Filed: Nov. 10, 2008
Latest Update: Feb. 12, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 07-1719 MARK H. BEAM, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. GEORGE TATUM, Commissioner, North Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles; BRYAN BEATTY, Secretary, North Carolina Department of Crime Control and Public Safety; LYNDO TIPPETT, Secretary, North Carolina Department of Transportation, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever III, District
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 07-1719 MARK H. BEAM, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. GEORGE TATUM, Commissioner, North Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles; BRYAN BEATTY, Secretary, North Carolina Department of Crime Control and Public Safety; LYNDO TIPPETT, Secretary, North Carolina Department of Transportation, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever III, District ..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-1719
MARK H. BEAM,
Plaintiff − Appellant,
v.
GEORGE TATUM, Commissioner, North Carolina Division of Motor
Vehicles; BRYAN BEATTY, Secretary, North Carolina Department
of Crime Control and Public Safety; LYNDO TIPPETT,
Secretary, North Carolina Department of Transportation,
Defendants − Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever III,
District Judge. (5:06-cv-00279-D)
Argued: September 24, 2008 Decided: November 10, 2008
Before WILLIAMS, Chief Judge, AGEE, Circuit Judge, and T. S.
ELLIS, III, Senior United States District Judge for the Eastern
District of Virginia, sitting by designation.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished
per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: Ralph David Wicker, Jr., ROBERTI, WITTENBERG, LAUFFER &
WICKER, P.A., Durham, North Carolina, for Appellant. Mark Allen
Davis, NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North
Carolina, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Roy Cooper, North Carolina
Attorney General, Christopher G. Browning, Jr., Solicitor
General, John W. Congleton, Assistant Attorney General, NORTH
CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2
PER CURIAM:
Mark H. Beam brought this action in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina,
pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 2003), requesting a
declaration that a civil penalty imposed upon him by the State
of North Carolina violates the United States and North Carolina
Constitutions and that a refund of the civil penalty be ordered.
The district court abstained under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
37 (1971), from exercising jurisdiction, concluding that Beam
failed to exhaust his state judicial remedies, this case
involves North Carolina’s substantial interest in motor safety,
and Beam will have an opportunity to raise his constitutional
claims in North Carolina’s state courts. For the reasons that
follow, we agree and therefore affirm the district court’s
decision to abstain. Because Beam’s complaint requests monetary
relief, however, we vacate the district court’s order dismissing
Beam’s suit and remand with instructions to stay the action.
I.
The underlying facts in this case are not in dispute. Beam
drives a truck for BarMar Transportation Corp. (“BarMar”), a
small trucking firm owned by Beam and his wife. In 2005, BarMar
contracted with Daystar Transportation, LLC (“Daystar”) to haul
a large piece of industrial equipment from Pineville, North
3
Carolina to the Tennessee border. On December 15, 2005, the
North Carolina Department of Transportation (“DOT”) issued
Daystar a permit to transport the equipment. The permit, which
listed Beam as the “permittee,” required the hauling truck to be
accompanied by two escort vehicles with certified drivers.
(J.A. at 6-7.)
On December 19, 2005, during the transport of the
industrial equipment, a North Carolina vehicle enforcement
officer issued Beam two civil penalties at a weigh station: (1)
a $500 citation for “Operating an Escort Vehicle Without the
Required Certification” because the rear escort driver could not
produce an escort permit (the “escort penalty”) and (2) a
$23,820 citation for carrying too much weight (the “overweight
penalty”). (J.A. at 27.) Had the officer not treated the
permit as invalid because of the escort penalty, the weight
total would have been within the weight limit permitted by the
permit. Both civil penalties were paid.
On January 10, 2006, Beam sent a letter to the North
Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”) stating that,
pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-91.1, repealed by 2007 N.C.
