Filed: Jun. 26, 2007
Latest Update: Feb. 12, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 06-1646 CHRISTOPHER WHITTEN, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus HARTFORD LIFE GROUP INSURANCE COMPANY, d/b/a CNA Group Life Assurance Company, Defendant - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. James C. Cacheris, Senior District Judge. (1:05-cv-01050-JCC) Argued: May 23, 2007 Decided: June 26, 2007 Before WILKINSON and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and Frank D. WHITNEY,
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 06-1646 CHRISTOPHER WHITTEN, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus HARTFORD LIFE GROUP INSURANCE COMPANY, d/b/a CNA Group Life Assurance Company, Defendant - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. James C. Cacheris, Senior District Judge. (1:05-cv-01050-JCC) Argued: May 23, 2007 Decided: June 26, 2007 Before WILKINSON and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and Frank D. WHITNEY, U..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-1646
CHRISTOPHER WHITTEN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
HARTFORD LIFE GROUP INSURANCE COMPANY, d/b/a
CNA Group Life Assurance Company,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. James C. Cacheris, Senior
District Judge. (1:05-cv-01050-JCC)
Argued: May 23, 2007 Decided: June 26, 2007
Before WILKINSON and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and Frank D. WHITNEY,
United States District Judge for the Western District of North
Carolina, sitting by designation.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: Craig Littleton Parshall, Winchester, Virginia, for
Appellant. David Edward Constine, III, TROUTMAN & SANDERS, L.L.P.,
Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Laura D. Windsor,
TROUTMAN & SANDERS, L.L.P., Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Christopher Whitten appeals the district court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of Hartford Life Group Insurance Company
(“Hartford”) in this action brought pursuant to the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) to obtain long-term
disability benefits. Finding no error, we affirm.
I
A.
This action arises out of Whitten’s employment by DynCorp,
Inc. (“DynCorp”) as a warehouse specialist.* As such, Whitten’s
job responsibilities included driving a forklift, loading and
lifting boxes that weighed up to fifty pounds, and working on a
computer. During his employment at DynCorp, which ended on May 8,
2001, Whitten participated in an employee welfare benefit plan
(“the Plan”) sponsored by DynCorp and insured by Hartford.
In May 2001, Dr. Michael Hasz diagnosed Whitten with lumbar
annual tears, segmental instability of the lumbar spine, lumbar
facet syndrome, and lower back pain. On May 10, 2001, Whitten
underwent an anterior lumbar diskectomy, partial vertebrectomy, and
interbody fusion at the L4-L5 level of his lumbar spine. Effective
*
We recite the facts here largely as they were presented by
the district court in its opinion. In so doing, we view the facts
in a light most favorable to Whitten. Garofolo v. Donald B. Heslep
Assocs., Inc., 405 F.3d 194, 198 (4th Cir. 2005).
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May 24, 2001, Whitten began to receive short-term disability
benefits from CNA Group Life Assurance Company (“CNA”), Hartford’s
predecessor in the policy at issue.
During post-operation office visits to Dr. Hasz on July 11,
September 5, October 17, 2001, and January 3, 2002, Whitten
complained of continuing lower back pain. After each of these
visits, Dr. Hasz extended Whitten’s return-to-work date. Based on
Dr. Hasz’s opinions, CNA extended Whitten’s short-term disability
benefits and eventually granted him long-term disability benefits
in November 2001. To alleviate the reported pain, Dr. Hasz
performed follow-up surgery on March 26, 2002 to stabilize the L4-
L5 fusion. After the second surgery, Whitten continued to complain
of lower back pain. Dr. Hasz examined Whitten again on October 23,
2002. During this office visit, Whitten reported headaches, visual
changes that looked like lightning and dancing lights, right arm
pain, and right leg pain. Whitten reported that the vision
problems had been ongoing since a 1998 automobile accident and
stated that he planned to see an ophthalmologist. Dr. Hasz
referred Whitten to another physician to evaluate whether the arm
pain indicated carpal tunnel syndrome. On December 17, 2002, Dr.
Aysegul Soyer conducted an electrodiagnostic test of Whitten’s
upper extremities and found that the results were abnormal and
consistent with bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome.
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When Whitten next saw Dr. Hasz, on July 21, 2003, Whitten
reported back pain, symptoms associated with carpal tunnel
syndrome, neck pain, shoulder pain, headaches, and visual
disturbances. Based on the multiplicity of symptoms reported by
Whitten, Dr. Hasz concluded that Whitten was disabled from work and
unable to perform any job. On September 9, 2003, Whitten met with
Dr. Douglas Wisor, a pain management physician, who recommended
physical therapy targeted toward Whitten’s cervical and lumbosacral
spine. Whitten also consulted with Dr. Charles Azzam in September
2003 for an evaluation of his possible carpal tunnel syndrome. In
October 2003, Whitten successfully underwent carpal tunnel release
surgery on his right hand. Whitten also consulted with Dr. Biony
Jani, an ophthalmologist, and Dr. Paul Hoffman, a
neuroophthalmologist, in October 2003. Dr. Jani’s examination
revealed nothing remarkable, and Dr. Hoffman’s examination was
normal, with no evidence of optic neuropathy. Dr. Hoffman stated
that Whitten’s vision problems could be attributable to an injury
to Whitten’s occitipal cortex that occurred during the 1998
automobile accident.
