Filed: Apr. 22, 2011
Latest Update: Feb. 22, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 10-4793 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. GARY EARL ADAMS, a/k/a David A. Freeze, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, Senior District Judge. (4:96-cr-00058-BR-1) Submitted: March 31, 2011 Decided: April 22, 2011 Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Susa
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 10-4793 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. GARY EARL ADAMS, a/k/a David A. Freeze, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, Senior District Judge. (4:96-cr-00058-BR-1) Submitted: March 31, 2011 Decided: April 22, 2011 Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Susan..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4793
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
GARY EARL ADAMS, a/k/a David A. Freeze,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, Senior
District Judge. (4:96-cr-00058-BR-1)
Submitted: March 31, 2011 Decided: April 22, 2011
Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Susan S. Kister, St. Louis, Missouri, for Appellant. George
E.B. Holding, United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker,
Barbara D. Kocher, Assistant United States Attorneys, Raleigh,
North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Gary Earl Adams appeals the judgment revoking
supervised release and imposing a sixty-month sentence. On
appeal, Adams contends that the district court erred in revoking
his period of supervised release and imposed a plainly
unreasonable sentence upon revocation. Finding no reversible
error, we affirm.
Adams first contends that the district court erred in
revoking his period of supervised release. To revoke supervised
release, the district court must find by a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant violated terms of his release. 18
U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2006); United States v. Copley, 978 F.2d
829, 831 (4th Cir. 1992). Our review of the record leads us to
conclude that the district court did not clearly err in finding
that Adams violated the terms of his supervised release. See
United States v. Benton,
627 F.3d 1051, 1054 (8th Cir. 2010)
(reviewing district court’s findings of fact related to
supervised release violations for clear error). Therefore, we
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
revoking Adams’s supervised release. See
Copley, 978 F.2d at
831 (reviewing district court’s decision to revoke defendant’s
supervised release for abuse of discretion); see also United
States v. Pregent,
190 F.3d 279, 282 (4th Cir. 1999) (reviewing
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district court’s termination of defendant’s supervised release
for abuse of discretion).
Adams also contends that the district court’s sentence
imposed upon revocation was plainly unreasonable. Because Adams
did not request a sentence outside the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual policy statement range, we review his
challenge to the reasonableness of his sentence for plain error.
United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 577 (4th Cir. 2010); see
United States v. Olano,
507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993) (detailing
plain error standard).
The district court has broad discretion to impose a
sentence upon revoking a defendant’s supervised release. United
States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010). Thus, we
assume “a deferential appellate posture concerning issues of
fact and the exercise of [that] discretion,” United States v.
Crudup,
461 F.3d 433, 439 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation
marks omitted), and will affirm unless the sentence is “plainly
unreasonable” in light of the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
(2006) factors.
Id. at 437.
Our first step in reviewing a sentence imposed upon a
revocation of supervised release is to “decide whether the
sentence is unreasonable.” Id. at 438. In doing so, “we follow
generally the procedural and substantive considerations”
employed in reviewing original sentences.
Id. A sentence is
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procedurally reasonable if the district court has considered the
policy statements contained in Chapter 7 of the Guidelines and
the applicable § 3553(a) factors, id. at 439, and has adequately
explained the sentence chosen, though it need not explain the
sentence in as much detail as when imposing the original
sentence.
Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547. A sentence is
substantively reasonable if the district court states a proper
basis for its imposition of a sentence up to the statutory
maximum.
Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440.
“[I]n some cases, a district court’s reasons for
imposing a within-range sentence may be clear from context,
including the court’s statements to the defendant throughout the
sentencing hearing.” Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547 (internal
citation omitted). Unless the district court completely fails
to indicate any reasons for its sentence, “[w]e may be hard-
pressed to find any explanation for within-range, revocation
sentences insufficient given the amount of deference we afford
district courts when imposing these sentences.”
Id. If we
determine that the sentence is not unreasonable, we will affirm.
Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439.
Our review of the record on appeal leads us to
conclude that the district court committed no plain error and
that the revocation sentence is procedurally and substantively
reasonable. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
4
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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