Filed: Aug. 23, 2013
Latest Update: Feb. 12, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 12-4420 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. MANUEL CAMACHO GARCIA, a/k/a Meno, Defendant - Appellant. No. 12-4783 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. TIMOTHY LEON STREET, a/k/a Supreme, Defendant - Appellant. Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder, District Judge. (1:11-cr-00253-TDS-3; 1:11-cr-00253-TDS-7) Submitt
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 12-4420 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. MANUEL CAMACHO GARCIA, a/k/a Meno, Defendant - Appellant. No. 12-4783 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. TIMOTHY LEON STREET, a/k/a Supreme, Defendant - Appellant. Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder, District Judge. (1:11-cr-00253-TDS-3; 1:11-cr-00253-TDS-7) Submitte..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4420
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
MANUEL CAMACHO GARCIA, a/k/a Meno,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 12-4783
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
TIMOTHY LEON STREET, a/k/a Supreme,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder,
District Judge. (1:11-cr-00253-TDS-3; 1:11-cr-00253-TDS-7)
Submitted: August 15, 2013 Decided: August 23, 2013
Before MOTZ and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Anne M. Hayes, Cary, North Carolina; James B. Craven, III,
Durham, North Carolina, for Appellants. Ripley Rand, United
States Attorney, Sandra J. Hairston, Assistant United States
Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
A federal jury convicted Manuel Camacho Garcia of
conspiracy to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 846 (2006), and convicted Timothy Leon Street of conspiracy to
distribute cocaine and marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 846. The district court sentenced Garcia to 140 months of
imprisonment, and sentenced Street to 245 months of
imprisonment, and they now appeal. Finding no error, we affirm.
Garcia argues on appeal that the evidence was
insufficient to support his conviction because the Government
failed to demonstrate that he knowingly joined in the
conspiracy. We review a district court’s decision to deny a
Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 motion for a judgment of acquittal de novo.
United States v. Smith, 451 F.3d 209, 216 (4th Cir. 2006). A
defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence faces a
heavy burden. United States v. Beidler,
110 F.3d 1064, 1067
(4th Cir. 1997). The verdict of a jury must be sustained “if,
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, the verdict is supported by ‘substantial
evidence.’”
Smith, 451 F.3d at 216 (citations omitted).
Substantial evidence is “evidence that a reasonable finder of
fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a
conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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Furthermore, “[t]he jury, not the reviewing court, weighs the
credibility of the evidence and resolves any conflicts in the
evidence presented.” Beidler, 110 F.3d at 1067 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). “Reversal for
insufficient evidence is reserved for the rare case where the
prosecution’s failure is clear.”
Id. (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).
In order to prove that Garcia conspired to distribute
cocaine, the Government needed to show (1) an agreement between
two or more persons, (2) that Garcia knew of the agreement, and
(3) that Garcia knowingly and voluntarily joined the conspiracy.
United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 857 (4th Cir. 1996) (en
banc) (citations omitted). However, the Government was not
required to make this showing through direct evidence. In fact,
“a conspiracy may be proved wholly by circumstantial evidence,”
and therefore may be inferred from the circumstances presented
at trial.
Id. at 858. We have thoroughly reviewed the record
and conclude that the Government provided sufficient evidence
from which the jury could conclude that Garcia was guilty of the
conspiracy charge.
Street argues on appeal that the district court erred
in admitting the transcripts of recorded phone calls between the
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coconspirators because the transcripts identified the speakers. *
“We review a trial court’s rulings on the admissibility of
evidence for abuse of discretion, and we will only overturn an
evidentiary ruling that is arbitrary and irrational.” United
States v. Cole, 631 F.3d 146, 153 (4th Cir. 2011) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). In addition, we will not
“set aside or reverse a judgment on the grounds that evidence
was erroneously admitted unless justice so requires or a party’s
substantial rights are affected.” Creekmore v. Maryview Hosp.,
662 F.3d 686, 693 (4th Cir. 2011) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 61).
Our review of the record and the relevant legal authorities
leads us to conclude that the district court did not commit
error in admitting the transcripts of the recorded calls.
Finally, Street argues that he should not have been
attributed a criminal history point for a prior conviction to
which he pleaded guilty but received no term of imprisonment.
In reviewing the district court’s calculations under the
*
Street has also filed a Fed. R. App. P. 28(j) letter
citing the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Alleyne v. United
States, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013), in which the Court
determined that any fact that increases a statutory mandatory
minimum term of imprisonment must be submitted to the jury.
Here, as the drug weights were charged in the indictment,
submitted to the jury, and found by the jury beyond a reasonable
doubt, and no other factors affecting the statutory mandatory
minimum were found to be applicable to Street, his sentence did
not violate the mandate of Alleyne.
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Guidelines, “we review the district court’s legal conclusions de
novo and its factual findings for clear error.” United
States v. Manigan, 592 F.3d 621, 626 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). We will “find clear
error only if, on the entire evidence, we are left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”
Id. at 631 (internal quotation marks, alteration, and citation
omitted).
Under the Guidelines, a district court shall assign
(a) three criminal history points to prior sentences of
imprisonment exceeding one year and one month, (b) two criminal
history points to prior sentences of imprisonment of at least
sixty days, and (c) one criminal history point for each prior
sentence other than those counted in subsections (a) and (b), up
to a total of four points under subsection (c). See U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“USSG”) § 4A1.1(a)-(c) (2012).
Here, the district court properly assigned one criminal history
point to Street’s prior conviction for misdemeanor possession or
sale of alcoholic beverages without a permit, a conviction for
which Street did not receive a sentence of imprisonment.
Further, the number of criminal history points assigned to
Street for prior sentences of less than sixty days of
imprisonment equaled the maximum permissible total of four.
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Therefore, the district court did not err in calculating
Street’s criminal history category.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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