B.
Under the Plan, Whitten is “totally disabled” and entitled to
disability benefits if, inter alia, during the first two years of
his injury or sickness he is unable to perform his own occupation.
After two years, Whitten is “totally disabled” only if he (1) is
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“continuously unable to engage in any occupation for which he is or
becomes qualified by education, training, or experience,” and (2)
is under the care of a licensed physician. J.A. 472 (emphasis
added).
In October 2002, CNA conducted a vocational assessment of
Whitten’s ability to perform alternate occupations based on the
medical restrictions listed by Dr. Hasz. CNA concluded that
Whitten was able to perform several alternative occupations,
including security systems monitor, inside sales agent, telephone
collections agent, and rental agent. On January 28, 2003, CNA
informed Whitten that his long-term disability benefits would cease
on November 21, 2003. While CNA conceded that Whitten remained
disabled from his own occupation as a warehouse specialist, CNA
determined that Whitten was able to perform alternative occupations
for which he was qualified. Therefore, under the Plan’s definition
of total disability, Whitten was not disabled.
On December 16, 2003, CNA received a report from Dr. Eugene
Truchelut, a physician with the American Board of Internal Medicine
who reviewed Whitten’s medical records. Dr. Truchelut concluded
that Whitten’s symptoms required some occupational restrictions but
that Whitten displayed no impairment which would preclude him from
performing work that required a low level of physical exertion. On
April 14, 2004, CNA denied Whitten’s renewed claim for continued
long-term disability benefits. Whitten appealed the denial and
5
provided additional medical records from his consultations with
various doctors at the Veterans’ Administration Medical Center
(“VAMC”).
In October 2004, Hartford, as the claims administrator of
Whitten’s disability policy, engaged University Disability
Consortium (“UDC”) for purposes of providing an independent medical
record review of Whitten’s file, including the VAMC records that he
had provided on appeal. UDC assigned the file to Dr. Carl Huff,
who reviewed the entirety of Whitten’s file, spoke with Dr. Hasz,
and concluded that Whitten was “capable of resuming work at a light
level according to the Department of Labor Guidelines as of 4/04 to
the present time, which is occasionally lifting 10 pounds,
frequently lifting 10 pounds with no restriction on sitting,
standing, or walking.” J.A. 147. On November 22, 2004, Hartford
denied Whitten’s appeal.
Whitten filed this action in the district court, challenging
Hartford’s denial of benefits. The parties agreed to resolve the
case solely on the administrative record and to forego discovery.
Despite this, Whitten filed several reports from VA doctors which
were not part of the administrative record and which post-dated
Hartford’s denial of benefits. One of these reports opined that
Whitten was disabled and unable to perform any job. Hartford moved
to strike these reports, and both parties moved for summary
6
judgment. The district court granted Hartford’s motion to strike
and its motion for summary judgment.
In awarding summary judgment to Hartford, the district court
held that Whitten had presented no medical evidence which supported
his claim of total disability, in that the one physician who opined
that Whitten was disabled changed his view after a subsequent
review of Whitten’s medical records. The court noted that
Hartford, on the other hand, obtained two independent medical
reviews which supported a finding that Whitten was not disabled.
Further, the court considered the Social Security Administration’s
(“SSA”) finding that Whitten is disabled but discounted the
relevancy of that finding due to the differing definitions of
disability used by SSA and the Plan. Therefore, the district court
found that as he had presented no evidence indicating that he was
totally disabled, Whitten had not met his burden of proof under
ERISA. Whitten now appeals.
II
Because Hartford did not reserve discretion in its
adjudication of Whitten’s benefits claim, the district court
properly reviewed de novo the denial of Whitten’s claim. Firestone
Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989). We, in turn,
review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment,
“viewing the facts in the light most favorable to, and drawing all
7
reasonable inferences in favor of, the nonmoving party.” Garofolo,
405 F.3d at 198. Summary judgment is appropriate “if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c). The relevant inquiry in a summary judgment analysis is
whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require
submission to a factfinder or whether it is so one-sided that one
party must prevail as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). We review for abuse of
discretion the district court’s decision to strike the additional
materials which Whitten submitted. Shaw v. Stroud,
13 F.3d 791,
804 (4th Cir. 1994).
Having reviewed the record and the applicable law pursuant to
the standard set forth above, and having had the benefit of oral
argument, we conclude that the district court did not err in
granting summary judgment in favor of Hartford. We additionally
conclude that the district court acted within its discretion when
it granted Hartford’s motion to strike the additional materials
submitted by Whitten. Accordingly, we affirm based on the
reasoning of the district court. Whitten v. Hartford, 1:05-cv-
1050-JCC (E.D. Va. April 28, 2006).
AFFIRMED
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