Filed: May 08, 2009
Latest Update: Feb. 12, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 07-2162 BRENDA BRYANT, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. CITY OF CAYCE; M. L. BRAKEFIELD, South Carolina Cayce Police Officer, individually and as agent and employee of the City of Cayce, Defendants – Appellants, and W. E. ACKERMAN; OFFICER POPENHAGEN; MASTERS ECONOMY INN, INCORPORATED; ROGER ARMSTRONG, Manager, Defendants. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Columbia. Matthew J. Perry, J
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 07-2162 BRENDA BRYANT, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. CITY OF CAYCE; M. L. BRAKEFIELD, South Carolina Cayce Police Officer, individually and as agent and employee of the City of Cayce, Defendants – Appellants, and W. E. ACKERMAN; OFFICER POPENHAGEN; MASTERS ECONOMY INN, INCORPORATED; ROGER ARMSTRONG, Manager, Defendants. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Columbia. Matthew J. Perry, Jr..
More
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-2162
BRENDA BRYANT,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
CITY OF CAYCE; M. L. BRAKEFIELD, South Carolina Cayce
Police Officer, individually and as agent and employee of
the City of Cayce,
Defendants – Appellants,
and
W. E. ACKERMAN; OFFICER POPENHAGEN; MASTERS ECONOMY INN,
INCORPORATED; ROGER ARMSTRONG, Manager,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Columbia. Matthew J. Perry, Jr., Senior
District Judge. (3:06-cv-00333-MJP)
Argued: March 25, 2009 Decided: May 8, 2009
Before MOTZ, TRAXLER, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished opinion. Judge Shedd wrote
the opinion, in which Judge Motz and Judge Traxler joined.
ARGUED: Andrew Lindemann, DAVIDSON & LINDEMANN, PA, Columbia,
South Carolina, for Appellants. David C. Gibbs, III, GIBBS LAW
FIRM, PA, Seminole, Florida, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: William H.
Davidson, Matthew B. Rosbrugh, DAVIDSON & LINDEMANN, PA,
Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellants.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2
SHEDD, Circuit Judge:
As is relevant here, Brenda Bryant brought this action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Officer M.L. Brakefield – an
officer with the Department of Public Safety of the City of
Cayce, South Carolina. Among other things, Bryant alleged that
her rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments were
violated when Brakefield arrested her for trespassing. After
Bryant moved for summary judgment, the district court ruled that
Brakefield was not entitled to qualified immunity. Brakefield
now appeals. 1 We vacate the district court’s denial of summary
judgment to Brakefield and remand this case for further
proceedings.
I
“In reviewing the denial of summary judgment based on
qualified immunity, we accept as true the facts that the
district court concluded may be reasonably inferred from the
record when viewed in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff.” Waterman v. Batton, 393 F.3d 471, 473 (4th Cir.
2005). “To the extent that the district court has not fully set
1
The City of Cayce, which was a defendant below, also
appealed the district court’s denial of summary judgment.
However, the only issue the appellants present for our review is
whether the district court erred by denying Brakefield summary
judgment. Therefore, this is the only issue we address in our
opinion.
3
forth the facts on which its decision is based, we assume the
facts that may reasonably be inferred from the record when
viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Id. With
these principles in mind, we will summarize the facts which are
pertinent to this appeal.
On April 28, 2005, Bryant checked into the Masters Economy
Inn in Cayce. Her husband registered for the room in his name,
reserved the room for one night, and paid for it in cash.
However, Bryant signed the hotel’s Guest Registration form,
which stated that the hotel’s check-out time was 11:00 a.m. the
following day and that guests staying past 11:00 a.m. would be
charged for an additional day.
Sometime the next morning before 11:00 a.m. Bryant
telephoned the hotel’s front desk and asked to extend her stay
another day. The person Bryant spoke with agreed she could stay
another day and that her husband could stop by later that day to
pay for the additional day. At some point around 11:00 a.m.,
the hotel’s manager, Robert Armstrong, came to Bryant’s room and
advised her that she would have to leave the hotel because no
arrangement had been made for her to continue to stay there.
Armstrong then called the Cayce Department of Public Safety.
Brakefield responded to Armstrong’s call. When he arrived
at the Masters Economy Inn, Armstrong informed him that he had
directed Bryant to vacate the premises. Brakefield then went to
4
Bryant’s room and informed her that she was not a registered
guest and that she needed to leave the premises. When Bryant
left the room, she was presented with a document titled “Cayce
Department of Public Safety Trespass Warning” (the “Trespass
Warning”).
