Filed: Jul. 16, 2010
Latest Update: Feb. 22, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 09-5105 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. ISAIAH N. PRINCE, Defendant – Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Clarksburg. Irene M. Keeley, District Judge. (1:09-cr-00036-IMK-JSK-1) Submitted: June 29, 2010 Decided: July 16, 2010 Before WILKINSON, GREGORY, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges. Affirmed in part; dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam opi
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 09-5105 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. ISAIAH N. PRINCE, Defendant – Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Clarksburg. Irene M. Keeley, District Judge. (1:09-cr-00036-IMK-JSK-1) Submitted: June 29, 2010 Decided: July 16, 2010 Before WILKINSON, GREGORY, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges. Affirmed in part; dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam opin..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-5105
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
ISAIAH N. PRINCE,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia, at Clarksburg. Irene M. Keeley,
District Judge. (1:09-cr-00036-IMK-JSK-1)
Submitted: June 29, 2010 Decided: July 16, 2010
Before WILKINSON, GREGORY, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part; dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.
Katy J. Cimino, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Clarksburg,
West Virginia, for Appellant. Zelda Elizabeth Wesley, Assistant
United States Attorney, Clarksburg, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Isaiah N. Prince pled guilty, pursuant to a plea
agreement, to one count of aiding and abetting the distribution
of crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and
(b)(1)(C) (2006). His plea agreement included a waiver of his
rights to appeal or collaterally attack any sentence imposed on
him that fell within the applicable statutory maximum. The
district court sentenced Prince to 108 months’ imprisonment,
considerably less than the statutory maximum of twenty years.
Prince appeals from that judgment.
Prince’s counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders
v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), in which she questions the
district court’s sentencing procedure; however, counsel
ultimately concludes that Prince has waived the right to appeal
sentencing issues, and that there are no meritorious issues for
appeal. Prince has filed a pro se brief, in which he challenges
the credibility of one of the witnesses who testified against
him at his sentencing hearing. The Government has moved to
dismiss Prince’s appeal as barred by the plea agreement’s waiver
of appellate rights.
This court reviews the validity of an appellate waiver
de novo, United States v. Brown, 232 F.3d 399, 402-03 (4th Cir.
2000), and will uphold a waiver of appellate rights if the
waiver is valid and the issue being appealed is covered by the
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waiver. United States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 168 (4th Cir.
2005). A waiver is valid if the defendant’s agreement to the
waiver was knowing and voluntary. United States v. Marin,
961
F.2d 493, 496 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Wessells,
936
F.2d 165, 167 (4th Cir. 1991).
To determine whether a waiver is knowing and
voluntarily, this court examines “the totality of the
circumstances, including the experience and conduct of the
accused, as well as the accused’s educational background and
familiarity with the terms of the plea agreement.” United
States v. General, 278 F.3d 389, 400 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Generally, if a district court fully
questions a defendant regarding the waiver of appellate rights
during the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 colloquy, the waiver is valid.
Wessells, 936 F.2d at 167-68. In this case, Prince does not
assert that his waiver was not voluntary.
Our review of the record discloses that Prince’s
appellate waiver was knowing and voluntary and should be
enforced to preclude any review of potential sentencing errors,
including the issues raised in counsel’s Anders brief and in
Prince’s supplemental pro se brief. The Government’s motion to
dismiss is therefore granted with respect to any challenge to
Prince’s sentence. Prince’s waiver does not, however, include a
waiver of his right to appeal his conviction; thus, the
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Government’s motion is denied to the extent it seeks dismissal
of any non-sentencing issues.
Prior to accepting a guilty plea, a trial court,
through colloquy with the defendant, must inform the defendant
of, and determine that the defendant understands the nature of,
the charges to which the plea is offered, any mandatory minimum
penalty, the maximum possible penalty he faces, and the various
rights he is relinquishing by pleading guilty. Fed. R. Crim. P.
11(b). “In reviewing the adequacy of compliance with Rule 11,
this court should accord deference to the trial court’s decision
as to how best to conduct the mandated colloquy with the
defendant.” United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116 (4th
Cir. 1991).
Because Prince did not move in the district court to
withdraw his guilty plea, any error in the Rule 11 hearing is
reviewed for plain error. United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d
517, 525 (4th Cir. 2002). To establish plain error, Prince
“must show: (1) an error was made; (2) the error is plain; and
(3) the error affects substantial rights.” United States v.
Massenburg,
564 F.3d 337, 342-43 (4th Cir. 2009) (reviewing
unpreserved Rule 11 error). “The decision to correct the error
lies within [this court’s] discretion, and [the court]
exercise[s] that discretion only if the error seriously affects
the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
4
proceedings.” Id. at 343 (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
Here, neither Prince nor his counsel has raised any
specific issues relating to Prince’s Rule 11 colloquy, let alone
shown that plain error occurred. See United States v. Goins, 51
F.3d 400, 402-03 (4th Cir. 1995) (discussing factors courts
should consider in determining whether substantial rights were
affected in decision to plead guilty). Moreover, our review of
the record reveals that the district court substantially
complied with the requirements of Rule 11 in accepting Prince’s
guilty plea, and that it ensured that Prince’s guilty plea was
knowing and voluntary and supported by a sufficient factual
basis. See
DeFusco, 949 F.2d at 116, 119-20. We therefore find
no infirmity in the conduct of the Rule 11 proceeding.
We have reviewed the entire record in accordance with
Anders and have not identified any meritorious issues for
appeal. Accordingly, we affirm Prince’s conviction and grant
the Government’s motion to dismiss any issues relating to
Prince’s sentence. This court requires counsel to inform her
client, in writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court
of the United States for further review. If the client requests
that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a
petition would be frivolous, counsel may move in this court to
withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that
5
a copy of the motion was served on the client.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART;
DISMISSED IN PART
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