Filed: Jan. 29, 2007
Latest Update: Feb. 12, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 06-4483 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus RONNIE LYNARD MORROW, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad, Jr., Chief District Judge. (3:05-cr-00303) Submitted: January 25, 2007 Decided: January 29, 2007 Before WIDENER and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 06-4483 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus RONNIE LYNARD MORROW, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad, Jr., Chief District Judge. (3:05-cr-00303) Submitted: January 25, 2007 Decided: January 29, 2007 Before WIDENER and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished p..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-4483
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
RONNIE LYNARD MORROW,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad, Jr.,
Chief District Judge. (3:05-cr-00303)
Submitted: January 25, 2007 Decided: January 29, 2007
Before WIDENER and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Reggie E. McKnight, MCKNIGHT LAW FIRM, P.L.L.C., Charlotte, North
Carolina, for Appellant. C. Nicks Williams, Assistant United
States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Ronnie Lynard Morrow pled guilty to one count of
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2000). Morrow was sentenced following the
Supreme Court’s opinion in United States v. Booker,
543 U.S. 220
(2005). The district court applied the holding of Booker and
sentenced Morrow to 100 months imprisonment, followed by three
years of supervised release. Counsel has filed a brief pursuant to
Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that there are
no meritorious grounds for appeal but addressing whether Morrow’s
sentence was excessive. Although informed of his right to file a
pro se supplemental brief, Morrow has not done so. Finding no
error, we affirm.
After the Supreme Court’ decision in Booker, a sentencing
court is no longer bound by the range prescribed by the sentencing
guidelines. See United States v. Hughes,
401 F.3d 540, 546 (4th
Cir. 2005). However, in determining a sentence post-Booker,
sentencing courts are still required to calculate and consider the
applicable guideline range as well as the factors set forth in 18
U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2006). United States v.
Moreland,
437 F.3d 424, 432 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
126 S. Ct.
2054 (2006). This court will affirm a post-Booker sentence if it
“is within the statutorily prescribed range and is reasonable.”
Id. at 433 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[A]
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sentence within the proper advisory Guidelines range is
presumptively reasonable.” United States v. Johnson,
445 F.3d 339,
341 (4th Cir. 2006).
Morrow’s sentence was both within the guideline range of 100
to 125 months, and within the statutory maximum of ten years
imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) (2000). Because the district
court appropriately treated the guidelines as advisory, and
properly calculated and considered the guideline range and the
relevant § 3553(a) factors, we find the sentence reasonable.
Accordingly, we affirm.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. This court requires that counsel inform his client, in
writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United
States for further review. If the client requests that a petition
be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be
frivolous, then counsel may move this court for leave to withdraw
from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy
thereof was served on the client. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in
the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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