Filed: Mar. 27, 2007
Latest Update: Mar. 28, 2017
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 06-4732 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus JAMAL EDWARD CRUMP, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Samuel G. Wilson, District Judge. (7:06-cr-00007-sjw) Submitted: March 7, 2007 Decided: March 27, 2007 Before WILKINSON, WILLIAMS, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Rhonda L. Overstreet, LUMS
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 06-4732 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus JAMAL EDWARD CRUMP, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Samuel G. Wilson, District Judge. (7:06-cr-00007-sjw) Submitted: March 7, 2007 Decided: March 27, 2007 Before WILKINSON, WILLIAMS, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Rhonda L. Overstreet, LUMSD..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-4732
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
JAMAL EDWARD CRUMP,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Samuel G. Wilson, District
Judge. (7:06-cr-00007-sjw)
Submitted: March 7, 2007 Decided: March 27, 2007
Before WILKINSON, WILLIAMS, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Rhonda L. Overstreet, LUMSDEN & OVERSTREET, Roanoke, Virginia, for
Appellant. John L. Brownlee, United States Attorney, Edward A.
Lustig, Assistant United States Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jamal Edward Crump was indicted on two counts of
distribution of five or more grams of cocaine base. Crump pled
guilty to Count One of the indictment pursuant to a written plea
agreement.
At sentencing, the district court found that the
Guidelines range for Count One was 292-360 months. Crump testified
on his own behalf about his upbringing, his decision to plead
guilty, his children, and his efforts to cooperate with the
Government. During cross examination, Crump, then twenty-six,
admitted to selling cocaine since he was seventeen. Crump also
admitted to an extensive criminal record that began at age ten.
Crump’s mother also testified. Following the testimony and
argument by counsel, the court indicated it had considered the
factors in § 3553, Crump’s criminal history, and his facts in
mitigation, and sentenced Crump to 320 months.
On appeal, Crump alleges only a single error. According
to Crump, the district court abused its discretion in sentencing
him to an unreasonable period of incarceration.
After United States v. Booker, this court reviews a
sentence to determine whether it is reasonable. United States v.
Moreland,
437 F.3d 424, 433 (4th Cir.), cert denied,
126 S. Ct.
2054 (2006). A sentence that falls within the properly calculated
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advisory Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable. United
States v. Johnson,
445 F.3d 339, 341 (4th Cir. 2006).
A sentencing court, in setting an appropriate sentence,
is to consult the Guidelines and take them into account. United
States v. Booker,
543 U.S. 220, 263-64 (2005). After calculating
the correct Guidelines range, the sentencing court is to consider
the Guidelines range, any relevant facts set forth in the
Guidelines, and the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000); then the
court may impose sentence. United States v. Hughes,
401 F.3d 540,
547 (4th Cir. 2005). This court will affirm a sentence that is
within the statutorily prescribed Guidelines range and is
reasonable.* Id.
A post-Booker sentence may be unreasonable for procedural
or substantive reasons. “A sentence may be procedurally
unreasonable, for example, if the district court provides an
inadequate statement of reasons . . . A sentence may be
substantively unreasonable if the court relies on an improper
factor or rejects policies articulated by Congress or the
Sentencing Commission.” Moreland, 437 F.3d at 434. “[A] district
court’s explanation should provide some indication (1) that the
court considered the § 3553(a) factors with respect to the
particular defendant; and (2) that it has also considered the
*
Crump does not allege that his Guidelines range was
calculated incorrectly.
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potentially meritorious arguments raised by both parties about
sentencing.” United States v. Montes-Pineda,
445 F.3d 375, 380
(4th Cir. 2006), petition for cert. filed, U.S.L.W. , (U.S.
July 21, 2006) (No. 06-5439).
Crump argues that the district court abused its
discretion by sentencing him to an unreasonable sentence.
Specifically, Crump contends that the district court failed to take
mitigating factors into consideration in imposing sentence. Crump
points to the fact he accepted responsibility by pleading guilty,
provided assistance to the authorities, and had a difficult
childhood as factors the court should have considered in imposing
sentence. Finally, Crump argues that the district court unduly
relied on his criminal history in imposing sentence.
Despite Crump’s arguments to the contrary, the sentence
imposed was both procedurally and substantively reasonable. The
court expressly considered the factors in § 3553, the Guidelines,
together with Crump’s criminal history. Additionally, after
considering Crump’s mitigation arguments, his acceptance of
responsibility and candor, the court provided Crump with a thorough
explanation for the sentence. The court then imposed a sentence in
the bottom half of the applicable Guidelines range.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
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are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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