The Trespass Warning, which both Brakefield and Bryant
signed, stated that she was warned to depart the Masters Economy
Inn and not to return. Bryant was also warned not to enter onto
the property of any other hotel or motel in Cayce. 2 Moreover,
Brakefield stated in an affidavit that he believed Bryant was
prohibited from trespassing at any hotel or motel within Cayce.
J.A. 121. 3 However, after signing the Trespass Warning, Bryant
2
In a section of the Trespass Warning titled “Additional
Information,” the following handwritten notation appears: “All
Motels/Hotels in Cayce.” J.A. 174. Bryant later testified that
she understood what the Trespass Warning meant and could
comprehend the phrase “[a]ll motels/hotels in Cayce.” J.A. 321.
3
A number of motels/hotels in Cayce entered into a
“Trespassing Agreement” with the Cayce Department of Public
Safety and with each other. Under the Trespassing Agreement,
all of the signatories agreed “to uphold trespass notices given
to individuals by the City of Cayce Department of Public Safety
on this and other lodging properties in the City . . . . These
persons shall also not be allowed to utilize or be physically
on, around or in any facilities of this property. I furthermore
request that any persons placed on trespass notice on this or
any other lodging business or property in the City of Cayce, and
who are found on this property, be prosecuted for trespassing
and any other criminal offenses applicable.” J.A. 163-64.
Representatives of both the Masters Economy Inn and the Knights
Inn in Cayce signed the Trespassing Agreement.
5
walked away from the Masters Economy Inn and onto the premises
of the Knights Inn – another hotel in Cayce which was about a
quarter of a mile away. After walking onto the Knights Inn’s
property, Bryant went inside the hotel’s lobby and received
permission to use the telephone. Around that time, Brakefield
arrived at the Knights Inn. He intended to inform the hotel’s
management that Bryant had been given a Trespass Warning. As
Brakefield entered the lobby, he encountered Bryant. He
informed her that she was trespassing on Knights Inn’s property
and arrested her for trespass after notice in violation of S.C.
Code Ann. § 16-11-620. 4
Cayce prosecuted Bryant in municipal court for this
trespass. At the close of Cayce’s case, Bryant moved for a
directed verdict, which the judge denied. However, a jury found
Bryant not guilty.
Bryant then commenced this action seeking, inter alia,
monetary damages under § 1983 because her constitutional rights
4
Section 16-11-620 provides: “Any person who, without legal
cause or good excuse, enters into the dwelling house, place of
business, or on the premises of another person after having been
warned not to do so or any person who, having entered into the
dwelling house, place of business, or on the premises of another
person without having been warned fails and refuses, without
good cause or good excuse, to leave immediately upon being
ordered or requested to do so by the person in possession or his
agent or representative shall, on conviction, be fined not more
than two hundred dollars or be imprisoned for not more than
thirty days.”
6
were allegedly violated when Brakefield arrested her.
Brakefield moved for summary judgment based in part on the
defense of qualified immunity. In an oral ruling from the
bench, the district court denied Brakefield summary judgment on
his qualified immunity defense. This appeal followed.
II
A.
The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government
officials performing discretionary functions “from liability for
civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 818 (1982). “The concern of the immunity inquiry is
to acknowledge that reasonable mistakes can be made as to the
legal constraints on particular police conduct.” Saucier v.
Katz,
533 U.S. 194, 205 (2001). Qualified immunity protects
“all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate
the law.” Malley v. Briggs,
475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
When government officials properly assert the defense of
qualified immunity, they are entitled to summary judgment if
either (1) the facts the plaintiff has alleged or shown do not
make out a violation of a constitutional right – a question on
which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof; or (2) the right
7
at issue was not “clearly established” at the time of the
defendant’s alleged misconduct – a question on which the
defendant bears the burden of proof. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201;
Henry v. Purnell,
501 F.3d 374, 377-78 (4th Cir. 2007). We need
not address these questions in any particular order, Pearson v.
Callahan,
129 S. Ct. 808, 818 (2009), and our inquiry ends if we
resolve either question against the plaintiff, see
Henry, 501
F.3d at 377.
B.
At the outset of our analysis, we address Bryant’s argument
that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal. In general, we have
jurisdiction to review “final decisions” of district courts, 28
U.S.C. § 1291, and “a district court’s denial of a claim of
qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of
law, is an appealable ‘final decision’ within the meaning of 28
U.S.C. § 1291 notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment,”
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985). However, “[i]f
summary judgment was denied as to a particular claim solely
because there is a genuine issue of material fact, that claim is
not immediately appealable and we lack jurisdiction to consider
it.” Iko v. Shreve,
535 F.3d 225, 235 (4th Cir. 2008).
Bryant contends that we lack jurisdiction because the
district court’s decision did not turn on an issue of law.
