Filed: Feb. 27, 2009
Latest Update: Feb. 12, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 08-4594 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. JOSEPH MICHAEL FORT, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Columbia. Matthew J. Perry, Jr., Senior District Judge. (3:07-cr-00593-MJP-1) Submitted: January 29, 2009 Decided: February 27, 2009 Before NIEMEYER, MICHAEL, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. James P. Ro
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 08-4594 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. JOSEPH MICHAEL FORT, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Columbia. Matthew J. Perry, Jr., Senior District Judge. (3:07-cr-00593-MJP-1) Submitted: January 29, 2009 Decided: February 27, 2009 Before NIEMEYER, MICHAEL, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. James P. Rog..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-4594
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JOSEPH MICHAEL FORT,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Columbia. Matthew J. Perry, Jr., Senior
District Judge. (3:07-cr-00593-MJP-1)
Submitted: January 29, 2009 Decided: February 27, 2009
Before NIEMEYER, MICHAEL, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James P. Rogers, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Columbia,
South Carolina, for Appellant. W. Walter Wilkins, United States
Attorney, Jimmie Ewing, Assistant United States Attorney,
Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Joseph Michael Fort appeals from his conviction and
eight-month sentence after pleading guilty to possession of a
Remington 12-gauge shotgun with a barrel length of less than 18
inches, and a Colt, model AR-15, .223 caliber machine gun,
neither of which were properly registered, in violation of 26
U.S.C. §§ 5841, 5861(d), and 5871 (2006). Fort contends that
police violated his Fourth Amendment rights by improperly
seizing the firearms during a search of his vehicle, as there
was no justification for carrying out an inventory search after
police discovered him in medical distress behind the wheel of
his parked car. Fort further asserts that the seizure of the
weapons cannot be justified based on the fact that they were in
plain view, as the incriminating nature of the firearms was not
immediately apparent and could only be determined after the
officers handled them. After thoroughly reviewing the record,
we conclude that the district court did not err in denying
Fort’s motion to suppress.
This court reviews the district court’s factual
findings underlying a motion to suppress for clear error, and
the district court’s legal determinations de novo. United
States v. Wilson, 484 F.3d 267, 280 (4th Cir. 2007) (citing
Ornelas v. United States,
517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996)). When a
suppression motion has been denied, the evidence is reviewed in
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the light most favorable to the government. United States v.
Uzenski, 434 F.3d 690, 704 (4th Cir. 2006).
A warrantless search or seizure is prohibited by the
Fourth Amendment unless it falls within an exception to the
warrant requirement. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128,
134 n.4 (1990). An inventory search qualifies as a well-defined
exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, as
the exception serves to “guard against claims of theft,
vandalism, or negligence” by police, as well as to “avert any
danger to police or others that may have been posed by the
property.” See Colorado v. Bertine,
479 U.S. 367, 373 (1987).
The Fourth Amendment requirements are violated when, considering
the totality of the circumstances, an inventory search is
unreasonable. See South Dakota v. Opperman,
428 U.S. 364,
373-75 (1976). If an inventory search is conducted according to
standard departmental policies and not as a ruse for an
impermissible search, the search does not violate the Fourth
Amendment, and evidence seized during the search is admissible
at trial. See Florida v. Wells,
495 U.S. 1, 3-5 (1990); United
States v. Brown,
787 F.2d 929, 932 (4th Cir. 1986).
“[R]easonable police regulations relating to inventory
procedures administered in good faith satisfy the Fourth
Amendment, even though courts might as a matter of hindsight be
3
able to devise equally reasonable rules requiring a different
procedure.” Bertine, 479 U.S. at 369-70 & 374.
Fort contends there was no justification for
performing an inventory search because there was no need to tow
or impound the vehicle, as Fort’s wife was given custody of the
vehicle and permitted to drive it home. However, the decision
to have the vehicle towed, and therefore subject it to an
inventory search, was made before Fort’s wife arrived and spoke
to the officers. The lead officer testified that a tow truck
was called and en route before Fort’s wife arrived at the scene
“about halfway through the inventory.” The officer stated that
he decided to have the vehicle towed and to take inventory of
the items inside based on the fact that Fort was unable to give
consent for someone to take custody of the vehicle, and the
actual owner of the car was also unavailable.
Fort also asserts that the police policy manual did
not permit his vehicle to be towed under these circumstances;
however, the manual’s “Property Control Safeguards” state that
“[w]hen an injured driver is removed from an accident scene
and/or it is necessary to tow the vehicle,” a tow truck request
should be put in to the dispatcher and “[t]he officer will
conduct an inventory [] of the contents of the vehicle.” Based
on the information available to him at the time, the lead
officer acted well within his discretion in determining that it
4
was necessary to have the car towed. As the Supreme Court has
noted, there is no prohibition on the discretion of a police
officer to determine how to store and secure an unattended
vehicle “so long as that discretion is exercised according to
standard criteria and on the basis of something other than
suspicion of evidence of criminal activity.” Bertine, 479 U.S.
at 375; see also United States v. Rodriguez-Morales,
929 F.2d
780, 787 (1st Cir. 1991) (when the police have “solid,
noninvestigatory reasons for impounding a car, there is no need
for them to show that they followed explicit criteria in
deciding to impound, as long as the decision was reasonable”).
Furthermore, the police inventory policy did not
specifically address the procedures to be followed in the
particular circumstances present in this case, especially
considering the dangerous nature of the items that were visible
inside of the vehicle. See United States v. Banks, 482 F.3d
733, 740 (4th Cir. 2007). In such a situation, the police are
not required to comply with “all the written directives
governing one particular application of the standardized
procedures for inventory searches”; rather, the relevant
question is whether the officers, in light of the unusual
circumstances, “acted in accordance with standard procedures
more generally.”
Id. In this case, the police properly abided
by the “Property Control Safeguards” that are generally employed
5
for traffic accidents in which a driver is removed from the
scene. Accordingly, because the police did not violate any
clear directives under their towing and inventory policy and
there is no evidence that the search was initiated by an
investigatory motive, we find that the officers did not abuse
their discretion and that the decision to have Fort’s vehicle
towed and inventoried was reasonable.
As for the manner in which the officers carried out
the inventory search of the vehicle, Fort has failed to
demonstrate that the seizure of the firearms was in any way
unreasonable. Looking into the vehicle, officers could see, in
plain view, that Ford was in possession of an assault rifle with
a grenade launcher attachment, loaded magazines, multiple boxes
of ammunition, and police tactical gear. In all, seven
different firearms, many of which were loaded, were taken out of
the vehicle and placed into police custody for safekeeping. One
of the key purposes served by an inventory search is to provide
officers with precise knowledge of the property in order to
“avert any danger to police or others that may have been posed
by the property.” Bertine, 479 U.S. at 373; see also United
States v. Ford,
986 F.2d 57, 60 (4th Cir. 1993). In light of
the inherently hazardous nature of the items found in Fort’s
car, the officers were fully justified in carrying out a
complete search of the vehicle to ensure that no dangerous or
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illegal items remained inside. See Wells, 495 U.S. at 4.
Therefore, considering the totality of the circumstances, we
find the inventory search was reasonable and not in violation of
Fort’s Fourth Amendment rights. *
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
conclusions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
*
Because the officers’ actions were undertaken as part of a
valid inventory search, it is unnecessary to determine whether
the officers were alternatively justified in seizing the weapons
because they were in plain view.
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