Filed: Sep. 13, 2007
Latest Update: Feb. 12, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 07-4223 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus MATTHEW KEVIN MORRIS, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Martinsburg. Frederick P. Stamp, Jr., District Judge. (3:06-cr-00012-IMK) Submitted: August 29, 2007 Decided: September 13, 2007 Before NIEMEYER and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and WILKINS, Senior Circuit Judge. Dismissed by unpublish
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 07-4223 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus MATTHEW KEVIN MORRIS, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Martinsburg. Frederick P. Stamp, Jr., District Judge. (3:06-cr-00012-IMK) Submitted: August 29, 2007 Decided: September 13, 2007 Before NIEMEYER and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and WILKINS, Senior Circuit Judge. Dismissed by unpublishe..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-4223
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
MATTHEW KEVIN MORRIS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia, at Martinsburg. Frederick P. Stamp,
Jr., District Judge. (3:06-cr-00012-IMK)
Submitted: August 29, 2007 Decided: September 13, 2007
Before NIEMEYER and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and WILKINS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Brian C. Crockett, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Martinsburg,
West Virginia, for Appellant. Sharon L. Potter, United States
Attorney, Thomas O. Mucklow, Assistant United States Attorney,
Martinsburg, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Matthew K. Morris appeals his ninety-two month sentence
following his guilty plea and conviction for possession with intent
to distribute 1.06 grams of cocaine base. Counsel filed a brief in
accordance with Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738 (1967), raising
one issue, but stating that in his opinion, there are no
meritorious issues for review. Morris was advised of his right to
file a pro se brief, and has done so. The Government also filed a
responding brief arguing that Morris waived his right to appeal his
sentence, and that in the alternative, Morris’s sentence was
reasonable. Finding Morris validly waived the right to appeal his
sentence, we dismiss his appeal.
The Government contends that Morris waived his right to
appeal any sentence within or below the maximum provided in the
statute or the manner in which the sentence was determined. This
court reviews the validity of a waiver de novo, United States v.
Brown,
232 F.3d 399, 403 (4th Cir. 2000), and will uphold a waiver
of appellate rights if the waiver is valid and the issue being
appealed is covered by the waiver. United States v. Blick,
408
F.3d 162, 168 (4th Cir. 2005). A waiver is valid if the
defendant’s agreement to the waiver was knowing and voluntary.
United States v. Marin,
961 F.2d 493, 496 (4th Cir. 1992); United
States v. Wessells,
936 F.2d 165, 167 (4th Cir. 1991). Generally,
if a district court fully questions a defendant regarding his
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waiver of appellate rights during the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 colloquy,
the waiver is valid.
Wessells, 936 F.2d at 167-68. Morris
explicitly agreed that he: “knowingly and voluntarily waives the
right to appeal any sentence which is within the maximum provided
in the statute of conviction or the manner in which the sentence
was determined on any ground whatsoever, including those grounds
set forth in Title 18, United States Code, Section 3742.”
The district court conducted a thorough Rule 11 colloquy
and specifically questioned Morris about whether he understood he
was waiving his right to appeal a sentence below the statutory
maximum. Morris stated that he was not under the influence of any
drugs, nor was he suffering from any hearing impairments or mental
illnesses that would prevent him from entering a valid plea. The
court reviewed the terms of the plea agreement, and Morris
understood that the agreement was the complete agreement, had
reviewed its terms with his attorney, was pleading guilty because
he was indeed guilty, and agreed there were no other promises or
representations inducing his guilty plea. Morris agreed that he
understood the elements of the crime to which he was pleading
guilty and that he could receive up to the statutory maximum of
twenty years in prison.
Morris agreed that the court had the authority to depart
from any sentence recommended under the guidelines and impose
either a longer or shorter sentence, that if the sentence imposed
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upon him was longer than he hoped or expected he would still be
bound by his guilty plea and may not withdraw it, nor could he
appeal such sentence. The district court concluded that the plea
was freely and voluntarily made and that Morris had full knowledge
of its consequences, and accepted the plea.
Morris’s sentence of ninety-two months is well below the
statutory maximum of twenty years. The record establishes that
Morris made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his appellate rights,
thus, the waiver provision should be enforced, precluding Morris’s
Anders sentencing challenge.
Morris argues in his pro se filing that he should have
received a lesser sentence in light of his assistance and his
girlfriend’s assistance with the Government’s ongoing criminal
investigations, and that he should not have been found to be a
career offender. As discussed above, these sentencing claims are
foreclosed by Morris’s validly entered guilty plea and the waiver
provision of his plea agreement.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record in
this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. This court requires that
counsel inform Morris, in writing, of the right to petition the
Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Morris
requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such
a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court
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for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must
state that a copy thereof was served on Morris.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED
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