Filed: Nov. 14, 2005
Latest Update: Feb. 12, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 05-4281 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus JEROME SAUNDERS, Defendant -Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Charleston. John T. Copenhaver, Jr., District Judge. (CR-04-17) Submitted: October 31, 2005 Decided: November 14, 2005 Before LUTTIG, MICHAEL, and KING, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Herbert L. Hively, II,
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 05-4281 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus JEROME SAUNDERS, Defendant -Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Charleston. John T. Copenhaver, Jr., District Judge. (CR-04-17) Submitted: October 31, 2005 Decided: November 14, 2005 Before LUTTIG, MICHAEL, and KING, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Herbert L. Hively, II, H..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-4281
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
JEROME SAUNDERS,
Defendant -Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Charleston. John T. Copenhaver, Jr.,
District Judge. (CR-04-17)
Submitted: October 31, 2005 Decided: November 14, 2005
Before LUTTIG, MICHAEL, and KING, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Herbert L. Hively, II, Hurricane, West Virginia, for Appellant.
Kasey Warner, United States Attorney, W. Chad Noel, Assistant
United States Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Jerome Saunders pled guilty to possession of marijuana
with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(a), (b)(1)(D) (West
1999 & Supp. 2005) (Count Two), and was sentenced as a career
offender, U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.1 (2004), to a
term of ninety-six months imprisonment. The court made the
sentence consecutive to a one-year sentence imposed in the same
hearing upon revocation of Saunders’s supervised release. Saunders
appeals his sentence, contending that it is unreasonable. We
affirm.
At the sentencing hearing, Saunders had no objection to
the guideline calculation, but he requested a sentence of seventy-
seven months (the bottom of the guideline range of 77-96 months),
and requested that it run concurrently with the revocation
sentence. After considering the advisory guideline range and the
factors set out in 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2005),
the court explained its decision to impose a sentence at the top of
the range by noting that Saunders was a career offender, that this
was the second time he had violated the conditions of his
supervised release, and that the court could have departed upward
for reckless endangerment that posed a substantial risk of death to
more than one person. See USSG § 3C1.2, comment. (n.6). After the
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker,
125 S. Ct. 738
(2005), the sentencing court must calculate the appropriate
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guideline range, consider the range in conjunction with other
relevant factors under the advisory guidelines and 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3553(a), and impose a sentence. We will “affirm the sentence
imposed as long as it is within the statutorily prescribed
range . . . and is reasonable.” United States v. Hughes,
401 F.3d
540, 546-47 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing
Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 767).
Saunders argues that the imposition of consecutive
sentences was unreasonable and that a sentence of seventy-seven
months would have been reasonable. However, the court correctly
treated the guidelines as advisory and considered the § 3553(a)
factors. The court complied with Hughes and explained its reasons
for sentencing Saunders at the top of the range. We conclude that
the sentence is reasonable.
We therefore affirm the sentence imposed by the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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