No. 02-1237

                  and
SECRETARY OF HOUSING AND URBAN
DEVELOPMENT; GEORGE MCMILLAN,
Sheriff of Roanoke,
                       Defendants.
                                          
           Appeal from the United States District Court
         for the Western District of Virginia, at Roanoke.
               James C. Turk, Senior District Judge.
                         (CA-01-869-7)

                       Submitted: January 31, 2003

                         Decided: March 6, 2003

  Before LUTTIG, WILLIAMS, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.



Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.


                              COUNSEL

Gary M. Bowman, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellant. Kevin W. Holt,
GENTRY, LOCKE, RAKES & MOORE, Roanoke, Virginia;
2             CURTIS v. PRINCIPAL RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE
Michael F. Urbanski, John Cotton Richmond, WOODS, ROGERS &
HAZELGROVE, P.L.C., Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellees.



Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).


                              OPINION

PER CURIAM:

   Darlene Curtis appeals the district court’s final order granting sum-
mary judgment to the Defendants. Curtis contends First Preston Man-
agement Corporation erred by denying her application for an
occupied conveyance. We find First Preston’s denial of Curtis’ appli-
cation for an occupied conveyance was not "plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation." Auer v. Robbins, 

, 461
(1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). Curtis also contends the
district court erred by granting summary judgment to Principal Resi-
dential Mortgage Corporation prior to her receiving notice of the
motion. We find any error harmless. See Fender v. General Elec. Co.,

, 152 (4th Cir. 1967) (concluding that district court’s
consideration of summary judgment before counter-affidavits were
due was harmless error because, among other reasons, there was "no
material surprise," and Fender did not contradict General Electric’s
proof); see also Powell v. United States, 

, 1580 (5th
Cir. 1988) (applying a harmless-error analysis to a district court’s
grant of summary judgment sua sponte without ten-day notice); Har-
rington v. Vandalia-Butler Bd. of Educ., 

, 436-37 (6th
Cir. 1981) (same).

  Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s final order. Having
granted the Appellees’ motion to submit the case on briefs, we dis-
pense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.

                                                           AFFIRMED