Filed: Aug. 07, 2013
Latest Update: Mar. 28, 2017
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 13-4004 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. ZAVIER LAVAR WILLIAMS, Defendant – Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Rock Hill. Cameron McGowan Currie, District Judge. (0:12-cr-00197-CMC-1) Submitted: July 18, 2013 Decided: August 7, 2013 Before KEENAN, DIAZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Scarlet B. Moore, Greenvi
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 13-4004 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. ZAVIER LAVAR WILLIAMS, Defendant – Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Rock Hill. Cameron McGowan Currie, District Judge. (0:12-cr-00197-CMC-1) Submitted: July 18, 2013 Decided: August 7, 2013 Before KEENAN, DIAZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Scarlet B. Moore, Greenvil..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4004
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
ZAVIER LAVAR WILLIAMS,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Rock Hill. Cameron McGowan Currie, District
Judge. (0:12-cr-00197-CMC-1)
Submitted: July 18, 2013 Decided: August 7, 2013
Before KEENAN, DIAZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Scarlet B. Moore, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellant.
John David Rowell, Assistant United States Attorney, Columbia,
South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Zavier Lavar Williams pled guilty, pursuant to a
written plea agreement, to conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute and to distribute quantities of cocaine, crack
cocaine, and marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),
(b)(1)(C)-(D), 846 (2006), and possessing a firearm in
furtherance of a drug trafficking offense, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (2006). He was designated a career offender
and sentenced to 262 months’ imprisonment, which was at the
bottom of his advisory Guidelines range. On appeal, counsel has
filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738
(1967), certifying that there are no nonfrivolous grounds for
appeal, but asking us to review Williams’ convictions and the
reasonableness of the sentence. In his pro se supplemental
filing, Williams asks that we review whether he is entitled to
relief based on the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Alleyne
v. United States,
133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013). For the reasons that
follow, we affirm.
Because Williams did not move in the district court to
withdraw his guilty plea, we review the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11
hearing for plain error. United States v. Martinez,
277 F.3d
517, 525 (4th Cir. 2002). To prevail under this standard,
Williams must establish that an error occurred, that this error
was plain, and that it affected his substantial rights. United
2
States v. Massenburg,
564 F.3d 337, 342–43 (4th Cir. 2009). Our
review of the record establishes that the district court fully
complied with the mandates of Rule 11, ensuring that Williams’
plea was knowing and voluntary and supported by an independent
basis in fact. We therefore affirm Williams’ convictions.
We review Williams’ sentence for reasonableness,
applying an abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United
States,
552 U.S. 38, 46, 51 (2007). This review requires
consideration of both the procedural and substantive
reasonableness of the sentence. Id. at 51. We first assess
whether the district court properly calculated the advisory
Guidelines range, considered the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) (2006), analyzed any arguments presented by the
parties, and sufficiently explained the selected sentence. Id.
at 49–51; see United States v. Lynn,
592 F.3d 572, 575–76 (4th
Cir. 2010). If there is no procedural error, we review the
substantive reasonableness of the sentence, “examin[ing] the
totality of the circumstances to see whether the sentencing
court abused its discretion in concluding that the sentence it
chose satisfied the standards set forth in § 3553(a).” United
States v. Mendoza–Mendoza,
597 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2010).
If the sentence is within the defendant’s properly calculated
Guidelines range, we apply a presumption of substantive
reasonableness. United States v. Bynum,
604 F.3d 161, 168-69
3
(4th Cir. 2010); see Rita v. United States,
551 U.S. 338, 347
(2007) (permitting appellate presumption of reasonableness for
within-Guidelines sentence).
We have thoroughly reviewed the record and conclude
that the sentence is both procedurally and substantively
reasonable. We discern no error in the district court’s
computation of Williams’ Guidelines range, including the career
offender designation, the opportunities it provided Williams and
his counsel to speak in mitigation, or its explanation of the
sentence imposed by reference to the relevant § 3553(a) factors.
In addition to noting its overall consideration of the relevant
sentencing factors, the district court opined that the 262-month
sentence was appropriate given the seriousness of Williams’
crimes; Williams’ recidivism and demonstrated lack of respect
for the law; and the need to impose a just punishment that would
protect the public and deter future criminality. Finally, we
have found no basis in the record to overcome the presumption of
reasonableness accorded this within-Guidelines sentence.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
We note that Williams’ claim for relief under Alleyne fails,
given that the mandatory minimum five-year consecutive term of
imprisonment applicable to the § 924(c) charge was not increased
based on aggravating factors not charged in the indictment. Cf.
4
Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2155-56, 2160-63. We therefore affirm
the judgment of the district court. This court requires that
counsel inform Williams, in writing, of the right to petition
the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If
Williams requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes
that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move
in this court for leave to withdraw from representation.
Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on
Williams. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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