Sess. Laws 491, he paid the overweight penalty under protest and
demanded that this money be repaid to him within 90 days. 1 On
1
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-91.1 provided:
(Continued)
4
January 31, 2006, the North Carolina Department of Crime Control
and Public Safety (“CCPS”) responded with a letter informing
Beam that an administrative review had determined that the
overweight penalty was issued in accordance with state law and
that the CCPS lacked authority to reduce “any penalty imposed
according to law.” (J.A. at 11.) Further, the letter
specifically informed Beam of his right to appeal the CCPS’s
administrative decision in North Carolina state court under N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 20-91.1.
In lieu of seeking judicial review of the administrative
decision in state court, on July 7, 2006, Beam filed this § 1983
action seeking a refund of the overweight penalty. Beam named
as defendants George Tatum, Commissioner of the DMV; Bryan
Beatty, the Secretary of the CCPS; and Lyndo Tippett, the
Secretary of the DOT (collectively “North Carolina”). He
No court of this State shall entertain a suit of any
kind brought for the purpose of preventing the
collection of any tax imposed in this Article.
Whenever a person shall have a valid defense to the
enforcement of the collection of a tax assessed or
charged against him or his property, such person shall
pay such tax . . . and if the same shall not be
refunded within 90 days thereafter, may sue such
official in the courts of the State for the amount so
demanded. Such suit must be brought in the Superior
Court of Wake County, or in the county in which the
taxpayer resides.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-91.1, repealed by 2007 N.C. Sess. Laws 491.
5
alleged that North Carolina’s actions violated the Excessive
Fines Clauses of the Eighth Amendment and the North Carolina
Constitution, the prohibition against delegation of judicial
power in the North Carolina Constitution, the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and the Due Process Clauses of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
On June 26, 2007, the district court abstained under
Younger from exercising jurisdiction and dismissed Beam’s case,
concluding that by filing suit in federal court:
[Beam] has expressly short-circuited North Carolina’s
statutory scheme concerning such civil penalties. See
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-91.1. Under that statutory
scheme, [Beam] may protest the penalty
administratively (which he did) and then file suit in
Wake County Superior Court (which he did not do). In
Wake County Superior Court, [Beam] . . . could raise
the constitutional challenges set forth in his
complaint.
(J.A. at 91.) Beam timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291 (West 2006).
II.
The sole issue on appeal is whether the district court
properly abstained under Younger from exercising jurisdiction.
“We review for abuse of discretion the district court’s decision
to abstain under Younger.” Nivens v. Gilchrist, 444 F.3d 237,
240 (4th Cir. 2006). Younger and “its progeny espouse a strong
federal policy against federal-court interference with pending
6
state judicial proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances.”
Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457
U.S. 423, 431 (1982). The principle of “comity” underlying this
abstention doctrine includes “a proper respect for state
functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is
made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a
continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare
best if the States and their institutions are left free to
perform their separate functions in their separate ways.”
Younger, 401 U.S. at 44.
Sensitive to principles of equity, comity, and federalism,
Younger mandates “abstention not only when the pending state
proceedings are criminal, but also when certain civil
proceedings are pending, if the State’s interests in the
proceeding are so important that exercise of the federal
judicial power would disregard the comity between the States and
the National Government.” Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481
U.S. 1, 11 (1987). Further, Younger “recognizes that state
courts are fully competent to decide issues of federal law and
has as a corollary the idea that all state and federal claims
should be presented to the state courts.” Richmond,
Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. Forst,
4 F.3d 244, 251 (4th
Cir. 1993) (internal citation omitted). In sum, Younger
abstention requires a federal court to abstain from interfering
7
in state proceedings, even if federal subject matter
jurisdiction exists, if the following three factors are present:
(1) there is an ongoing state judicial proceeding
brought prior to substantial progress in the federal
proceeding; that (2) implicates important,
substantial, or vital state interests; and (3)
provides adequate opportunity to raise constitutional
challenges.
Nivens, 444 F.3d at 241; see
Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 432. We
analyze each of these factors in turn.