Instead, she argues, the district court denied Brakefield
8
qualified immunity because she raised a genuine issue of
material fact. We disagree with Bryant’s characterization of
the district court’s decision. In the relevant portion of its
ruling, the district court stated:
I’m of the view that assuming the truth of the
plaintiff’s allegations, that is still a matter that
would have to be proven at trial, that in arresting
the plaintiff the officer acted in violation of the
constitution. Because the evidence does not accept
that the plaintiff was acting in violation of any law
when she was placed under arrest. And, thus, assuming
the truth of the plaintiff’s allegations, her arrest
would have been in violation of the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
J.A. 638-39. As this language makes clear, the district court
did not deny Brakefield qualified immunity because the parties
disputed a genuine issue of material fact. Rather, the district
court viewed the facts in the light most favorable to Bryant and
then decided as matter of law that her constitutional rights
were violated. Accordingly, we have jurisdiction over the
district court’s ruling.
C.
We now turn to the merits of Brakefield’s arguments on
appeal. He contends that the district court erred by not
granting him qualified immunity with respect to three of
Bryant’s claims – her Fourth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment,
and related conspiracy claims. As set forth below, we hold that
9
the district court erred by not granting Brakefield summary
judgment on these claims.
1.
In her complaint, Bryant alleged that Brakefield violated
her Fourth Amendment rights by arresting her without probable
cause. Under Supreme Court precedent, “a warrantless arrest by
a law officer is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment where
there is probable cause to believe that a criminal offense has
been or is being committed.” Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146,
152 (2004). Probable cause exists if the “facts and
circumstances within the officer’s knowledge . . . are
sufficient to warrant a prudent person . . . in the
circumstances shown, [to conclude] that the suspect has
committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.”
Michigan v. DeFillippo,
443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979). “The validity
of the arrest does not depend on whether the suspect actually
committed a crime; the mere fact that the suspect is later
acquitted of the offense for which he is arrested is irrelevant
to the validity of the arrest.”
Id. at 36.
Based on the facts known to Brakefield at the time he
arrested Bryant, we conclude that a reasonable officer would
have had probable cause to believe that she had committed a
criminal offense. As indicated above, South Carolina law makes
it unlawful for a person without legal cause or good excuse to
10
enter a place of business after having been warned not to do so.
See S.C. Code Ann. § 16-11-620. At the time of her arrest, both
Brakefield and Bryant knew that she had been warned not to
return to the Masters Economy Inn. Moreover, Bryant was warned
not to enter the property of any other hotel or motel in Cayce,
and Brakefield stated that he knew Bryant was prohibited from
entering the property of any hotel or motel within Cayce. 5
Minutes after she signed the Trespass Warning in his presence,
Brakefield saw Bryant on the premises of the Knights Inn in
Cayce. Her presence at the Knights Inn gave Brakefield probable
cause to believe that she had committed a crime – namely, a
violation of S.C. Code Ann. § 16-11-620. Therefore, the
district court erred by denying Brakefield summary judgment on
Bryant’s Fourth Amendment claim.
2.
Bryant’s complaint also alleged that Brakefield violated
her Fourteenth Amendment rights when he arrested her. However,
the facts Bryant has alleged or shown do not make out a
violation by Brakefield of any of her rights recognized under
5
Although Bryant contends that the Trespassing Agreement is
unlawful, we find that this argument does not negate the
presence of probable cause because, at a minimum, a reasonable
officer in Brakefield’s position would not have known that the
Trespassing Agreement was unlawful at the time of the arrest.
See Michigan, 443 U.S. at 38 (“Police are charged to enforce
laws until and unless they are declared unconstitutional.”).
11
the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, the district court erred by not
granting Brakefield summary judgment on Bryant’s Fourteenth
Amendment claims.
3.
In addition to her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims,
Bryant’s complaint also alleged that Brakefield entered into an
unlawful conspiracy to deprive her of her federal constitutional
rights. “To establish a civil conspiracy under § 1983,
. . . [the plaintiff] must present evidence that the
[defendants] . . . acted jointly in concert and that some overt
act was done in furtherance of the conspiracy which resulted in
[the plaintiff’s] . . . deprivation of a constitutional right.”
Hinkle v. City of Clarksburg, 81 F.3d 416, 421 (4th Cir. 1996).
Here, the facts do not establish that Brakefield deprived Bryant
of any constitutional rights. Consequently, we conclude that
Brakefield is entitled to summary judgment on Bryant’s
conspiracy claim.
III
Based on the foregoing, we vacate the district court’s
denial of summary judgment to Brakefield and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
VACATED AND REMANDED
12
