Filed: May 09, 2011
Latest Update: Feb. 22, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 10-2195 RACHEL LYNN PERRY, Plaintiff – Appellant, v. COMPUTER SCIENCES CORPORATION, Defendant– Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Anthony John Trenga, District Judge. (1:10-cv-00175-AJT-IDD) Submitted: April 26, 2011 Decided: May 9, 2011 Before DAVIS and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 10-2195 RACHEL LYNN PERRY, Plaintiff – Appellant, v. COMPUTER SCIENCES CORPORATION, Defendant– Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Anthony John Trenga, District Judge. (1:10-cv-00175-AJT-IDD) Submitted: April 26, 2011 Decided: May 9, 2011 Before DAVIS and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. L..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-2195
RACHEL LYNN PERRY,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
COMPUTER SCIENCES CORPORATION,
Defendant– Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Anthony John Trenga,
District Judge. (1:10-cv-00175-AJT-IDD)
Submitted: April 26, 2011 Decided: May 9, 2011
Before DAVIS and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Leizer Z. Goldsmith, THE GOLDSMITH LAW FIRM, LLC, Washington,
D.C., for Appellant. Tyler A. Brown, JACKSON LEWIS, LLP,
Reston, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Rachel Lynn Perry appeals the district court’s order
granting summary judgment in favor of Computer Sciences
Corporation (“CSC”) on Perry’s employment discrimination and
retaliation claims. On appeal, Perry argues that the district
court erred when it found no genuine issue of material fact in
regards to her claims that CSC (1) chose not to promote her in
2008 based on her disability and in retaliation for internal
discrimination complaints she filed, in violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-
12213 (West 2005 & Supp. 2010), and the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C.A. § 701-7961 (West 2008 & Supp.
2010); (2) terminated her based on her disability and in
retaliation for internal discrimination complaints she filed, in
violation of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act; and
(3) terminated her in violation of the Family Medical Leave Act
of 1993 (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2006).
Disability discrimination and retaliation claims under
the ADA and Rehabilitation Act are evaluated under the McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973), “pretext”
framework. * See Laber v. Harvey,
438 F.3d 404, 432 (4th Cir.
*
We employ the same substantive standards for determining
liability under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. See 29
(Continued)
2
2006); Ennis v. Nat’l Ass’n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, 53 F.3d 55,
57-58 (4th Cir. 1995). Under the burden-shifting scheme, the
plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie
case of discrimination. McDonnell
Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. To
establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination under
either Act, a plaintiff must show that: (1) she is disabled;
(2) she was otherwise qualified for the position; and (3) she
suffered an adverse employment action solely on the basis of the
disability. Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason
Univ.,
411 F.3d 474, 498 (4th Cir. 2005). To establish a prima
facie case of retaliation under either Act, a plaintiff must
show that: (1) she has engaged in protected conduct; (2) “she
suffered an adverse action subsequent to engaging in the
protected conduct”; and (3) “there was a causal link between the
protected activity and the adverse action.”
Laber, 438 F.3d at
432.
If the plaintiff is successful in establishing a prima
facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to provide a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action. Id. If
the defendant provides evidence of a nondiscriminatory reason
for its action, the plaintiff, who bears the ultimate burden of
U.S.C.A. § 794(d) (West 2008); Myers v. Hose,
50 F.3d 278, 281
(4th Cir. 1995).
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persuasion, must show by a preponderance of the evidence that
the proffered reason was a pretext for discrimination or
retaliation. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530
U.S. 133, 146-48 (2000);
Laber, 438 F.3d at 432.
Perry failed to prove a prima facie case of
discrimination with regard to CSC’s failure to promote her
because she could not show that she was qualified, as she lacked
the global experience required by the position. Additionally,
even assuming Perry could establish a prima facie case of
retaliation, CSC met its burden of establishing a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for not promoting her, as the position
she held at the time was limited to the company’s United States
operations and Perry lacked experience with its global
activities. Because Perry did not meet her burden of
establishing that CSC’s stated reason is pretextual, we hold
that the district court properly granted summary judgment in
favor of CSC on this claim.
Perry’s termination claims did not survive summary
judgment because, as the district court held, CSC had
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for her termination, as it
underwent a departmental reorganization and Perry was not
available to meet its personnel needs. In the face of CSC’s
evidence that it reorganized to maximize efficiency and did so
by eliminating Perry’s position in favor of more highly skilled
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positions, Perry could not satisfy her burden to show that the
reorganization was pretextual. See E.E.O.C. v. Clay Printing
Co., 955 F.2d 936, 942 (4th Cir. 1992). Accordingly, we hold
that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment
on Perry’s termination claims.
Finally, Perry contends that the district court erred
when it held that Perry’s termination did not violate the FMLA
because, she argues, it did so in retaliation for her taking
FMLA leave. It is unlawful for an employer “to interfere with,
restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise,
any right provided under [the FMLA].” 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1)
(2006). Under the FMLA, during any twelve-month period, an
employee is entitled to a total of twelve work weeks’ leave for
a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to
perform her job. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D) (2006).
The FMLA also prohibits an employer from
discriminating against an employee for asserting rights under
the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 2165(a)(2) (2006). Thus, an employer may
not consider an employee’s use of FMLA leave as a negative
factor when making an employment decision affecting the
employee. FMLA retaliation claims are evaluated under the
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. To establish a
prima facie case of FMLA retaliation, a plaintiff must show
“that [she] engaged in protected activity, that the employer
5
took adverse action against [her], and that the adverse action
was causally connected to the plaintiff’s protected activity.”
Yashenko v. Harrah’s N.C. Casino Co., LLC, 446 F.3d 541, 551
(4th Cir. 2006) (quoting Cline v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
144
F.3d 294, 301 (4th Cir. 1998)).
Although Perry satisfies the first and second prong of
the prima facie case, she has not produced any evidence showing
a causal connection between her FMLA leave and her termination.
Thus, we hold that the district court properly granted summary
judgment in favor of CSC on Perry’s FMLA retaliation claim.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district
court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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