First, we consider whether there is an ongoing state
proceeding. The pertinent question presented in this case is
whether this factor is met where a party fails to exhaust its
state judicial remedies before seeking relief in federal
district court. The Supreme Court has answered this question in
the affirmative: “a necessary concomitant of Younger is that a
party . . . must exhaust his state appellate remedies before
seeking relief in the District Court.” Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.,
420 U.S. 592, 608 (1975). This rule applies with equal force to
judicial review of state administrative proceedings. See Ohio
Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc.,
477 U.S.
619, 629 (1986) (holding that Younger abstention is appropriate
where “constitutional claims may be raised in state-court
judicial review of the administrative proceeding”). Relying on
the principles articulated in Huffman and Ohio Civil Rights
Comm’n, we have similarly held that “a defendant to a coercive
8
state administrative proceeding must exhaust his state
administrative and judicial remedies and may not bypass them in
favor of a federal court proceeding in which he seeks
effectively ‘to annul the results’ of a state administrative
body.” Moore v. City of Asheville, 396 F.3d 385, 388 (4th Cir.
2005) (citing
Huffman, 420 U.S. at 609) (emphasis added). 2
In this case, Beam did not exhaust his state judicial
remedies. Rather, he abandoned the state review process he
initiated and bypassed state court judicial review of the CCPS’s
administrative decision in favor of filing suit in federal
court. As noted above, Beam initially challenged the overweight
penalty under the procedures provided by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-
91.1, North Carolina’s statutory scheme concerning such
penalties. Specifically, on January 10, 2006, Beam sent a
letter to the DMV pursuant to “N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-91.1”
demanding a refund of the amount of the overweight penalty.
(J.A. at 10.) On January 31, 2006, the CCPS responded with a
letter informing Beam that an administrative review had
determined that the overweight penalty was issued in accordance
2
Beam contends that the district court’s decision to
abstain was improper because the state proceedings in this case
are not sufficiently “coercive.” We disagree. Similar to the
proceedings in Moore v. City of Asheville, the state proceedings
in this case are “unquestionably coercive.” 396 F.3d 385, 395
n.4 (4th Cir. 2005).
9
with state law and that he had a right to appeal the CCPS’s
administrative decision in “Wake County Superior Court” as
provided for by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-91.1. (J.A. 11.) Beam,
however, did not challenge the CCPS’s decision in Wake County
Superior Court; instead he filed suit in federal court.
Beam attempts to excuse his failure to exhaust his state
judicial remedies, asserting that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-91.1 did
not and does not afford him a right to appeal the CCPS’s
administrative decision in state court. Specifically, he
argues: (1) the North Carolina Supreme Court in North Carolina
Sch. Bds. Ass’n v. Moore, 614 S.E.2d 504 (2005) made clear that
the statute is solely a tax statute and he is seeking recovery
of a civil penalty (not a tax); and (2) that the statute was
repealed after he filed this suit, preserving only a right to
litigate tax cases, not a right to sue for recovery of a civil
penalty. In response, North Carolina asserts: (1) the North
Carolina Supreme Court in Cedar Creek Enter., Inc. v. State
Dep’t of Motor Vehicles,
226 S.E.2d 336 (1976) concluded that
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-91.1 applied to monetary penalties like the
one Beam received and that North Carolina Sch. Bds. Ass’n does
not even address this issue (nor in anyway purport to overrule
Cedar Creek); and (2) because Beam invoked his rights under this
10
statute prior to its repeal, he can still seek judicial review
in state court. 3
We find Beam’s arguments unpersuasive, particularly given
that he initially challenged the overweight penalty under the
very statute he now claims does not apply to him. Moreover,
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-91.1 had not been repealed at time Beam
filed the instant federal suit. Therefore, the point remains:
If Beam wanted to challenge the CCPS’s decision he should have
continued the process he invoked under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-91.1
and filed suit in North Carolina state court. Because he did
not do so, we conclude that Younger’s first prong is satisfied.
