Filed: Aug. 01, 2013
Latest Update: Feb. 12, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 12-4450 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. IGNACIO ANDRADE-MARTINEZ, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Columbia. Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., District Judge. (3:11-cr-00246-JFA-5) Submitted: July 10, 2013 Decided: August 1, 2013 Before AGEE, DAVIS, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges. Affirmed in part, dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 12-4450 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. IGNACIO ANDRADE-MARTINEZ, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Columbia. Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., District Judge. (3:11-cr-00246-JFA-5) Submitted: July 10, 2013 Decided: August 1, 2013 Before AGEE, DAVIS, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges. Affirmed in part, dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam opinion. ..
More
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4450
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
IGNACIO ANDRADE-MARTINEZ,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Columbia. Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., District
Judge. (3:11-cr-00246-JFA-5)
Submitted: July 10, 2013 Decided: August 1, 2013
Before AGEE, DAVIS, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part, dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.
John Delgado, BLUESTEIN, NICHOLS, THOMPSON & DELGADO, Columbia,
South Carolina, for Appellant. Mark C. Moore, Assistant United
States Attorney, Stanley D. Ragsdale, Assistant United States
Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Ignacio Andrade-Martinez pleaded guilty to conspiracy
to possess with intent to distribute and distribute marijuana,
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006). The district court
sentenced Andrade-Martinez to 127 months of imprisonment and he
now appeals. Appellate counsel has filed a brief pursuant to
Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738 (1967), questioning whether
the district court fully complied with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11.
Andrade-Martinez was informed of his right to file a pro se
supplemental brief, but he has not done so. In addition, the
Government has filed a motion to dismiss the appeal based on the
waiver in the plea agreement. We previously deferred ruling on
that motion pending the filing of the parties’ briefs. For the
reasons that follow, we affirm the conviction and dismiss
Andrade-Martinez’s appeal of his sentence.
Counsel questions whether the district court complied
with Rule 11. The purpose of the Rule 11 colloquy is to ensure
that the plea of guilt is entered into knowingly and
voluntarily. See United States v. Vonn,
535 U.S. 55, 58 (2002).
Accordingly, prior to accepting a guilty plea, a trial court,
through colloquy with the defendant, must inform the defendant
of, and determine that he understands, the nature of the charges
to which the plea is offered, any mandatory minimum penalty, the
maximum possible penalty he faces, and the various rights he is
2
relinquishing by pleading guilty. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b). The
court also must determine whether there is a factual basis for
the plea. Id.; United States v. DeFusco,
949 F.2d 114, 120 (4th
Cir. 1991). As Andrade-Martinez did not move in the district
court to withdraw his guilty plea, any error in the Rule 11
hearing is reviewed for plain error. United States v. Martinez,
277 F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir. 2002).
Moreover, pursuant to a plea agreement, a defendant
may waive his appellate rights under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (2006).
United States v. Wiggins,
905 F.2d 51, 53 (4th Cir. 1990). A
waiver will preclude appeal of a specific issue if the waiver is
valid and the issue is within the scope of the waiver. United
States v. Blick,
408 F.3d 162, 168 (4th Cir. 2005). The
question of whether a defendant validly waived his right to
appeal is a question of law that this court reviews de novo.
Id. at 168.
“The validity of an appeal waiver depends on whether
the defendant knowingly and intelligently agreed to waive the
right to appeal.”
Id. at 169 (citation omitted). To determine
whether a waiver is knowing and intelligent, we examine “the
totality of the circumstances, including the experience and
conduct of the accused, as well as the accused’s educational
background and familiarity with the terms of the plea
agreement.” United States v. General,
278 F.3d 389, 400 (4th
3
Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Generally, if the district court fully questions a defendant
regarding the waiver of his right to appeal during the Rule 11
colloquy, the waiver is both valid and enforceable. United
States v. Johnson,
410 F.3d 137, 151 (4th Cir. 2005); United
States v. Wessells,
936 F.2d 165, 167-68 (4th Cir. 1991).
We have thoroughly reviewed the record and conclude
that the district court fully complied with the requirements of
Rule 11. We further conclude that Andrade-Martinez’s guilty
plea, including his waiver of his appellate rights, was knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary. As the appellate waiver precluded
Andrade-Martinez from appealing any sentence below life
imprisonment, he has waived appellate review of his sentence.
We have examined the entire record in accordance with
the requirements of Anders and have found no meritorious issues
for appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the conviction, grant the
Government’s motion to dismiss in part, and dismiss
Andrade-Martinez’s appeal of his sentence. This court requires
that counsel inform Andrade-Martinez, in writing, of the right
to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If Andrade-Martinez requests that a petition be filed,
but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,
then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
4
was served on Andrade-Martinez. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before the court and argument would not aid in
the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART;
DISMISSED IN PART
5