Filed: Aug. 10, 2004
Latest Update: Feb. 12, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 04-1171 LENARD A. FOOTLAND, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus DONALD L. EVANS, in his official capacity as Secretary of Commerce, Defendant - Appellee, and BRUCE H. STONER, JR., in his official capacity as Chief Administrative Patent Judge; GEORGE W. BUSH, in his official capacity as President of the United States, Defendants. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. T. S. E
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 04-1171 LENARD A. FOOTLAND, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus DONALD L. EVANS, in his official capacity as Secretary of Commerce, Defendant - Appellee, and BRUCE H. STONER, JR., in his official capacity as Chief Administrative Patent Judge; GEORGE W. BUSH, in his official capacity as President of the United States, Defendants. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. T. S. El..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-1171
LENARD A. FOOTLAND,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
DONALD L. EVANS, in his official capacity as
Secretary of Commerce,
Defendant - Appellee,
and
BRUCE H. STONER, JR., in his official capacity
as Chief Administrative Patent Judge; GEORGE
W. BUSH, in his official capacity as President
of the United States,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. T. S. Ellis, III, District
Judge. (CA-03-487)
Submitted: July 28, 2004 Decided: August 10, 2004
Before WILKINSON and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Lenard A. Footland, Appellant Pro Se. Rachel Celia Ballow, OFFICE
OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
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PER CURIAM:
Lenard A. Footland appeals the district court’s order
granting summary judgment to Defendant on Footland’s claims of race
and sex discrimination, as well as retaliation.
We review an order granting summary judgment de novo.
Higgins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 863 F.2d 1162, 1167 (4th
Cir. 1988). Summary judgment is appropriate only when there are no
genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). We view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). A mere
scintilla of proof, however, will not suffice to prevent summary
judgment; the question is “not whether there is literally no
evidence, but whether there is any upon which a jury could properly
proceed to find a verdict for the party” resisting summary
judgment.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251 (1986) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
We agree with the district court that Footland failed to
demonstrate a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination. See St.
Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 505-06 (1993). We
further agree that Footland failed to satisfy the three elements of
a prima facie case of retaliation. See Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas &
Elec. Co.,
77 F.3d 745, 754 (4th Cir. 1996). Accordingly, we
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affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would not
aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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