EVELEIGH, J.
The sole issue in this writ of error is whether the plaintiff in error, State Marshal Lisa H. Stevenson (plaintiff), was entitled to a fee for copies of a complaint handled in connection with her service of process in a civil action pursuant to General Statutes § 52-261 (a)(2),
The record reveals the following relevant facts and procedural history. The named plaintiff in the underlying action, Ernest Francis, brought a declaratory judgment action in the judicial district of Hartford against all 185 members of the Connecticut General Assembly, including the named defendant, John W. Fonfara. Francis sought and received a waiver of the entry fee and the process server's service fees pursuant to Practice Book § 8-2,
Thereafter, the trial court conducted a hearing on its own motion to review the fees charged by the plaintiff. The trial court subsequently issued a memorandum of decision in which it allowed the plaintiff's requested service, mileage, and endorsement fees, but disallowed the $900 fee for copies. This writ of error followed.
The plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly disallowed the fee for copies because, although the trial court properly determined that § 52-261(a)(2) was ambiguous, it failed to consider relevant and compelling legislative history when it considered extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute. The plaintiff contends that the legislative history demonstrates a clearly expressed intent for process servers to be paid the fee for copies, regardless of whether they actually make the copies. The trial court now contends, contrary to its memorandum of decision, that § 52-261(a)(2) is plain and unambiguous when read in context. According to the trial court, § 52-261(a) requires payment only for services actually performed, including the making of copies. Therefore, the trial court further contends that, pursuant to General Statutes § 1-2z,
Whether § 52-261(a)(2) entitles a process server to the fee for copies, even if she has not personally made the copies, is a question of statutory interpretation "over which we exercise plenary review.. . . The principles that govern statutory construction are well established. When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.. . . In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply.. . . In seeking to determine that meaning . . . § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extra-textual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered. . . . When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter. . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Grady v. Somers, 294 Conn. 324, 332-33, 984 A.2d 684 (2009). "The test to determine ambiguity is whether the statute, when read in context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tayco Corp. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 294 Conn. 673, 679, 986 A.2d 290 (2010).
Section 52-261(a) provides in relevant part: "The following fees shall be allowed and paid . . . (2) for copies of writs and complaints, exclusive of endorsements, one dollar per page, not to exceed a total amount of nine hundred dollars in any particular matter. . . ." The trial court now contends that the only reasonable interpretation of the statute is that the process server claiming the statutory fee for copies personally must make the copies in order to be paid, because to conclude otherwise would lead to the absurd result that the
It is significant that this subdivision of the statute does not employ a gerund, as other subdivisions of the statute do, to specify for which act, if any, compensation shall be paid. For example, almost all of the other subdivisions of § 52-261(a) suggest a necessary action to qualify for the fee, such as "taking," "service," "removal," "levy," "causing," "committing," and "summoning and attending. . . ."
In accordance with the requirements of § 1-2z, we also look to related statutes in construing § 52-261, which provide for payment for fees and expenses of persons serving civil process. Chapter 896, General Statutes § 52-45a et seq., governs civil process. Chapter 896 requires that "a proper officer" must serve on each defendant a "true and attested copy" of process.
