Filed: Sep. 16, 2010
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 09-4190 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. JASON WARD NORMAN, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Statesville. Richard L. Voorhees, District Judge. (5:07-cr-00011-RLV-DCK-4) Submitted: August 2, 2010 Decided: September 16, 2010 Before MOTZ, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Claire J. Rausch
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 09-4190 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. JASON WARD NORMAN, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Statesville. Richard L. Voorhees, District Judge. (5:07-cr-00011-RLV-DCK-4) Submitted: August 2, 2010 Decided: September 16, 2010 Before MOTZ, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Claire J. Rausche..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-4190
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JASON WARD NORMAN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Statesville. Richard L.
Voorhees, District Judge. (5:07-cr-00011-RLV-DCK-4)
Submitted: August 2, 2010 Decided: September 16, 2010
Before MOTZ, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Claire J. Rauscher, Ann L. Hester, FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN
NORTH CAROLINA, INC., Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Edward R. Ryan, Acting United States Attorney, Mark A. Jones,
Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jason Ward Norman pled guilty to conspiracy to possess
with intent to distribute cocaine and cocaine base and
possession with intent to distribute cocaine base (crack). The
district court sentenced him to 168 months’ imprisonment. On
appeal, Norman argues that the district court failed to address
his arguments at sentencing and failed to provide an
individualized explanation of the sentencing factors as they
apply to him. We affirm.
At sentencing, Norman contested the quantity of drugs
that was attributed to him in the presentence report. The court
heard testimony from the case agent and Norman and determined
that the probation officer’s calculation of approximately 3,859
grams of crack cocaine and 2,240 grams of powder cocaine was
supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Norman’s attorney
asked the court to consider all the sentencing factors and
“sentence [Norman] with leniency,” considering his health, the
fact that he was an addict, the level of his culpability, and
his family support.
The district court adopted the findings in the
presentence report. The applicable advisory guideline range was
therefore 168 to 210 months’ imprisonment. The court then
referenced United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), and 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006), and imposed a 168-month sentence. The
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court further stated that it “ha[d] not identified factors in
[§] 3553(a) that would mitigate the guideline range.” The court
also commented, “This case illustrates the demons of drugs as
well as any in that the defendant found himself helpless and
nevertheless continued to participate in activities which spread
drugs about to others who would therefore be in similar
circumstances to him.”
An appellate court reviews a sentence for
reasonableness under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). This review requires
consideration of both the procedural and substantive
reasonableness of a sentence.
Id. First, the court must assess
whether the district court properly calculated the guidelines
range, considered the § 3553(a) factors, analyzed any arguments
presented by the parties, and sufficiently explained the
selected sentence.
Gall, 552 U.S. at 49-50; see United
States v. Lynn,
592 F.3d 572, 576 (4th Cir. 2010) (“[A]n
individualized explanation must accompany every sentence.”);
United States v. Carter,
564 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009).
Even if the sentence is procedurally reasonable, the court must
consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence,
“examin[ing] the totality of the circumstances to see whether
the sentencing court abused its discretion in concluding that
the sentence it chose satisfied the standards set forth in
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§ 3553(a).” United States v. Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216
(4th Cir. 2010).
Norman argues that his sentence is procedurally
unreasonable because the district court did not consider the
§ 3553(a) factors and failed to provide an individualized
statement of how the factors applied in his case. Norman
preserved the issue by arguing in the district court for a
lenient sentence. See Lynn, 592 F.3d at 577-78.
The district court is not required to “robotically
tick through § 3553(a)’s every subsection.” United States v.
Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir. 2006). However, the
district court must “place on the record an individualized
assessment based on the particular facts of the case before it.
This individualized assessment need not be elaborate or lengthy,
but it must provide a rationale tailored to the particular case
at hand and adequate to permit meaningful appellate review.”
Carter, 564 F.3d at 330 (internal quotation marks, footnote, and
citation omitted). This is true even when the district court
sentences a defendant within the applicable guidelines range.
Id. An extensive explanation is not required as long as the
appellate court is satisfied “‘that [the district court] has
considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for
exercising [its] own legal decisionmaking authority.’” United
States v. Engle,
592 F.3d 495, 500 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting
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Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007)), petition for
cert. filed,
78 U.S.L.W. 3764 (U.S. 2010) (No. 09-1512).
The district court properly calculated Norman’s
guidelines range. In imposing sentence, the court commented on
the dangers of drugs, and illustrated those dangers by
referencing Norman’s particular case. We need not determine
whether this constitutes an adequate explanation under Carter
and Supreme Court law. Rather, because the district court
explicitly considered the § 3553(a) factors for potential
mitigation of the sentence, and because the district court
sentenced Norman to the lowest point in the applicable guideline
range, we conclude that any error was harmless. See Lynn, 592
F.3d at 582; see also
Rita, 551 U.S. at 359 (“Where . . . the
record makes clear that the sentencing judge considered the
evidence and arguments, we do not believe the law requires the
judge to write more extensively.”); United States v. Boulware,
604 F.3d 832, 838 (4th Cir. 2010) (procedural error is harmless
if it “did not have a substantial and injurious effect or
influence on the result and we can[] say with . . . fair
assurance[] . . . that the district court’s explicit
consideration of [the defendant’s] arguments would not have
affected the sentence imposed”).
Having determined that there is no reversible
procedural error, the court next considers the substantive
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reasonableness of the sentence, taking into account the totality
of the circumstances. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. Because Norman’s
sentence is within the appropriate guidelines range, we presume
on appeal that it is substantively reasonable. United States v.
Go,
517 F.3d 216, 218 (4th Cir. 2008). The presumption may be
rebutted by a showing “that the sentence is unreasonable when
measured against the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v.
Montes-Pineda,
445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Norman has not rebutted that
presumption. Accordingly, we hold that the district court
committed no significant procedural or substantive error in
sentencing Norman. Accordingly, we affirm Norman’s 168-month
sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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