Filed: Apr. 27, 2011
Latest Update: Feb. 22, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 10-4430 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. CHARLES STEVEN WEAVER, Defendant - Appellant. No. 10-4438 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. WENDELL WILLIAM CHINNERS, JR., a/k/a Wendall Chinners, a/k/a BJ, Defendant - Appellant. Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Charleston. David C. Norton, Chief District Judge. (2:09-cr-00592-DCN-6; 2:09-cr-00592-DC
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 10-4430 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. CHARLES STEVEN WEAVER, Defendant - Appellant. No. 10-4438 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. WENDELL WILLIAM CHINNERS, JR., a/k/a Wendall Chinners, a/k/a BJ, Defendant - Appellant. Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Charleston. David C. Norton, Chief District Judge. (2:09-cr-00592-DCN-6; 2:09-cr-00592-DCN..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4430
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CHARLES STEVEN WEAVER,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 10-4438
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
WENDELL WILLIAM CHINNERS, JR., a/k/a Wendall Chinners, a/k/a
BJ,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the District
of South Carolina, at Charleston. David C. Norton, Chief
District Judge. (2:09-cr-00592-DCN-6; 2:09-cr-00592-DCN-1)
Submitted: March 31, 2011 Decided: April 27, 2011
Before MOTZ, SHEDD, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
John W. Locklair, III, LOCKLAIR & LOCKLAIR, PC, Columbia, South
Carolina; Janis R. Hall, Greenville, South Carolina, for
Appellants. Matthew J. Modica, Assistant United States Attorney,
Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Charles Steven Weaver pleaded guilty, pursuant to a
plea agreement, to one count of conspiracy to manufacture with
intent to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), 846 (2006). Wendell William Chinners
pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to one count of
conspiracy to manufacture with intent to distribute
methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),
(b)(1)(B), 846 (2006), and one count of possessing a firearm in
furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (2006). The district court sentenced Weaver
to ninety-six months’ imprisonment and Chinners to a total term
of imprisonment of 180 months.
Counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating their opinion that
there are no meritorious issues for appeal but questioning
whether the district court incorrectly calculated the
theoretical yield of methamphetamine as to Weaver and whether
the district court erred in applying a reckless endangerment
enhancement * as to Chinners. Neither Weaver nor Chinners,
*
Counsel characterizes the enhancement as one for
obstruction of justice, which is covered by USSG § 3C1.1.
Chinners’ offense level was actually enhanced for reckless
endangerment during flight, pursuant to USSG § 3C1.2.
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although notified of their right to file pro se supplemental
briefs, has done so. The Government declined to file a
responsive brief. We affirm.
Weaver contends that the district court erred in
calculating the theoretical yield of methamphetamine from the
amount of pseudoephedrine he purchased for the purpose of
converting it to methamphetamine. The district court’s
determination of the amount of drugs attributable to the
defendant for sentencing purposes is a factual finding reviewed
for clear error. United States v. Sampson, 140 F.3d 585, 591
(4th Cir. 1998). This deferential standard of review requires
reversal only if the court is “left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v.
Stevenson,
396 F.3d 538, 542 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation
marks omitted). When the amount of drugs “seized does not
reflect the scale of the offense, the district court shall
approximate the quantity to be used for sentencing.” USSG
§ 2D1.1, cmt. n.12. After reviewing the record, we conclude
that the district court did not clearly error in calculating the
theoretical yield of methamphetamine.
Chinners contends that the reckless endangerment
during flight enhancement was improper. “We review the district
court’s application of the reckless endangerment enhancement for
clear error.” United States v. Carter, 601 F.3d 252, 254 (4th
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Cir. 2010). A two-level enhancement is required “[i]f the
defendant recklessly created a substantial risk of death or
serious bodily injury to another person in the course of fleeing
from a law enforcement officer.” USSG § 3C1.2. “[A]cts are
considered ‘reckless’ when [the defendant] was aware of the risk
created by his conduct and the risk was of such a nature and
degree that to disregard that risk constituted a gross deviation
from the standard of care that a reasonable person would
exercise in such a situation.” Carter, 601 F.3d at 255
(internal quotation marks omitted). Because Chinners led police
on a high-speed chase past several vehicles and placed the
pursuing officer and the passengers in his car in danger, we
conclude that the district court did not err in applying the
enhancement.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
Accordingly, we affirm the Appellants’ convictions and
sentences. This court requires that counsel inform Weaver and
Chinners, in writing, of their right to petition the Supreme
Court of the United States for further review. If Weaver or
Chinners requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes
that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move
in this court for leave to withdraw from representation.
Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on
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the client. We dispense with oral argument because the facts
and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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