Cf. Moore, 396 F.3d at 395 (affirming the district court’s
decision to abstain under Younger even though the plaintiff was
left without any remedy for challenging his citation because his
appellate rights in state court had already expired.)
Next, we examine whether the proceedings at issue implicate
a substantial state interest. To satisfy this factor, the
ongoing state proceedings must be “the type of proceeding to
which Younger applies.” New Orleans Public Serv., Inc. v.
Council of the City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 367 (1989).
3
North Carolina forcefully reiterated this position at oral
argument, stating that “without question” Beam can still raise
all of his state and federal claims in state court pursuant to
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-91.1 and that the State would “absolutely”
support his entitlement to raise these claims in such a suit.
11
Beam concedes that “the district court was correct in holding
that [North Carolina] has ‘a substantial interest in motor
safety’ . . . .” (Appellant’s Br. at 32.) He argues, however,
that this interest was not genuinely implicated because Beam’s
only real offense was failing to ensure that the rear escort’s
certification was not expired. We disagree. As North Carolina
points out, Beam’s “argument ignores the direct link between the
State’s desire to ensure the safety of its roadways and the
requirement that escort vehicles driven by properly certified
drivers accompany an overweight vehicle.” (Appellees’ Br. at
10.) Hence, the district court correctly concluded that North
Carolina has a substantial state interest in motor safety.
Finally, we consider whether Beam will have an adequate
opportunity to raise his constitutional claims in North Carolina
state court. See Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 432. As to this
consideration, we agree with the district court that Beam “will
receive a full and fair opportunity to litigate the
constitutional claims during the state proceedings.” (J.A. 98.)
Thus, the three prong test for Younger abstention is met. 4
4
Beam also argues that the district court abused its
discretion by failing to take into account any existing Commerce
Clause considerations. Similar to Beam’s other contentions,
this argument is likewise without merit.
12
In sum, Beam failed to exhaust his state judicial remedies,
where he could have asserted his constitutional claims, and
North Carolina has a substantial interest in motor safety.
Therefore, we hold that the principles of federalism and comity
demand application of Younger abstention. As we concluded in
Moore:
[T]o the extent that [Beam] in this case seeks to
annul or trample on the results of state
administrative proceedings, he interferes with the
State’s interest in enforcing its substantive laws as
well as its interest in enforcing those laws through
available administrative procedures and in its own
courts. That [Beam] did not avail himself of state-
provided avenues for review can only cast aspersion on
the State’s capabilities and good faith and deprive
the State of a function which quite legitimately is
left to the state appellate bodies, that of overseeing
agency dispositions of constitutional issues which
arise in civil litigation over which they have
jurisdiction.
Moore, 396 F.3d at 395 (internal quotation marks, citations and
alteration omitted). Accordingly, the district court did not
abuse its discretion in abstaining from entertaining Beam’s
claims in deference to North Carolina’s substantial interest in
motor safety. 5
5
North Carolina contends that Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319
U.S. 315 (1943) also mandated abstention. To be sure,
abstention doctrines “are not rigid pigeonholes into which
federal courts must try to fit cases.” Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco
Inc.,
481 U.S. 1, 11 n.9, (1987). The district court, however,
solely relied on the principles of federalism articulated in
Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37 (1971), and so, although Burford
abstention may (or may not) apply here, our analysis is limited
(Continued)
13
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s
decision to abstain. We note, however, that because Beam’s
complaint requests monetary relief, the proper resolution is to
stay Beam’s case pending conclusion of the state proceedings.
See Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 731 (1996)
(“[f]ederal courts have the power to dismiss . . . based on
abstention principles only where the relief being sought is
equitable or otherwise discretionary.”); see also Traverso v.
Penn,
874 F.2d 209, 213 (4th Cir. 1989) (same). Accordingly, we
vacate the district court’s order dismissing Beam’s action and
remand with instructions to stay the action.
AFFIRMED IN PART,
VACATED IN PART,
AND REMANDED
to whether or not the district court correctly abstained under
Younger.
14
