Filed: Sep. 30, 2013
Latest Update: Mar. 28, 2017
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 12-5005 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. DAVID STUCKEY, a/k/a Shortstop, Defendant - Appellant. No. 12-5022 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. DEMARIO COVINGTON, a/k/a Booger, Defendant - Appellant. Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Florence. Terry L. Wooten, Chief District Judge. (4:11-cr-00417-TLW-11) Submitted: September 20, 2013 Decided: S
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 12-5005 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. DAVID STUCKEY, a/k/a Shortstop, Defendant - Appellant. No. 12-5022 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. DEMARIO COVINGTON, a/k/a Booger, Defendant - Appellant. Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Florence. Terry L. Wooten, Chief District Judge. (4:11-cr-00417-TLW-11) Submitted: September 20, 2013 Decided: Se..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-5005
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DAVID STUCKEY, a/k/a Shortstop,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 12-5022
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DEMARIO COVINGTON, a/k/a Booger,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the District
of South Carolina, at Florence. Terry L. Wooten, Chief District
Judge. (4:11-cr-00417-TLW-11)
Submitted: September 20, 2013 Decided: September 30, 2013
Before GREGORY, SHEDD, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Melvin W. Cockrell, III, COCKRELL LAW FIRM, PC, Chesterfield,
South Carolina; Nicole Nicolette Mace, THE MACE FIRM, Myrtle
Beach, South Carolina, for Appellants. William N. Nettles,
United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina; Alfred W.
Bethea, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Florence, South
Carolina; Mythili Raman, Acting Assistant Attorney General,
Denis J. McInerney, Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney General,
Thomas E. Booth, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
David Stuckey and Demario Covington pled guilty to one
count of conspiracy to traffic in five kilograms or more of
cocaine and 280 grams or more of crack cocaine. Stuckey was
sentenced to 360 months’ imprisonment and Covington received a
420-month sentence, a sentence Covington stipulated to pursuant
to Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C) in an addendum to his plea
agreement. Prior to sentencing, Stuckey and Covington
separately moved to withdraw their guilty pleas. After
conducting a hearing in each case, the district court denied the
motions. Both men now appeal, challenging the denial of the
motions to withdraw. Additionally, Stuckey appeals the district
court’s denial of his counsel’s motion to withdraw from
representation. Finding no error, we affirm.
We review a district court’s denial of a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea for abuse of discretion. United States
v. Battle, 499 F.3d 315, 319 (4th Cir. 2007). In order to
withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing, a defendant must show
that a “fair and just reason” supports his request. Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B). “[A] ‘fair and just’ reason . . . is one
that essentially challenges . . . the fairness of the Rule 11
proceeding.” United States v. Lambey,
974 F.2d 1389, 1394 (4th
Cir. 1992) (en banc). The defendant bears the heavy burden of
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demonstrating the existence of such a reason. United States v.
Thompson–Riviere, 561 F.3d 345, 348 (4th Cir. 2009).
In determining whether a defendant has met this
burden, a district court must consider the six factors
articulated in United States v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245, 248 (4th
Cir. 1991). We have reviewed the record in these cases and,
after carefully considering the factors described in Moore,
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Stuckey’s and Covington’s motions to withdraw their
guilty pleas. See also Blackledge v. Allison,
431 U.S. 63, 74
(1977) (holding that sworn statements carry a strong
“presumption of verity”); Fields v. Attorney Gen.,
956 F.2d
1290, 1299 (4th Cir. 1992) (“Absent clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary, a defendant is bound by the
representations he makes under oath during a plea colloquy.”).
Accordingly, we find that the district court correctly concluded
that consideration of the Moore factors counseled against
allowing Stuckey and Covington to withdraw their guilty pleas.
Stuckey also challenges on appeal the district court’s
denial of his counsel’s motion to withdraw. The Sixth Amendment
guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel
for his defense.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. Implicit in the Sixth
Amendment is the right of a defendant to have counsel of his own
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choosing. United States v. Mullen, 32 F.3d 891, 895 (4th Cir.
1994). But this right is not absolute, and its exercise “must
not obstruct orderly judicial procedure and deprive courts of
the exercise of their inherent power to control the
administration of justice.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
A defendant similarly has no absolute right to
substitution of counsel. Id. Instead, the decision whether to
allow a defendant to substitute counsel rests in the sound
discretion of the trial court. Id. When determining whether a
district court abused its discretion in disallowing the
substitution of counsel, this court considers three factors:
“(1) the timeliness of [the request]; (2) the adequacy of the
court’s inquiry into [defendant’s] complaint about counsel; and
(3) whether [defendant] and his counsel experienced a total lack
of communication preventing an adequate defense.” United States
v. Reevey, 364 F.3d 151, 156 (4th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation
marks omitted). After reviewing the transcript of the hearing
on counsel’s motion and with these standards in mind, we discern
no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of
counsel’s motion to withdraw.
Accordingly, we affirm Stuckey’s and Covington’s
convictions and sentences. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal conclusions are adequately presented
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in the materials before this court and argument would not aid
the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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