Filed: Dec. 29, 2008
Latest Update: Feb. 12, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 08-6840 LLOYD EUGENE BROWN, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. JOHN J. LAMANNA, Warden of FCI-Edgefield; WAYNE SMITH, Camp Administrator; BRIAN FINNERLY, Special Housing Unit Lieutenant; JASON KAPRAL, Special Housing Unit Officer and in their official capacities, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Charleston. R. Bryan Harwell, District Judge. (2:06-cv-00390-RBH) S
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 08-6840 LLOYD EUGENE BROWN, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. JOHN J. LAMANNA, Warden of FCI-Edgefield; WAYNE SMITH, Camp Administrator; BRIAN FINNERLY, Special Housing Unit Lieutenant; JASON KAPRAL, Special Housing Unit Officer and in their official capacities, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Charleston. R. Bryan Harwell, District Judge. (2:06-cv-00390-RBH) Su..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-6840
LLOYD EUGENE BROWN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
JOHN J. LAMANNA, Warden of FCI-Edgefield; WAYNE SMITH, Camp
Administrator; BRIAN FINNERLY, Special Housing Unit
Lieutenant; JASON KAPRAL, Special Housing Unit Officer and
in their official capacities,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Charleston. R. Bryan Harwell, District
Judge. (2:06-cv-00390-RBH)
Submitted: November 21, 2008 Decided: December 29, 2008
Before NIEMEYER, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part; vacated and remanded in part by unpublished
per curiam opinion.
Lloyd Eugene Brown, Appellant Pro Se. Beth Drake, Assistant
United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Lloyd Eugene Brown appeals from the district court’s
grant of summary judgment to Defendants in his suit regarding
prison conditions. Brown raises claims under Biven v. Six
Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”). We
find that Brown’s claims of overcrowding and violations of the
ADA and RA were correctly rejected by the district court.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment on these claims for the
reasons stated by the district court. Brown v. LaManna, No.
2:06-cv-00390-RBH (D.S.C. Mar. 27, 2008). However, we vacate
the portion of the district court’s order granting summary
judgment on Brown’s claims that his crutches were improperly
confiscated, that he was denied recreation for sixty-five days,
and that he was not given a handicapped accessible shower.
Finding that Brown has raised disputed issues of material fact
concerning these claims, we remand them for further proceedings.
To state a claim for relief under the Eighth
Amendment, the plaintiff must establish that a prison official
was deliberately indifferent to a serious condition, medical
need, or risk of harm. See Short v. Smoot, 436 F.3d 422, 427
(4th Cir. 2006). In addition, conditions that deprive a
prisoner of basic human needs, involve the wanton and
unnecessary infliction of pain, or constitute extreme
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deprivation disproportionate to the severity of the crime amount
to cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). With regard to
lack of recreation, an inmate must show specific harm resulting
from the deprivation and a complete denial for an extended
period of time. Compare Mitchell v. Rice,
954 F.2d 187, 192
(4th Cir. 1992) (seven months without out-of-cell exercise
violated constitutional standards of decency), and Knight v.
Armontrout,
878 F.2d 1093, 1095-96 (8th Cir. 1989) (thirteen
days without recreation does not rise to Eighth Amendment
violation). Complaints about infrequent showers state a
constitutional violation only upon a showing that the
deprivation is a serious one to which defendants were
deliberately indifferent. See Wilson v. Seiter,
501 U.S. 294,
303 (1991).
We review de novo a district court’s order granting
summary judgment and view the facts in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party. Bogart v. Chapell, 396 F.3d 548, 555
(4th Cir. 2005). Summary judgment is appropriate when no
genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c); United States Dep’t of Labor v. N.C. Growers Ass’n,
377
F.3d 345, 350 (4th Cir. 2004). The non-movant is entitled “to
have the credibility of his evidence as forecast assumed, his
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version of all that is in dispute accepted, [and] all internal
conflicts in it resolved favorably to him.” Charbonnages de
France v. Smith, 597 F.2d 406, 414 (4th Cir. 1979). To raise a
genuine issue of material fact, Brown may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of his pleadings. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
Rather, he must present evidence supporting his position through
“depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with . . . affidavits, if any.” Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)).