Although this analysis strongly indicates that the fee for copies is compensation for handling and ensuring copies of complaints and writs are true, whatever that may entail, and therefore in compliance with chapter 896, we nevertheless acknowledge that the interpretation advanced by the trial court is reasonable, as well. Because it is clear that the legislature can indicate a necessary action, or condition payment on the showing of incurred expenses, it is reasonable to conclude, as the plaintiff now contends, that the fee for copies is to compensate the process server for handling copies of writs and complaints, regardless of whether the copies were made by the process server. Because the fee is calculated per page of each copy, it is also reasonable to conclude, as the trial court
In 1981, the legislature adopted an amendment to § 52-261 that, inter alia, increased the fee for copies from sixty cents per page to $1 per page. See Public Acts 1981, No. 81-80, § 1. The role of the process server and the fee for copies were expressly discussed, first at a judiciary committee hearing,
The trial court contends, however, that it retains discretion in awarding fees for service of process and urges us to affirm its refusal to order the fee for copies as an exercise of that discretion. The plaintiff responds that the trial court's interpretation of § 52-261(a)(2) was a misapplication of the law and thereby constitutes an abuse of discretion. We agree with the plaintiff. There is nothing in the record to
In determining whether a trial court may exercise its discretion in determining the fee for copies, or whether our interpretation of the statute compels the court to award the fee for copies, we note that § 52-261(a) provides in relevant part that "[t]he following fees shall be allowed and paid. . . ." (Emphasis added.) "[A]lthough we have often stated [that] [d]efinitive words, such as must or shall, ordinarily express legislative mandates of a nondirectory nature . . . we also have noted that the use of the word shall, though significant, does not invariably establish a mandatory duty. . . . Furthermore, a requirement stated in affirmative terms unaccompanied by negative words, as in the present case, generally is not viewed as mandatory." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Teresa T. v. Ragaglia, 272 Conn. 734, 744, 865 A.2d 428 (2005). "While we generally will not look for interpretative guidance beyond the language of the statute when the words of that statute are plain and unambiguous. . . our past decisions have indicated that the use of the word shall, though significant, does not invariably create a mandatory duty. . . . The test we have adopted for determining whether such a statutory requirement is mandatory or directory is whether the prescribed mode of action is of the essence of the thing to be accomplished, or in other words, whether it relates to matter material or immaterial—to matters of convenience or of substance. . . . If it is a matter of convenience, the statutory provision is directory; if it is a matter of substance, the statutory provision is mandatory. . . . A statutory provision that is directory prescribes what shall be done but does not invalidate action upon a failure to comply." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hall Manor Owner's Assn. v. West Haven, 212 Conn. 147, 152-53, 561 A.2d 1373 (1989).
In light of our preceding analysis, the use of the word shall in § 52-261 is sufficiently plain and unambiguous that further analysis to determine the nature of the duty is unnecessary. The statute provides for payment of specific fees for the service of process and, where the court has discretion in determining the amount to be paid, the court's discretion is expressed clearly in the statutory text. For example, § 52-261(a) provides in relevant part: "[F]or summoning grand jurors, such [process server] shall receive only such [process server's] actual expenses and such reasonable sum for services as are taxed by the court. . . ." (Emphasis added.) Section 52-261(a) provides in relevant part: "The following fees shall be allowed and paid . . . (5) for the removal and custody of such liquors so seized, reasonable expenses, and twenty dollars. . . ." (Emphasis added.) Accordingly, it is plain that the legislature intended that a process server has a right to be paid a specified fee for all pages of copies of writs and complaints served, but that the court has discretion to determine a reasonable fee for a variety of other services.
We have previously held that a trial court had abused its discretion, in the context of an equitable action, by awarding excessive process server mileage fees under § 52-261(a). Danbury v. Dana Investment Corp., 249 Conn. 1, 29-30, 730 A.2d 1128 (1999).
The writ of error is granted, the judgment is reversed and the case is remanded with direction to award the plaintiff the requested fee for copies of $900.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
"[Representative Parker]: . . . Do [process servers] know . . . [w]hat they are serving?
"[Senator Flynn]: Yes, they do know what papers they are serving and the reason why they have to know is that on the paper that is actually served on the defend[a]nt, they must make an endorsement on the back of it stating that this is a true copy of the original. Their job is to serve an exact copy of whatever the original writ or process is the subject of the lawsuit. So they would know what the particular kind of process they were serving even if they might not understand all the implications of it, they'd at least have to know that the copy served on the defend[a]nt met in every particular the exact text of the original document." (Emphasis added.) Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary Committee, Pt. 3, 1981 Sess., p. 811.
Representative Van Norstrand asked: "If the plaintiff, or presumably the plaintiff's attorney, supplies the copies is there to be a charge under this [s]tatute?" 24 H.R. Proc., Pt. 5, 1981 Sess., p. 1668.
Representative Tulisano responded: "I believe they charge the same no matter who provides the copies. I think that's the custom that exists now and they charge it no matter who provides it. So I anticipate that would continue." (Emphasis added.) Id., at pp. 1668-69.