Filed: Jul. 13, 2007
Latest Update: Mar. 28, 2017
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 07-1107 STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus ROOSEVELT GRACE, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Greenville. G. Ross Anderson, Jr., District Judge. (6:07-mc-00007) Submitted: June 22, 2007 Decided: July 13, 2007 Before NIEMEYER, WILKINSON, and KING, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Richard A. Harpootlian, RICHARD
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 07-1107 STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus ROOSEVELT GRACE, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Greenville. G. Ross Anderson, Jr., District Judge. (6:07-mc-00007) Submitted: June 22, 2007 Decided: July 13, 2007 Before NIEMEYER, WILKINSON, and KING, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Richard A. Harpootlian, RICHARD ..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-1107
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
ROOSEVELT GRACE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Greenville. G. Ross Anderson, Jr., District
Judge. (6:07-mc-00007)
Submitted: June 22, 2007 Decided: July 13, 2007
Before NIEMEYER, WILKINSON, and KING, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Richard A. Harpootlian, RICHARD A. HARPOOTLIAN, PA, Columbia, South
Carolina, James H. Price, III, PRICE, PASCHAL, & ASHMORE, P.A.,
Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellant. Robert M. Ariail,
THIRTEENTH CIRCUIT SOLICITOR’S OFFICE, Greenville, South Carolina,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
A state grand jury indicted Roosevelt Grace on one count
of trafficking more than 400 grams of cocaine. Citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 1443(1) (2000), Grace sought to remove his criminal prosecution
to federal district court. In his memorandum supporting removal,
Grace contended the arresting officer stopped him pretextually on
account of his race, thus violating his civil rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000). Grace further
contended the officer had a history of conducting pretextual stops
of minorities, the solicitor’s office showed no interest in
vindicating his civil right to racial equality, and under the
authority given solicitors under South Carolina law to control the
criminal docket, he could not be assured of a fair trial in state
court. The district court denied Grace’s removal request and
remanded the case to state court, and Grace appealed. Finding no
error, we affirm.
Under § 1443(1), a civil action or criminal prosecution
commenced in state court may be removed by the defendant to federal
district court when the defendant “is denied or cannot enforce in
the courts of such State a right under any law providing for the
equal civil rights of citizens of the United States, or of all
persons within the jurisdiction thereof.” Removal is limited to
rare situations in which a defendant has been denied or cannot
enforce the right to racial equality in the state courts. See
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Georgia v. Rachel,
384 U.S. 780, 788 (1966). After a thorough
review of the materials before us on appeal, including the
transcript of the removal hearing, we conclude removal is
inappropriate in this case. See City of Greenwood v. Peacock,
384
U.S. 808, 828 (1966) (vindication of defendant’s federal rights
left to state courts “except in the rare situations where it can be
clearly predicted by reason of the operation of a pervasive and
explicit state or federal law that those rights will inevitably be
denied by the very act of bringing the defendant to trial” in state
court); South Carolina v. Moore,
447 F.2d 1067, 1070 (4th Cir.
1971) (holding right of removal under § 1443(1) limited to cases in
which charged conduct enjoys federal protection).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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