The district court relied primarily on the affidavits
of a prison physician and the Defendants to show that the
Defendants contacted prison medical staff and determined that
crutches were not medically required once Brown was transferred
to the Special Housing Unit (“SHU”), where he remained for
sixty-five days. Specifically, the court noted that “medical
records stated that Plaintiff was able to ambulate without
assistance” and that Defendants were informed as such when they
inquired. These determinations formed the basis of the district
court’s decision.
However, our review of the medical records reveals
that they are, in fact, ambiguous. They do not state that
crutches or a wheelchair are medically necessary, but they also
do not state that Brown can ambulate without assistance.
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Instead, they merely record that, in the summer prior to his
stint in SHU, Brown ambulated with crutches. As such, we find
that the medical records are insufficient to show that Brown was
ambulatory without assistance. Moreover, Brown submitted
affidavits and other evidence showing that, prior to his
incarceration, he had been found to be disabled, requiring
crutches and/or a wheelchair; that he was unable to stand or
walk without assistance; that he repeatedly complained of pain
while in SHU; that he repeatedly complained of lack of
recreation and access to the shower while in SHU; that, when he
was transferred during his stay in SHU, officials used crutches
or a wheelchair; and that, since being released from SHU, he has
been confined to a wheelchair.
While Brown does not (and logically could not) dispute
that officials checked on his condition and were told by medical
staff that crutches were not a medical necessity, these
affidavits cannot completely shield Defendants from claims of
deliberate indifference. First, Brown asserts that his
condition was blatant and obvious--he could not stand or walk
without assistance and was constantly in a great deal of pain.
See Brice v. Virginia Beach Corr. Ctr., 58 F.3d 101, 105 (4th
Cir. 1995) (noting that official cannot hide behind an excuse
that he was unaware of a risk, if the risk was obvious and that
official is charged with confirming inferences he strongly
5
suspects exist). Second, if Brown’s allegations are true,
Defendants were obliged to further investigate his condition to
determine if it had deteriorated or whether the initial
diagnosis was incorrect. See McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d
1248, 1258 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that jury could find
deliberate indifference where prison staff failed to respond to
deteriorating condition); Greeno v. Daley,
414 F.3d 645, 655
(7th Cir. 2005) (finding that “dogged[] persist[ance] in a
course of treatment known to be ineffective” can violate the
Eighth Amendment). While Brown did see a physician while in
SHU, Defendants do not allege that they asked this physician
about Brown’s condition, even after receiving Brown’s grievances
stating that he was unable to shower or recreate. Finally, the
fact that the crucial conversation between medical staff and the
prison officials was not reduced to writing or otherwise
memorialized in the medical records would seem to militate
against blindly accepting its veracity, especially in light of
Brown’s conflicting affidavits.
In short, we find that Brown has sufficiently raised a
material issue of fact as to whether crutches or a wheelchair
were medically necessary for him to ambulate, recreate, take a
shower, ease his pain, and prevent further damage. Moreover,
Brown presented evidence showing that he could not recreate or
take a shower without assistance and that Defendants refused
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assistance in the face of his obvious need, resulting in over
two months without a shower or recreation. In addition, Brown
asserts that the Defendants’ failure to address his obvious
needs resulted in a deteriorated condition. While a trier of
fact may find that, under all the circumstances, prison
officials were entitled to rely on the medical staff’s
conclusions or were not aware of Brown’s condition, Brown has
raised questions about the credibility of Defendants’ affidavits
and other material issues of fact that should be resolved at
trial. See Gray v. Spillman, 925 F.2d 90, 95 (4th Cir. 1991)
(holding that summary judgment may not be granted when there is
opposing sworn testimony, even when one side’s story is hard to
believe).
Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s judgment
on Brown’s claims discussed above and remand for further
proceedings. The remainder of the district court’s judgment is
affirmed. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED IN PART;
VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART
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